第2章 The historical backgrounds and political context of Thailand’s March, 2019 election by Thongchai Winichakul
第2章 The historical backgrounds and political
context of Thailand’s March, 2019 election
著者 Thongchai Winichakul
権利 Copyrights 日本貿易振興機構（ジェトロ）アジア
経済研究所 / Institute of Developing
Economies, Japan External Trade Organization
(IDE-JETRO) http://www.ide.go.jp
シリーズタイトル 情勢分析レポート 
シリーズ番号 32
雑誌名 タイ2019年総選挙 : 軍事政権の統括と新政権の展
望
ページ 45-58
発行年 2020
章番号 第2章
出版者 日本貿易振興機構アジア経済研究所
URL http://hdl.handle.net/2344/00051661
45
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????
second printing (The original document was written in 1903).
Ferrara, Federico 2015. The Political Development of Modern Thailand. Combridge: Cambridge 
University Press.
Handley, Paul?2006. The King Never Smiles: a Biography of Thailand’s King Bhumibol Adulyadej. 
New Haven: Yale University Press.
McCargo, Duncan 2005. “Network Monarchy and Legitimacy Crises in Thailand,” Pacific Review, 
18(4): 499-519.
Mérieau, Eugénie 2016. “Thailand’s Deep State, Royal Power and the Constitutional Court 
(1997-2015),” Journal of Contemporary Asia, 46(3): 445-466
??? 2019. “How Thailand Became the World’s Last Military Dictatorship,” The Atlantic, Mar 20; 
https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/ 2019/03/thailand-military-junta- 
election-king/585274 (accessed online Aug 30, 2019).
Nattapoll Chaiching 2013. Kho fanfai nai fan an-lueachuea [To dream the impossible dream]. 
Nonthaburi: Same Sky Books.
Nelson, Michael 2019. “Thailand’s Flawed 2019 Eection Confirms the Country’s Deep Political 
Divide” on Academic.edu , 21 pp. https://www.academia.edu/38933076/Thailands_Flawed_ 
2019_Election_Confirms_the_Countrys_Deep_Political_Divide_draft (accessed Aug 30, 
2019).
Prajak Kongkirati 2016, “Thailand’s Failed 2014 Election: The Anti-Election Movement, Violence 
and Democratic Breakdown” Journal of Contemporary Asia, 46(3): 467-485.
Somchai Phattharathananunth 2016. “Rural Transformations and Democracy in Northeast 
Thailand,” Journal of Contemporary Asia, 46(3): 504-519.
Thak Chaloemtiarana 2006. Thailand: The Politics of Despotic Paternalism, revised Edition. Ithaca, 
NY: Cornell Southeast Asia Program Publications.
Thongchai Winichakul 2008. “Toppling Democracy.” Journal of Contemporary Asia 38(1): 11-37.
??? 2014. “Monarchy and Anti-Monarchy: Two Elephants in the Room and the State of Denial in 
Thailand.” In Good Coup Gone Bad: Thailand's Political Developments since Thaksin's 
Downfall, edited by Pavin Chachavalpongpun. Singapore: ISEAS Yusuf Ishak Institute.
??? 2016. “Thailand’s Hyper-Royalism: Its Past Success and Present Predicament,” Trends in 
Southeast Asia, no.7, Singapore: ISEAS Yusuf Ishak Institute.
??? 2019. “Thailand’s Royal Democracy in Crisis” In After the Coup: The National Council for 
Peace and Order Era and the Future of Thailand, edited by Michael J. Montesano, Terence 
Chong and Mark Heng, Singapore: ISEAS Yusof Ishak Institute.
Veerayooth Kanchoochat and Prajak Kongkirati 2018. “The Prayuth Regime: Embedded Military 
and Hierarchical Capitalism in Thailand” , TRaNS: Trans-Regional and -National Studies of 
Thailand’s socioeconomic and demographic structure that had occurred since the late 
1980s, in which dramatic rural transformation occurred alongside the rapid expansion 
of urbanization. Rural folks became urban dwellers in their ways of life, mentality, 
material interests, and anxieties (Somchai 2016).  The entire political landscape had 
changed because of this changing democracy (Apichat, Yukti and Niti 2013).  The 
centralized bureaucracy, however, cared more for and served the interests of the 
growing affluent middleclass in major cities, especially Bangkok. In short, Thaksin’s 
success was primarily not of his own making. He and his party responded to the 
structural changes, maximizing the opportunity for their political ascendency. 
The 2006 coup awakened Thaksin’s suppor ters throughout the country to 
understanding the politics of the monarchists. Discontent with the monarchists and 
the demand for popular democracy, therefore, remained strong, if not stronger and 
more determined (Thongchai 2014, 92-100).  Meanwhile, with committed support 
from the palace, the military’s political power expanded rapidly, like the demon that 
was released from the lamp and could not be put back. Thailand’s political crisis was 
protracted. 
Although the monarchy remained supreme throughout the crisis, its political power 
relied increasingly on the military, which was subservient to King Bhumibol. Popular 
democracy, on the other hand, could not be denied as every sector of the population 
and society wanted to have their voices heard and some power in the government. 
Democracy was also hard to resist  if Thailand were to attain recognition in the global 
community, especially in terms of economic and trade relations. 
In other words, the ongoing political crisis since 2006 to the present has been a 
contention between the traditional power elite (the alliance between the monarchy and 
military) on the one hand and the demand of popular sovereignty on the other.
A key factor to the crisis was the deteriorating health of King Bhumibol since the 
mid-2000s. Given his unparalleled moral authority, he had been the lynchpin of royal 
democracy. The royal succession—a supposedly nonpolitical matter in a typical 
constitution monarchy like the United Kingdom and Japan—became a matter of huge 
political consequence to royal democracy. The 2014 coup was another attempt to 
secure royal democracy in the final years of King Bhumibol. 
3. The Junta Regime since the 2014 Coup
The regime of the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) or the junta 
regime after the 2014 coup was one of the fiercest and most powerful military rules in 
Thai history. Its repressive measures were swift, effective, uncompromising, and even 
brutal at times in order to disrupt or decisively eliminate all political activities for 
democracy and protest against its rule. For a few years since the coup, especially in 
the immediate months after, a large number of people throughout the country were 
summoned or temporarily detained euphemistically for “attitude adjustment.” Many 
were charged, jailed, or mired in legal problems. Freedom of expression was severely 
limited, the lese majeste law was strictly enforced, and quite a number of ordinary 
people were penalized3).  Despite the protests, condemnations and sanctions of 
various degrees from the international community, the alliance of the military and the 
monarchists was able to secure their power. As King Bhumibol passed away in 
October 2016 and the succession occurred without a glitch, the task of securing the 
royal transition was accomplished.
The NCPO rule was not smooth, although popular dissatisfaction and opposition 
never amounted to a threat against it. In particular, in the early years after the coup, it 
faced serious pressures from the international community, particularly the European 
Union and the United States, which called for the return to democracy. However, 
these pressures did not bear any results for the military regime was able to turn to 
China for support in various ways. The pressure also fizzled out as the EU and the US 
did not want to push Thailand into China’s embrace (Zawacki 2017).  
Actually, the junta regime under General Prayuth Chan-ocha since 2014 has done 
much more than securing the royalist dominance and the regnal t ransit ion. 
Veerayooth Kanchoochat and Prajak Kongkirati characterized the agenda of the 
current junta regime as “embedded military and hierarchical capitalism.” They 
summarize what the regime has done succinctly:
Politically, we indicate how the junta has embedded its power in ways different 
from the past. It does not pursue a power-sharing governance … but tries to 
militarize the cabinet, parliament, and even state-owned enterprises. The new 
constitution is designed to institutionalize the power of the military and the 
traditional elite vis-à-vis the electoral forces. … Economically, the Prayuth 
regime forms a partnership with a group of Sino-Thai conglomerates to establish 
the [scheme that] … has become a platform through which the giant f irms 
perform the leading role of ‘Big Brother’ in supervising small businesses in their 
sectors, [ref lecting] the collective endeavors of the conglomerates to replace 
competitive markets with hierarchy, rather than encouraging local firms to 
catch-up with them (Veerayooth and Prajak 2018, 279).
 
This economic strategy resulted in the growth of the top conglomerates but a 
weakening economy overall. Economic disparity accelerated during the NCPO 
regime. 
After several delays, including the rejection of one constitution draft that had taken 
a year to complete, finally, the NCPO introduced a new constitution in 2017 and 
related laws in the following year in preparation for the return to the parliamentary 
system and new elections. According to the 2017 constitution and the related laws 
(elaborated below), however, it is obvious that the junta had been trying to remain in 
power even after the election and the alleged return to democracy. As Michael 
Nelson, a keen observer of Thai politics, has put it: 
… the end of the [NCPO’s] direct rule did not mean a return to ‘democracy.’ 
Rather, it would usher in what they called a ‘transition period’ of at least five 
years. Only afterwards, people could start thinking about moving towards a 
greater degree of democracy (Nelson 2019, 3-4). 
4. The Beginning of King Rama X
 
In theory, in Thailand and elsewhere, a constitutional monarchy is above politics. In 
reality, many scholars and observers have made it clear the Thai monarchy has played 
a crucial and sometimes active role in politics (Handley 2006; Thongchai 2019).  As 
described earlier in this article, the political crisis since 2006 has been related to the 
monarchy indirectly and directly and implicitly as well as explicitly. Royal democracy 
implies the presence of the monarchy in name as well as in action. In the last twenty 
years of Bhumibol’s reign, the stature of the king grew tremendously in tandem with 
his ever increasing significance as a pillar to Thailand’s royal democracy.
The passing of Bhumibol created political anxieties that should not have been the 
case had the monarchy been truly uninvolved in politics. The anxieties related to the 
future of royal democracy and the political domination of the monarchists since the 
cult of a charismatic and beloved king was a pillar of the successful royal democracy 
(Thongchai 2019, 287-290, 301-303).  Without this kind of cult, the dominance of the 
monarchy could be in trouble. Such a cult, however, relies on the accomplishment and 
charisma of the reigning monarch. 
Since the monarchy is an institution of one person (plus his followers and networks 
who often act in his name), his personal character and attributes, words, actions and 
inactions, and even rumors about him, could affect and shape the king’s aura. 
Currently, the shadow of Bhumibol’s cult remains beneficial to the new king. Sooner 
or later, the shadow will fade away, and King Rama X will be responsible for his own 
reputation.
The first few years of Rama X have been another cause for concern. The new king 
has been active in recreating the monarchy in his vision. He reorganized and 
expanded the Office of the Royal Household in 20174).  A few old buildings in the 
palace compound were demolished, and several new ones were constructed. Huge 
areas of former crown estate that had been turned into public space for decades, 
including military bases, government offices, roads, and Bangkok’s only public zoo, 
were reclaimed by the palace5).  All crown properties, including all the assets of the 
Thai monarchy over generations, have been declared the personal property of the new 
king6).  All properties are exempt from tax. These changes were executed legally. 
Several royal customs that had ended with the absolute monarchy have been revived, 
including the official, legal appointment of the royal consort7).  What these actions tell 
us and the political community in Thailand about the king and his probable role in 
politics remains a matter of speculation. 
Nevertheless, this was one of the conditions in which the general election was held 
on March 24, 2019.
5. The March 24, 2019 Election
As mentioned above, the election may not mean the return to democracy as the 
junta, apparently, attempt to hold on to power in a different form than military rule. 
They have done so using several legal instruments. 
First, due to several restrictions and mandates in the election law, the result of the 
general election would likely produce no majority party. Thus, a weak and possibly 
fragmented coalition government is the likely outcome. 
Second, the constitution also allows a nonelected person be chosen as the prime 
minister. Given the fragmented coalition, it was expected long before the election that 
General Prayuth Chan-ocha, the head of the NPCO, would likely be chosen. 
Third, the upper house (the Senate) of the new parliament comprises of 250 
members, all of whom are all selected by the NCPO, with the majority being military 
officers. They are chosen without any election or broad-based selection criteria. 
Fourth, together with the 500 elected members of the lower house, these senators 
will take part in the selection of the prime minister. In addition, the senators serve a 
five-year term. Assuming a government lasts a full four-year term, these senators can 
choose two prime ministers.
Last but not least, the 2017 constitution mandates that every government must 
observe the “national strategic plan.” Drafted by the NPCO-appointed committee and 
approved before the election by the NPCO-appointed national assembly, the plan is 
the framework that all policies and projects by any elected government in the next 
twenty years must follow. Violations to the strategic framework could result in the 
disqualification of the government.
The March 24 election took place under these restrictions. Despite that, political 
parties and the public enthusiastically welcomed the election, as it could represent a 
fresh change of condition without severe limits to political freedom and freedom of 
expression. Many may have hoped that it would be the end of the downward spiral of 
popular democracy or the beginning of the end of the actual power of the NPCO. 
It remains to be seen if it would be the beginning of another attempt at popular 
democracy or if it is indeed the renewal of the authoritarian rule under a different 
cloak.
The election may help understand not only the future of popular democracy but also 
serve as a lens to examine the relationship between the military and the new king. 
The monarchists knew that they should not rely too heavily on the military. During 
the latter half of the reign of King Bhumbol, the military became monarchized, the 
“soldiers of the king.” The election may provide some hints about their power 
relations under the new king. The February 8, 2019 incident was significant in this 
regard as well. 
A few days earlier, the king’s elder sister, who had resigned from royalty decades 
ago to marry a foreigner, was nominated by a political party to be the candidate for 
the next prime minister. This was certainly a challenge to the NPCO’s plan for 
General Prayuth to remain the prime minister. After a few days of political 
maneuvers, on February 8, 2019, the king intervened, issuing a public statement, 
forbidding his sister from submitting herself as a candidate. The statement did not 
refer to any legal prohibition, since his sister is an ordinary citizen, legally speaking, 
and nobody counter-signed the statement8).  Regardless of these legal quandaries, as 
this happened in Thailand, the king’s statement was accepted as the final word by 
everyone. What did this incident tell us about the relationship between the palace and 
the NPCO? Unfortunately, information about the event remains inadequate for 
speculation. 
Conclusion
Even as the monarchists distrust popular sovereignty and the representative system, 
they also need “people” or popular support to bargain with the military. Meanwhile, 
the rapid ascendency of their power, especially their embeddedness in the state and 
society, suggests that the military have a vision for their eventual supremacy. They 
are here to stay for the long term, not merely as a caretaker for royal democracy and 
definitely not to return to barracks after the election. After all, they are the only 
political force with weapons, and a coup in Thailand is a relatively low-risk action 
(Mérieau 2019). 
Despite the initial popular support for the coup for the sake of peaceful and orderly 
society, people’s dissention to military authoritarianism is growing, especially in the 
past year as the economy has grown sluggish and the ruling junta has become 
shamelessly out of touch in many respects. Ordinary people, however, have no agency 
currently, other than political parties and politicians, who do not always represent 
their voice and interests. 
The political status quo under King Bhumibol meant the settlement of power 
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Introduction
Even before the recent election in Thailand on March 24, 2019, Thai people and 
foreign observers alike wondered if this was simply another election in the repeated 
cycle of coups, military rule, new constitutions, and elections that end with the failure 
of democracy and the beginning of another coup. Was it another farce in Thailand’s 
political history? 
This seemingly repeating cycle of political history is a superficial observation of an 
apparent phenomenon. In fact, many elections, democratic breakthroughs, 
constitutions, and even coups and military rules, and constitutions in the past were 
meaningful in various ways in par ticular moments relating to the history of 
democratization in Thailand.
Thailand’s election on March 24, 2019 was a historic one in many respects. It was 
the first general election after almost five years of an authoritarian regime under 
military rule. It was either the beginning of another attempt at democracy or the 
renewal of the authoritarian rule under a different cloak. Perhaps it was both at the 
same time, as different political agents have attempted to push different agendas for 
the county’s future. It was also the first election and first major political event in the 
new reign of King Vajiralongkorn or Rama X.
This essay will provide the historical background and context to help understand 
the March 24, 2019 election. It looks at the election through the perspective of the 
long history of democratization in the country and within the context of Thailand’s 
ongoing political crisis since 2006 that eventually led to the 2014 coup. Then, the 
essay examines the two most important contextual factors surrounding the election; 
namely, the military regime under which the election was held and the royal 
succession and early years of King Rama X’s reign.
1. A Brief History of Democratization in Thailand
We may say summarily that the democratization process in Thailand has been a 
contest of power among three main political forces; namely, the military, the 
monarchists, and ordinary people for military rule, royalist rule, and popular 
sovereignty, respectively. Never theless, af ter nearly one hundred years of 
democratization, no single faction has achieved outright domination or sustained its 
desired regime; instead, they have had to settle for compromise or alliance with other 
forces. 
The concept of “democracy” was introduced to Siam, the former name of Thailand 
before 1939, around the turn of the twentieth century. At the time, it was simply 
dismissed by the elite of the absolute monarchy as an unsuitable idea for a country 
where people were mostly uneducated and unable to represent themselves and were 
thus content with rule by monarchy1).  Whereas the modern state and government 
were introduced by the absolute monarchy since the late nineteenth century as a 
consolidated and more efficient form of rule, the royals kept power to themselves, 
believing that only they could rule the country properly, including granting a 
democratic government from the top down at the appropriate time (Batson 1974).  
They did not realize the growing dissatisfaction with royal rule that eventually 
toppled the absolute monarchy in 1932. 
?????????
The revolutionaries—called the People’s Party—represented the rising power 
among the commoners, especially in the military, which was one of the most 
organized and developed institutions in Thai society at the time. However, the 
revolution was an “unfinished” transition (Ferrara 2015).  The monarchists kept 
t rying to return to power, not to revive the absolute monarchy, but to a new 
supremacy i n  t he  new pa rl iament a r y reg i me.  A n a l l iance be t ween t he  
nonrevolutionary army officers and the monarchists toppled the last government of 
the People’s Party in 1947 (Handley 2006, 80-89).  Then, the long period of military 
rule began.
The rocky alliance and the infighting among military factions eventually resulted 
in military rule in 1957 that groomed the young King Bhumibol (Rama IX, born 
1930; reigned 1946 and lived mostly abroad until 1951) for politics (Thak 2006, 
chapter 3).  Thanks to the Cold War, the United States joined the junta in promoting 
the monarchy as an instrument against communism (Nattapoll 2013, chapter 8).  The 
monarchy, the young Bhumibol in particular, grew in stature and popularity, as he 
worked hard to cultivate the people’s utmost loyalty. Ostensibly, the monarchy was 
“above” politics. The harder he worked beyond politics, the more his enormous moral 
authority increased politically. 
Military rule began to retreat thanks to the popular uprising for democracy in 1973. 
The monarchy took the opportunity to broker the end of violence by forcing the junta 
into exile. In doing so, the nonpolitical institution ascended to the highest authority in 
the land (albeit not a legal-political power but a moral one) and the supreme source of 
political legitimacy. Between 1973 and 1992, the tug-of-political-war and shifting 
alliances among the three political forces, including several coups, attempted coups, 
one massacre that was the most horrific in Thai history in 1976, and another uprising 
for democracy in 1992, resulted in the retreat of the military from politics, “back to 
the barracks” so to speak, and the triumph of royalist democracy (Thongchai 2008, 
15-21).  
Ostensibly, the royalist democracy in Thailand f rom 1992 to 2006 was a 
parliamentary democracy. Actually, however, it was a form of “guided democracy.” 
The elected authority was under the influence, supervision, and interference of the 
monarchists, who operated from the palace and beyond through formal mechanisms, 
such as the Privy Council, and informal networks (McCargo 2005; Thongchai 2019, 
290-300).  Every government during the time presented themselves as the government 
of the king (Chambers and Napisa 2017, chapter 1).  Furthermore, the military’s 
political and material interests were also increasingly attached to the monarchy. They 
became the “monarchized military” or “soldiers of the king.” 
The unprecedented popularity of Thaksin Shinawatra, who won landslide elections 
twice in 2001 and 2004, however, signaled the growing independence of popular 
sovereignty from the traditional ruling institutions, such as the monarchy and the 
military. Particularly in rural areas and in provinces distant from Bangkok, people 
found that the elected authority responded to their demands and interests better than 
the highly centralized and cumbersome bureaucracy. This made the elected 
authority—politicians—a threat to royalist democracy. 
2. Thailand’s Unstable Politics and the Crisis since 2006
The coup in 2006 was an attempt by the monarchists to secure their political 
dominance by curbing the growing demand for popular democracy. The monarchists 
did so by damaging all the necessary democratic institutions and components; 
namely, political parties, freedom of expression, especially the credibility and 
independence of the judiciary rule of law, and the election2).  They also brought the 
military back into politics. The discourse regarding corrupt politics was overblown, 
represented by the demonization of Thaksin. The demagoguery of Thaksin became 
the specter of royal democracy. Ultimately, only in Thailand was democracy 
considered worse than dictatorship.
The brief military rule after the 2006 coup, however, failed to stabilize the royalist 
dominance because the root of conf lict was not merely Thaksin versus the 
monarchists. Underneath the apparent political conflict was a structural change in 
relations among the three main political force with the dominance of the monarchists. 
In this macropolitical perspective, the March 24, 2019 election was the first important 
political action in the absence of the lynchpin of monarchist dominance but with the 
most powerful military since 1992. It was the first major attempt to construct the new 
power relations or the new status quo among the three forces. The election may reveal 
the shifting balance of power and may foretell possible future scenarios. 
The NCPO came to power claiming that the political and social divides had reached 
a dangerous point because of the failure of democracy and politicians. They claimed 
that Thailand urgently needed reforms of politics and many other aspects of the state 
and society. After five years of its rule, it is doubtful that the election was better 
prepared and the outcome was better or reformed Thailand politics. It is highly 
doubtful if the divides have been less acute. Some have argued that the NCPO rule 
probably made the divides more severe. The March 2019 election may ref lect the 
failure of the NCPO in this regard as well. 
However one wonders was it the failure of reform its actual success that the junta 
bore in mind when retaining power.
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Thailand’s socioeconomic and demographic structure that had occurred since the late 
1980s, in which dramatic rural transformation occurred alongside the rapid expansion 
of urbanization. Rural folks became urban dwellers in their ways of life, mentality, 
material interests, and anxieties (Somchai 2016).  The entire political landscape had 
changed because of this changing democracy (Apichat, Yukti and Niti 2013).  The 
centralized bureaucracy, however, cared more for and served the interests of the 
growing affluent middleclass in major cities, especially Bangkok. In short, Thaksin’s 
success was primarily not of his own making. He and his party responded to the 
structural changes, maximizing the opportunity for their political ascendency. 
The 2006 coup awakened Thaksin’s suppor ters throughout the country to 
understanding the politics of the monarchists. Discontent with the monarchists and 
the demand for popular democracy, therefore, remained strong, if not stronger and 
more determined (Thongchai 2014, 92-100).  Meanwhile, with committed support 
from the palace, the military’s political power expanded rapidly, like the demon that 
was released from the lamp and could not be put back. Thailand’s political crisis was 
protracted. 
Although the monarchy remained supreme throughout the crisis, its political power 
relied increasingly on the military, which was subservient to King Bhumibol. Popular 
democracy, on the other hand, could not be denied as every sector of the population 
and society wanted to have their voices heard and some power in the government. 
Democracy was also hard to resist  if Thailand were to attain recognition in the global 
community, especially in terms of economic and trade relations. 
In other words, the ongoing political crisis since 2006 to the present has been a 
contention between the traditional power elite (the alliance between the monarchy and 
military) on the one hand and the demand of popular sovereignty on the other.
A key factor to the crisis was the deteriorating health of King Bhumibol since the 
mid-2000s. Given his unparalleled moral authority, he had been the lynchpin of royal 
democracy. The royal succession—a supposedly nonpolitical matter in a typical 
constitution monarchy like the United Kingdom and Japan—became a matter of huge 
political consequence to royal democracy. The 2014 coup was another attempt to 
secure royal democracy in the final years of King Bhumibol. 
3. The Junta Regime since the 2014 Coup
The regime of the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) or the junta 
regime after the 2014 coup was one of the fiercest and most powerful military rules in 
Thai history. Its repressive measures were swift, effective, uncompromising, and even 
brutal at times in order to disrupt or decisively eliminate all political activities for 
democracy and protest against its rule. For a few years since the coup, especially in 
the immediate months after, a large number of people throughout the country were 
summoned or temporarily detained euphemistically for “attitude adjustment.” Many 
were charged, jailed, or mired in legal problems. Freedom of expression was severely 
limited, the lese majeste law was strictly enforced, and quite a number of ordinary 
people were penalized3).  Despite the protests, condemnations and sanctions of 
various degrees from the international community, the alliance of the military and the 
monarchists was able to secure their power. As King Bhumibol passed away in 
October 2016 and the succession occurred without a glitch, the task of securing the 
royal transition was accomplished.
The NCPO rule was not smooth, although popular dissatisfaction and opposition 
never amounted to a threat against it. In particular, in the early years after the coup, it 
faced serious pressures from the international community, particularly the European 
Union and the United States, which called for the return to democracy. However, 
these pressures did not bear any results for the military regime was able to turn to 
China for support in various ways. The pressure also fizzled out as the EU and the US 
did not want to push Thailand into China’s embrace (Zawacki 2017).  
Actually, the junta regime under General Prayuth Chan-ocha since 2014 has done 
much more than securing the royalist dominance and the regnal t ransit ion. 
Veerayooth Kanchoochat and Prajak Kongkirati characterized the agenda of the 
current junta regime as “embedded military and hierarchical capitalism.” They 
summarize what the regime has done succinctly:
Politically, we indicate how the junta has embedded its power in ways different 
from the past. It does not pursue a power-sharing governance … but tries to 
militarize the cabinet, parliament, and even state-owned enterprises. The new 
constitution is designed to institutionalize the power of the military and the 
traditional elite vis-à-vis the electoral forces. … Economically, the Prayuth 
regime forms a partnership with a group of Sino-Thai conglomerates to establish 
the [scheme that] … has become a platform through which the giant f irms 
perform the leading role of ‘Big Brother’ in supervising small businesses in their 
sectors, [ref lecting] the collective endeavors of the conglomerates to replace 
competitive markets with hierarchy, rather than encouraging local firms to 
catch-up with them (Veerayooth and Prajak 2018, 279).
 
This economic strategy resulted in the growth of the top conglomerates but a 
weakening economy overall. Economic disparity accelerated during the NCPO 
regime. 
After several delays, including the rejection of one constitution draft that had taken 
a year to complete, finally, the NCPO introduced a new constitution in 2017 and 
related laws in the following year in preparation for the return to the parliamentary 
system and new elections. According to the 2017 constitution and the related laws 
(elaborated below), however, it is obvious that the junta had been trying to remain in 
power even after the election and the alleged return to democracy. As Michael 
Nelson, a keen observer of Thai politics, has put it: 
… the end of the [NCPO’s] direct rule did not mean a return to ‘democracy.’ 
Rather, it would usher in what they called a ‘transition period’ of at least five 
years. Only afterwards, people could start thinking about moving towards a 
greater degree of democracy (Nelson 2019, 3-4). 
4. The Beginning of King Rama X
 
In theory, in Thailand and elsewhere, a constitutional monarchy is above politics. In 
reality, many scholars and observers have made it clear the Thai monarchy has played 
a crucial and sometimes active role in politics (Handley 2006; Thongchai 2019).  As 
described earlier in this article, the political crisis since 2006 has been related to the 
monarchy indirectly and directly and implicitly as well as explicitly. Royal democracy 
implies the presence of the monarchy in name as well as in action. In the last twenty 
years of Bhumibol’s reign, the stature of the king grew tremendously in tandem with 
his ever increasing significance as a pillar to Thailand’s royal democracy.
The passing of Bhumibol created political anxieties that should not have been the 
case had the monarchy been truly uninvolved in politics. The anxieties related to the 
future of royal democracy and the political domination of the monarchists since the 
cult of a charismatic and beloved king was a pillar of the successful royal democracy 
(Thongchai 2019, 287-290, 301-303).  Without this kind of cult, the dominance of the 
monarchy could be in trouble. Such a cult, however, relies on the accomplishment and 
charisma of the reigning monarch. 
Since the monarchy is an institution of one person (plus his followers and networks 
who often act in his name), his personal character and attributes, words, actions and 
inactions, and even rumors about him, could affect and shape the king’s aura. 
Currently, the shadow of Bhumibol’s cult remains beneficial to the new king. Sooner 
or later, the shadow will fade away, and King Rama X will be responsible for his own 
reputation.
The first few years of Rama X have been another cause for concern. The new king 
has been active in recreating the monarchy in his vision. He reorganized and 
expanded the Office of the Royal Household in 20174).  A few old buildings in the 
palace compound were demolished, and several new ones were constructed. Huge 
areas of former crown estate that had been turned into public space for decades, 
including military bases, government offices, roads, and Bangkok’s only public zoo, 
were reclaimed by the palace5).  All crown properties, including all the assets of the 
Thai monarchy over generations, have been declared the personal property of the new 
king6).  All properties are exempt from tax. These changes were executed legally. 
Several royal customs that had ended with the absolute monarchy have been revived, 
including the official, legal appointment of the royal consort7).  What these actions tell 
us and the political community in Thailand about the king and his probable role in 
politics remains a matter of speculation. 
Nevertheless, this was one of the conditions in which the general election was held 
on March 24, 2019.
5. The March 24, 2019 Election
As mentioned above, the election may not mean the return to democracy as the 
junta, apparently, attempt to hold on to power in a different form than military rule. 
They have done so using several legal instruments. 
First, due to several restrictions and mandates in the election law, the result of the 
general election would likely produce no majority party. Thus, a weak and possibly 
fragmented coalition government is the likely outcome. 
Second, the constitution also allows a nonelected person be chosen as the prime 
minister. Given the fragmented coalition, it was expected long before the election that 
General Prayuth Chan-ocha, the head of the NPCO, would likely be chosen. 
Third, the upper house (the Senate) of the new parliament comprises of 250 
members, all of whom are all selected by the NCPO, with the majority being military 
officers. They are chosen without any election or broad-based selection criteria. 
Fourth, together with the 500 elected members of the lower house, these senators 
will take part in the selection of the prime minister. In addition, the senators serve a 
five-year term. Assuming a government lasts a full four-year term, these senators can 
choose two prime ministers.
Last but not least, the 2017 constitution mandates that every government must 
observe the “national strategic plan.” Drafted by the NPCO-appointed committee and 
approved before the election by the NPCO-appointed national assembly, the plan is 
the framework that all policies and projects by any elected government in the next 
twenty years must follow. Violations to the strategic framework could result in the 
disqualification of the government.
The March 24 election took place under these restrictions. Despite that, political 
parties and the public enthusiastically welcomed the election, as it could represent a 
fresh change of condition without severe limits to political freedom and freedom of 
expression. Many may have hoped that it would be the end of the downward spiral of 
popular democracy or the beginning of the end of the actual power of the NPCO. 
It remains to be seen if it would be the beginning of another attempt at popular 
democracy or if it is indeed the renewal of the authoritarian rule under a different 
cloak.
The election may help understand not only the future of popular democracy but also 
serve as a lens to examine the relationship between the military and the new king. 
The monarchists knew that they should not rely too heavily on the military. During 
the latter half of the reign of King Bhumbol, the military became monarchized, the 
“soldiers of the king.” The election may provide some hints about their power 
relations under the new king. The February 8, 2019 incident was significant in this 
regard as well. 
A few days earlier, the king’s elder sister, who had resigned from royalty decades 
ago to marry a foreigner, was nominated by a political party to be the candidate for 
the next prime minister. This was certainly a challenge to the NPCO’s plan for 
General Prayuth to remain the prime minister. After a few days of political 
maneuvers, on February 8, 2019, the king intervened, issuing a public statement, 
forbidding his sister from submitting herself as a candidate. The statement did not 
refer to any legal prohibition, since his sister is an ordinary citizen, legally speaking, 
and nobody counter-signed the statement8).  Regardless of these legal quandaries, as 
this happened in Thailand, the king’s statement was accepted as the final word by 
everyone. What did this incident tell us about the relationship between the palace and 
the NPCO? Unfortunately, information about the event remains inadequate for 
speculation. 
Conclusion
Even as the monarchists distrust popular sovereignty and the representative system, 
they also need “people” or popular support to bargain with the military. Meanwhile, 
the rapid ascendency of their power, especially their embeddedness in the state and 
society, suggests that the military have a vision for their eventual supremacy. They 
are here to stay for the long term, not merely as a caretaker for royal democracy and 
definitely not to return to barracks after the election. After all, they are the only 
political force with weapons, and a coup in Thailand is a relatively low-risk action 
(Mérieau 2019). 
Despite the initial popular support for the coup for the sake of peaceful and orderly 
society, people’s dissention to military authoritarianism is growing, especially in the 
past year as the economy has grown sluggish and the ruling junta has become 
shamelessly out of touch in many respects. Ordinary people, however, have no agency 
currently, other than political parties and politicians, who do not always represent 
their voice and interests. 
The political status quo under King Bhumibol meant the settlement of power 
Introduction
Even before the recent election in Thailand on March 24, 2019, Thai people and 
foreign observers alike wondered if this was simply another election in the repeated 
cycle of coups, military rule, new constitutions, and elections that end with the failure 
of democracy and the beginning of another coup. Was it another farce in Thailand’s 
political history? 
This seemingly repeating cycle of political history is a superficial observation of an 
apparent phenomenon. In fact, many elections, democratic breakthroughs, 
constitutions, and even coups and military rules, and constitutions in the past were 
meaningful in various ways in par ticular moments relating to the history of 
democratization in Thailand.
Thailand’s election on March 24, 2019 was a historic one in many respects. It was 
the first general election after almost five years of an authoritarian regime under 
military rule. It was either the beginning of another attempt at democracy or the 
renewal of the authoritarian rule under a different cloak. Perhaps it was both at the 
same time, as different political agents have attempted to push different agendas for 
the county’s future. It was also the first election and first major political event in the 
new reign of King Vajiralongkorn or Rama X.
This essay will provide the historical background and context to help understand 
the March 24, 2019 election. It looks at the election through the perspective of the 
long history of democratization in the country and within the context of Thailand’s 
ongoing political crisis since 2006 that eventually led to the 2014 coup. Then, the 
essay examines the two most important contextual factors surrounding the election; 
namely, the military regime under which the election was held and the royal 
succession and early years of King Rama X’s reign.
1. A Brief History of Democratization in Thailand
We may say summarily that the democratization process in Thailand has been a 
contest of power among three main political forces; namely, the military, the 
monarchists, and ordinary people for military rule, royalist rule, and popular 
sovereignty, respectively. Never theless, af ter nearly one hundred years of 
democratization, no single faction has achieved outright domination or sustained its 
desired regime; instead, they have had to settle for compromise or alliance with other 
forces. 
The concept of “democracy” was introduced to Siam, the former name of Thailand 
before 1939, around the turn of the twentieth century. At the time, it was simply 
dismissed by the elite of the absolute monarchy as an unsuitable idea for a country 
where people were mostly uneducated and unable to represent themselves and were 
thus content with rule by monarchy1).  Whereas the modern state and government 
were introduced by the absolute monarchy since the late nineteenth century as a 
consolidated and more efficient form of rule, the royals kept power to themselves, 
believing that only they could rule the country properly, including granting a 
democratic government from the top down at the appropriate time (Batson 1974).  
They did not realize the growing dissatisfaction with royal rule that eventually 
toppled the absolute monarchy in 1932. 
The revolutionaries—called the People’s Party—represented the rising power 
among the commoners, especially in the military, which was one of the most 
organized and developed institutions in Thai society at the time. However, the 
revolution was an “unfinished” transition (Ferrara 2015).  The monarchists kept 
t rying to return to power, not to revive the absolute monarchy, but to a new 
supremacy i n  t he  new pa rl iament a r y reg i me.  A n a l l iance be t ween t he  
nonrevolutionary army officers and the monarchists toppled the last government of 
the People’s Party in 1947 (Handley 2006, 80-89).  Then, the long period of military 
rule began.
The rocky alliance and the infighting among military factions eventually resulted 
in military rule in 1957 that groomed the young King Bhumibol (Rama IX, born 
1930; reigned 1946 and lived mostly abroad until 1951) for politics (Thak 2006, 
chapter 3).  Thanks to the Cold War, the United States joined the junta in promoting 
the monarchy as an instrument against communism (Nattapoll 2013, chapter 8).  The 
monarchy, the young Bhumibol in particular, grew in stature and popularity, as he 
worked hard to cultivate the people’s utmost loyalty. Ostensibly, the monarchy was 
“above” politics. The harder he worked beyond politics, the more his enormous moral 
authority increased politically. 
Military rule began to retreat thanks to the popular uprising for democracy in 1973. 
The monarchy took the opportunity to broker the end of violence by forcing the junta 
into exile. In doing so, the nonpolitical institution ascended to the highest authority in 
the land (albeit not a legal-political power but a moral one) and the supreme source of 
political legitimacy. Between 1973 and 1992, the tug-of-political-war and shifting 
alliances among the three political forces, including several coups, attempted coups, 
one massacre that was the most horrific in Thai history in 1976, and another uprising 
for democracy in 1992, resulted in the retreat of the military from politics, “back to 
the barracks” so to speak, and the triumph of royalist democracy (Thongchai 2008, 
15-21).  
Ostensibly, the royalist democracy in Thailand f rom 1992 to 2006 was a 
parliamentary democracy. Actually, however, it was a form of “guided democracy.” 
The elected authority was under the influence, supervision, and interference of the 
monarchists, who operated from the palace and beyond through formal mechanisms, 
such as the Privy Council, and informal networks (McCargo 2005; Thongchai 2019, 
290-300).  Every government during the time presented themselves as the government 
of the king (Chambers and Napisa 2017, chapter 1).  Furthermore, the military’s 
political and material interests were also increasingly attached to the monarchy. They 
became the “monarchized military” or “soldiers of the king.” 
The unprecedented popularity of Thaksin Shinawatra, who won landslide elections 
twice in 2001 and 2004, however, signaled the growing independence of popular 
sovereignty from the traditional ruling institutions, such as the monarchy and the 
military. Particularly in rural areas and in provinces distant from Bangkok, people 
found that the elected authority responded to their demands and interests better than 
the highly centralized and cumbersome bureaucracy. This made the elected 
authority—politicians—a threat to royalist democracy. 
2. Thailand’s Unstable Politics and the Crisis since 2006
The coup in 2006 was an attempt by the monarchists to secure their political 
dominance by curbing the growing demand for popular democracy. The monarchists 
did so by damaging all the necessary democratic institutions and components; 
namely, political parties, freedom of expression, especially the credibility and 
independence of the judiciary rule of law, and the election2).  They also brought the 
military back into politics. The discourse regarding corrupt politics was overblown, 
represented by the demonization of Thaksin. The demagoguery of Thaksin became 
the specter of royal democracy. Ultimately, only in Thailand was democracy 
considered worse than dictatorship.
The brief military rule after the 2006 coup, however, failed to stabilize the royalist 
dominance because the root of conf lict was not merely Thaksin versus the 
monarchists. Underneath the apparent political conflict was a structural change in 
relations among the three main political force with the dominance of the monarchists. 
In this macropolitical perspective, the March 24, 2019 election was the first important 
political action in the absence of the lynchpin of monarchist dominance but with the 
most powerful military since 1992. It was the first major attempt to construct the new 
power relations or the new status quo among the three forces. The election may reveal 
the shifting balance of power and may foretell possible future scenarios. 
The NCPO came to power claiming that the political and social divides had reached 
a dangerous point because of the failure of democracy and politicians. They claimed 
that Thailand urgently needed reforms of politics and many other aspects of the state 
and society. After five years of its rule, it is doubtful that the election was better 
prepared and the outcome was better or reformed Thailand politics. It is highly 
doubtful if the divides have been less acute. Some have argued that the NCPO rule 
probably made the divides more severe. The March 2019 election may ref lect the 
failure of the NCPO in this regard as well. 
However one wonders was it the failure of reform its actual success that the junta 
bore in mind when retaining power.
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Thailand’s socioeconomic and demographic structure that had occurred since the late 
1980s, in which dramatic rural transformation occurred alongside the rapid expansion 
of urbanization. Rural folks became urban dwellers in their ways of life, mentality, 
material interests, and anxieties (Somchai 2016).  The entire political landscape had 
changed because of this changing democracy (Apichat, Yukti and Niti 2013).  The 
centralized bureaucracy, however, cared more for and served the interests of the 
growing affluent middleclass in major cities, especially Bangkok. In short, Thaksin’s 
success was primarily not of his own making. He and his party responded to the 
structural changes, maximizing the opportunity for their political ascendency. 
The 2006 coup awakened Thaksin’s suppor ters throughout the country to 
understanding the politics of the monarchists. Discontent with the monarchists and 
the demand for popular democracy, therefore, remained strong, if not stronger and 
more determined (Thongchai 2014, 92-100).  Meanwhile, with committed support 
from the palace, the military’s political power expanded rapidly, like the demon that 
was released from the lamp and could not be put back. Thailand’s political crisis was 
protracted. 
Although the monarchy remained supreme throughout the crisis, its political power 
relied increasingly on the military, which was subservient to King Bhumibol. Popular 
democracy, on the other hand, could not be denied as every sector of the population 
and society wanted to have their voices heard and some power in the government. 
Democracy was also hard to resist  if Thailand were to attain recognition in the global 
community, especially in terms of economic and trade relations. 
In other words, the ongoing political crisis since 2006 to the present has been a 
contention between the traditional power elite (the alliance between the monarchy and 
military) on the one hand and the demand of popular sovereignty on the other.
A key factor to the crisis was the deteriorating health of King Bhumibol since the 
mid-2000s. Given his unparalleled moral authority, he had been the lynchpin of royal 
democracy. The royal succession—a supposedly nonpolitical matter in a typical 
constitution monarchy like the United Kingdom and Japan—became a matter of huge 
political consequence to royal democracy. The 2014 coup was another attempt to 
secure royal democracy in the final years of King Bhumibol. 
3. The Junta Regime since the 2014 Coup
The regime of the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) or the junta 
regime after the 2014 coup was one of the fiercest and most powerful military rules in 
Thai history. Its repressive measures were swift, effective, uncompromising, and even 
brutal at times in order to disrupt or decisively eliminate all political activities for 
democracy and protest against its rule. For a few years since the coup, especially in 
the immediate months after, a large number of people throughout the country were 
summoned or temporarily detained euphemistically for “attitude adjustment.” Many 
were charged, jailed, or mired in legal problems. Freedom of expression was severely 
limited, the lese majeste law was strictly enforced, and quite a number of ordinary 
people were penalized3).  Despite the protests, condemnations and sanctions of 
various degrees from the international community, the alliance of the military and the 
monarchists was able to secure their power. As King Bhumibol passed away in 
October 2016 and the succession occurred without a glitch, the task of securing the 
royal transition was accomplished.
The NCPO rule was not smooth, although popular dissatisfaction and opposition 
never amounted to a threat against it. In particular, in the early years after the coup, it 
faced serious pressures from the international community, particularly the European 
Union and the United States, which called for the return to democracy. However, 
these pressures did not bear any results for the military regime was able to turn to 
China for support in various ways. The pressure also fizzled out as the EU and the US 
did not want to push Thailand into China’s embrace (Zawacki 2017).  
Actually, the junta regime under General Prayuth Chan-ocha since 2014 has done 
much more than securing the royalist dominance and the regnal t ransit ion. 
Veerayooth Kanchoochat and Prajak Kongkirati characterized the agenda of the 
current junta regime as “embedded military and hierarchical capitalism.” They 
summarize what the regime has done succinctly:
Politically, we indicate how the junta has embedded its power in ways different 
from the past. It does not pursue a power-sharing governance … but tries to 
militarize the cabinet, parliament, and even state-owned enterprises. The new 
constitution is designed to institutionalize the power of the military and the 
traditional elite vis-à-vis the electoral forces. … Economically, the Prayuth 
regime forms a partnership with a group of Sino-Thai conglomerates to establish 
the [scheme that] … has become a platform through which the giant f irms 
perform the leading role of ‘Big Brother’ in supervising small businesses in their 
sectors, [ref lecting] the collective endeavors of the conglomerates to replace 
competitive markets with hierarchy, rather than encouraging local firms to 
catch-up with them (Veerayooth and Prajak 2018, 279).
 
This economic strategy resulted in the growth of the top conglomerates but a 
weakening economy overall. Economic disparity accelerated during the NCPO 
regime. 
After several delays, including the rejection of one constitution draft that had taken 
a year to complete, finally, the NCPO introduced a new constitution in 2017 and 
related laws in the following year in preparation for the return to the parliamentary 
system and new elections. According to the 2017 constitution and the related laws 
(elaborated below), however, it is obvious that the junta had been trying to remain in 
power even after the election and the alleged return to democracy. As Michael 
Nelson, a keen observer of Thai politics, has put it: 
… the end of the [NCPO’s] direct rule did not mean a return to ‘democracy.’ 
Rather, it would usher in what they called a ‘transition period’ of at least five 
years. Only afterwards, people could start thinking about moving towards a 
greater degree of democracy (Nelson 2019, 3-4). 
4. The Beginning of King Rama X
 
In theory, in Thailand and elsewhere, a constitutional monarchy is above politics. In 
reality, many scholars and observers have made it clear the Thai monarchy has played 
a crucial and sometimes active role in politics (Handley 2006; Thongchai 2019).  As 
described earlier in this article, the political crisis since 2006 has been related to the 
monarchy indirectly and directly and implicitly as well as explicitly. Royal democracy 
implies the presence of the monarchy in name as well as in action. In the last twenty 
years of Bhumibol’s reign, the stature of the king grew tremendously in tandem with 
his ever increasing significance as a pillar to Thailand’s royal democracy.
The passing of Bhumibol created political anxieties that should not have been the 
case had the monarchy been truly uninvolved in politics. The anxieties related to the 
future of royal democracy and the political domination of the monarchists since the 
cult of a charismatic and beloved king was a pillar of the successful royal democracy 
(Thongchai 2019, 287-290, 301-303).  Without this kind of cult, the dominance of the 
monarchy could be in trouble. Such a cult, however, relies on the accomplishment and 
charisma of the reigning monarch. 
Since the monarchy is an institution of one person (plus his followers and networks 
who often act in his name), his personal character and attributes, words, actions and 
inactions, and even rumors about him, could affect and shape the king’s aura. 
Currently, the shadow of Bhumibol’s cult remains beneficial to the new king. Sooner 
or later, the shadow will fade away, and King Rama X will be responsible for his own 
reputation.
The first few years of Rama X have been another cause for concern. The new king 
has been active in recreating the monarchy in his vision. He reorganized and 
expanded the Office of the Royal Household in 20174).  A few old buildings in the 
palace compound were demolished, and several new ones were constructed. Huge 
areas of former crown estate that had been turned into public space for decades, 
including military bases, government offices, roads, and Bangkok’s only public zoo, 
were reclaimed by the palace5).  All crown properties, including all the assets of the 
Thai monarchy over generations, have been declared the personal property of the new 
king6).  All properties are exempt from tax. These changes were executed legally. 
Several royal customs that had ended with the absolute monarchy have been revived, 
including the official, legal appointment of the royal consort7).  What these actions tell 
us and the political community in Thailand about the king and his probable role in 
politics remains a matter of speculation. 
Nevertheless, this was one of the conditions in which the general election was held 
on March 24, 2019.
5. The March 24, 2019 Election
As mentioned above, the election may not mean the return to democracy as the 
junta, apparently, attempt to hold on to power in a different form than military rule. 
They have done so using several legal instruments. 
First, due to several restrictions and mandates in the election law, the result of the 
general election would likely produce no majority party. Thus, a weak and possibly 
fragmented coalition government is the likely outcome. 
Second, the constitution also allows a nonelected person be chosen as the prime 
minister. Given the fragmented coalition, it was expected long before the election that 
General Prayuth Chan-ocha, the head of the NPCO, would likely be chosen. 
Third, the upper house (the Senate) of the new parliament comprises of 250 
members, all of whom are all selected by the NCPO, with the majority being military 
officers. They are chosen without any election or broad-based selection criteria. 
Fourth, together with the 500 elected members of the lower house, these senators 
will take part in the selection of the prime minister. In addition, the senators serve a 
five-year term. Assuming a government lasts a full four-year term, these senators can 
choose two prime ministers.
Last but not least, the 2017 constitution mandates that every government must 
observe the “national strategic plan.” Drafted by the NPCO-appointed committee and 
approved before the election by the NPCO-appointed national assembly, the plan is 
the framework that all policies and projects by any elected government in the next 
twenty years must follow. Violations to the strategic framework could result in the 
disqualification of the government.
The March 24 election took place under these restrictions. Despite that, political 
parties and the public enthusiastically welcomed the election, as it could represent a 
fresh change of condition without severe limits to political freedom and freedom of 
expression. Many may have hoped that it would be the end of the downward spiral of 
popular democracy or the beginning of the end of the actual power of the NPCO. 
It remains to be seen if it would be the beginning of another attempt at popular 
democracy or if it is indeed the renewal of the authoritarian rule under a different 
cloak.
The election may help understand not only the future of popular democracy but also 
serve as a lens to examine the relationship between the military and the new king. 
The monarchists knew that they should not rely too heavily on the military. During 
the latter half of the reign of King Bhumbol, the military became monarchized, the 
“soldiers of the king.” The election may provide some hints about their power 
relations under the new king. The February 8, 2019 incident was significant in this 
regard as well. 
A few days earlier, the king’s elder sister, who had resigned from royalty decades 
ago to marry a foreigner, was nominated by a political party to be the candidate for 
the next prime minister. This was certainly a challenge to the NPCO’s plan for 
General Prayuth to remain the prime minister. After a few days of political 
maneuvers, on February 8, 2019, the king intervened, issuing a public statement, 
forbidding his sister from submitting herself as a candidate. The statement did not 
refer to any legal prohibition, since his sister is an ordinary citizen, legally speaking, 
and nobody counter-signed the statement8).  Regardless of these legal quandaries, as 
this happened in Thailand, the king’s statement was accepted as the final word by 
everyone. What did this incident tell us about the relationship between the palace and 
the NPCO? Unfortunately, information about the event remains inadequate for 
speculation. 
Conclusion
Even as the monarchists distrust popular sovereignty and the representative system, 
they also need “people” or popular support to bargain with the military. Meanwhile, 
the rapid ascendency of their power, especially their embeddedness in the state and 
society, suggests that the military have a vision for their eventual supremacy. They 
are here to stay for the long term, not merely as a caretaker for royal democracy and 
definitely not to return to barracks after the election. After all, they are the only 
political force with weapons, and a coup in Thailand is a relatively low-risk action 
(Mérieau 2019). 
Despite the initial popular support for the coup for the sake of peaceful and orderly 
society, people’s dissention to military authoritarianism is growing, especially in the 
past year as the economy has grown sluggish and the ruling junta has become 
shamelessly out of touch in many respects. Ordinary people, however, have no agency 
currently, other than political parties and politicians, who do not always represent 
their voice and interests. 
The political status quo under King Bhumibol meant the settlement of power 
Introduction
Even before the recent election in Thailand on March 24, 2019, Thai people and 
foreign observers alike wondered if this was simply another election in the repeated 
cycle of coups, military rule, new constitutions, and elections that end with the failure 
of democracy and the beginning of another coup. Was it another farce in Thailand’s 
political history? 
This seemingly repeating cycle of political history is a superficial observation of an 
apparent phenomenon. In fact, many elections, democratic breakthroughs, 
constitutions, and even coups and military rules, and constitutions in the past were 
meaningful in various ways in par ticular moments relating to the history of 
democratization in Thailand.
Thailand’s election on March 24, 2019 was a historic one in many respects. It was 
the first general election after almost five years of an authoritarian regime under 
military rule. It was either the beginning of another attempt at democracy or the 
renewal of the authoritarian rule under a different cloak. Perhaps it was both at the 
same time, as different political agents have attempted to push different agendas for 
the county’s future. It was also the first election and first major political event in the 
new reign of King Vajiralongkorn or Rama X.
This essay will provide the historical background and context to help understand 
the March 24, 2019 election. It looks at the election through the perspective of the 
long history of democratization in the country and within the context of Thailand’s 
ongoing political crisis since 2006 that eventually led to the 2014 coup. Then, the 
essay examines the two most important contextual factors surrounding the election; 
namely, the military regime under which the election was held and the royal 
succession and early years of King Rama X’s reign.
1. A Brief History of Democratization in Thailand
We may say summarily that the democratization process in Thailand has been a 
contest of power among three main political forces; namely, the military, the 
monarchists, and ordinary people for military rule, royalist rule, and popular 
sovereignty, respectively. Never theless, af ter nearly one hundred years of 
democratization, no single faction has achieved outright domination or sustained its 
desired regime; instead, they have had to settle for compromise or alliance with other 
forces. 
The concept of “democracy” was introduced to Siam, the former name of Thailand 
before 1939, around the turn of the twentieth century. At the time, it was simply 
dismissed by the elite of the absolute monarchy as an unsuitable idea for a country 
where people were mostly uneducated and unable to represent themselves and were 
thus content with rule by monarchy1).  Whereas the modern state and government 
were introduced by the absolute monarchy since the late nineteenth century as a 
consolidated and more efficient form of rule, the royals kept power to themselves, 
believing that only they could rule the country properly, including granting a 
democratic government from the top down at the appropriate time (Batson 1974).  
They did not realize the growing dissatisfaction with royal rule that eventually 
toppled the absolute monarchy in 1932. 
The revolutionaries—called the People’s Party—represented the rising power 
among the commoners, especially in the military, which was one of the most 
organized and developed institutions in Thai society at the time. However, the 
revolution was an “unfinished” transition (Ferrara 2015).  The monarchists kept 
t rying to return to power, not to revive the absolute monarchy, but to a new 
supremacy i n  t he  new pa rl iament a r y reg i me.  A n a l l iance be t ween t he  
nonrevolutionary army officers and the monarchists toppled the last government of 
the People’s Party in 1947 (Handley 2006, 80-89).  Then, the long period of military 
rule began.
The rocky alliance and the infighting among military factions eventually resulted 
in military rule in 1957 that groomed the young King Bhumibol (Rama IX, born 
1930; reigned 1946 and lived mostly abroad until 1951) for politics (Thak 2006, 
chapter 3).  Thanks to the Cold War, the United States joined the junta in promoting 
the monarchy as an instrument against communism (Nattapoll 2013, chapter 8).  The 
monarchy, the young Bhumibol in particular, grew in stature and popularity, as he 
worked hard to cultivate the people’s utmost loyalty. Ostensibly, the monarchy was 
“above” politics. The harder he worked beyond politics, the more his enormous moral 
authority increased politically. 
Military rule began to retreat thanks to the popular uprising for democracy in 1973. 
The monarchy took the opportunity to broker the end of violence by forcing the junta 
into exile. In doing so, the nonpolitical institution ascended to the highest authority in 
the land (albeit not a legal-political power but a moral one) and the supreme source of 
political legitimacy. Between 1973 and 1992, the tug-of-political-war and shifting 
alliances among the three political forces, including several coups, attempted coups, 
one massacre that was the most horrific in Thai history in 1976, and another uprising 
for democracy in 1992, resulted in the retreat of the military from politics, “back to 
the barracks” so to speak, and the triumph of royalist democracy (Thongchai 2008, 
15-21).  
Ostensibly, the royalist democracy in Thailand f rom 1992 to 2006 was a 
parliamentary democracy. Actually, however, it was a form of “guided democracy.” 
The elected authority was under the influence, supervision, and interference of the 
monarchists, who operated from the palace and beyond through formal mechanisms, 
such as the Privy Council, and informal networks (McCargo 2005; Thongchai 2019, 
290-300).  Every government during the time presented themselves as the government 
of the king (Chambers and Napisa 2017, chapter 1).  Furthermore, the military’s 
political and material interests were also increasingly attached to the monarchy. They 
became the “monarchized military” or “soldiers of the king.” 
The unprecedented popularity of Thaksin Shinawatra, who won landslide elections 
twice in 2001 and 2004, however, signaled the growing independence of popular 
sovereignty from the traditional ruling institutions, such as the monarchy and the 
military. Particularly in rural areas and in provinces distant from Bangkok, people 
found that the elected authority responded to their demands and interests better than 
the highly centralized and cumbersome bureaucracy. This made the elected 
authority—politicians—a threat to royalist democracy. 
2. Thailand’s Unstable Politics and the Crisis since 2006
The coup in 2006 was an attempt by the monarchists to secure their political 
dominance by curbing the growing demand for popular democracy. The monarchists 
did so by damaging all the necessary democratic institutions and components; 
namely, political parties, freedom of expression, especially the credibility and 
independence of the judiciary rule of law, and the election2).  They also brought the 
military back into politics. The discourse regarding corrupt politics was overblown, 
represented by the demonization of Thaksin. The demagoguery of Thaksin became 
the specter of royal democracy. Ultimately, only in Thailand was democracy 
considered worse than dictatorship.
The brief military rule after the 2006 coup, however, failed to stabilize the royalist 
dominance because the root of conf lict was not merely Thaksin versus the 
monarchists. Underneath the apparent political conflict was a structural change in 
relations among the three main political force with the dominance of the monarchists. 
In this macropolitical perspective, the March 24, 2019 election was the first important 
political action in the absence of the lynchpin of monarchist dominance but with the 
most powerful military since 1992. It was the first major attempt to construct the new 
power relations or the new status quo among the three forces. The election may reveal 
the shifting balance of power and may foretell possible future scenarios. 
The NCPO came to power claiming that the political and social divides had reached 
a dangerous point because of the failure of democracy and politicians. They claimed 
that Thailand urgently needed reforms of politics and many other aspects of the state 
and society. After five years of its rule, it is doubtful that the election was better 
prepared and the outcome was better or reformed Thailand politics. It is highly 
doubtful if the divides have been less acute. Some have argued that the NCPO rule 
probably made the divides more severe. The March 2019 election may ref lect the 
failure of the NCPO in this regard as well. 
However one wonders was it the failure of reform its actual success that the junta 
bore in mind when retaining power.
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Thailand’s socioeconomic and demographic structure that had occurred since the late 
1980s, in which dramatic rural transformation occurred alongside the rapid expansion 
of urbanization. Rural folks became urban dwellers in their ways of life, mentality, 
material interests, and anxieties (Somchai 2016).  The entire political landscape had 
changed because of this changing democracy (Apichat, Yukti and Niti 2013).  The 
centralized bureaucracy, however, cared more for and served the interests of the 
growing affluent middleclass in major cities, especially Bangkok. In short, Thaksin’s 
success was primarily not of his own making. He and his party responded to the 
structural changes, maximizing the opportunity for their political ascendency. 
The 2006 coup awakened Thaksin’s suppor ters throughout the country to 
understanding the politics of the monarchists. Discontent with the monarchists and 
the demand for popular democracy, therefore, remained strong, if not stronger and 
more determined (Thongchai 2014, 92-100).  Meanwhile, with committed support 
from the palace, the military’s political power expanded rapidly, like the demon that 
was released from the lamp and could not be put back. Thailand’s political crisis was 
protracted. 
Although the monarchy remained supreme throughout the crisis, its political power 
relied increasingly on the military, which was subservient to King Bhumibol. Popular 
democracy, on the other hand, could not be denied as every sector of the population 
and society wanted to have their voices heard and some power in the government. 
Democracy was also hard to resist  if Thailand were to attain recognition in the global 
community, especially in terms of economic and trade relations. 
In other words, the ongoing political crisis since 2006 to the present has been a 
contention between the traditional power elite (the alliance between the monarchy and 
military) on the one hand and the demand of popular sovereignty on the other.
A key factor to the crisis was the deteriorating health of King Bhumibol since the 
mid-2000s. Given his unparalleled moral authority, he had been the lynchpin of royal 
democracy. The royal succession—a supposedly nonpolitical matter in a typical 
constitution monarchy like the United Kingdom and Japan—became a matter of huge 
political consequence to royal democracy. The 2014 coup was another attempt to 
secure royal democracy in the final years of King Bhumibol. 
3. The Junta Regime since the 2014 Coup
The regime of the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) or the junta 
regime after the 2014 coup was one of the fiercest and most powerful military rules in 
Thai history. Its repressive measures were swift, effective, uncompromising, and even 
brutal at times in order to disrupt or decisively eliminate all political activities for 
democracy and protest against its rule. For a few years since the coup, especially in 
the immediate months after, a large number of people throughout the country were 
summoned or temporarily detained euphemistically for “attitude adjustment.” Many 
were charged, jailed, or mired in legal problems. Freedom of expression was severely 
limited, the lese majeste law was strictly enforced, and quite a number of ordinary 
people were penalized3).  Despite the protests, condemnations and sanctions of 
various degrees from the international community, the alliance of the military and the 
monarchists was able to secure their power. As King Bhumibol passed away in 
October 2016 and the succession occurred without a glitch, the task of securing the 
royal transition was accomplished.
The NCPO rule was not smooth, although popular dissatisfaction and opposition 
never amounted to a threat against it. In particular, in the early years after the coup, it 
faced serious pressures from the international community, particularly the European 
Union and the United States, which called for the return to democracy. However, 
these pressures did not bear any results for the military regime was able to turn to 
China for support in various ways. The pressure also fizzled out as the EU and the US 
did not want to push Thailand into China’s embrace (Zawacki 2017).  
Actually, the junta regime under General Prayuth Chan-ocha since 2014 has done 
much more than securing the royalist dominance and the regnal t ransit ion. 
Veerayooth Kanchoochat and Prajak Kongkirati characterized the agenda of the 
current junta regime as “embedded military and hierarchical capitalism.” They 
summarize what the regime has done succinctly:
Politically, we indicate how the junta has embedded its power in ways different 
from the past. It does not pursue a power-sharing governance … but tries to 
militarize the cabinet, parliament, and even state-owned enterprises. The new 
constitution is designed to institutionalize the power of the military and the 
traditional elite vis-à-vis the electoral forces. … Economically, the Prayuth 
regime forms a partnership with a group of Sino-Thai conglomerates to establish 
the [scheme that] … has become a platform through which the giant f irms 
perform the leading role of ‘Big Brother’ in supervising small businesses in their 
sectors, [ref lecting] the collective endeavors of the conglomerates to replace 
competitive markets with hierarchy, rather than encouraging local firms to 
catch-up with them (Veerayooth and Prajak 2018, 279).
 
This economic strategy resulted in the growth of the top conglomerates but a 
weakening economy overall. Economic disparity accelerated during the NCPO 
regime. 
After several delays, including the rejection of one constitution draft that had taken 
a year to complete, finally, the NCPO introduced a new constitution in 2017 and 
related laws in the following year in preparation for the return to the parliamentary 
system and new elections. According to the 2017 constitution and the related laws 
(elaborated below), however, it is obvious that the junta had been trying to remain in 
power even after the election and the alleged return to democracy. As Michael 
Nelson, a keen observer of Thai politics, has put it: 
… the end of the [NCPO’s] direct rule did not mean a return to ‘democracy.’ 
Rather, it would usher in what they called a ‘transition period’ of at least five 
years. Only afterwards, people could start thinking about moving towards a 
greater degree of democracy (Nelson 2019, 3-4). 
4. The Beginning of King Rama X
 
In theory, in Thailand and elsewhere, a constitutional monarchy is above politics. In 
reality, many scholars and observers have made it clear the Thai monarchy has played 
a crucial and sometimes active role in politics (Handley 2006; Thongchai 2019).  As 
described earlier in this article, the political crisis since 2006 has been related to the 
monarchy indirectly and directly and implicitly as well as explicitly. Royal democracy 
implies the presence of the monarchy in name as well as in action. In the last twenty 
years of Bhumibol’s reign, the stature of the king grew tremendously in tandem with 
his ever increasing significance as a pillar to Thailand’s royal democracy.
The passing of Bhumibol created political anxieties that should not have been the 
case had the monarchy been truly uninvolved in politics. The anxieties related to the 
future of royal democracy and the political domination of the monarchists since the 
cult of a charismatic and beloved king was a pillar of the successful royal democracy 
(Thongchai 2019, 287-290, 301-303).  Without this kind of cult, the dominance of the 
monarchy could be in trouble. Such a cult, however, relies on the accomplishment and 
charisma of the reigning monarch. 
Since the monarchy is an institution of one person (plus his followers and networks 
who often act in his name), his personal character and attributes, words, actions and 
inactions, and even rumors about him, could affect and shape the king’s aura. 
Currently, the shadow of Bhumibol’s cult remains beneficial to the new king. Sooner 
or later, the shadow will fade away, and King Rama X will be responsible for his own 
reputation.
The first few years of Rama X have been another cause for concern. The new king 
has been active in recreating the monarchy in his vision. He reorganized and 
expanded the Office of the Royal Household in 20174).  A few old buildings in the 
palace compound were demolished, and several new ones were constructed. Huge 
areas of former crown estate that had been turned into public space for decades, 
including military bases, government offices, roads, and Bangkok’s only public zoo, 
were reclaimed by the palace5).  All crown properties, including all the assets of the 
Thai monarchy over generations, have been declared the personal property of the new 
king6).  All properties are exempt from tax. These changes were executed legally. 
Several royal customs that had ended with the absolute monarchy have been revived, 
including the official, legal appointment of the royal consort7).  What these actions tell 
us and the political community in Thailand about the king and his probable role in 
politics remains a matter of speculation. 
Nevertheless, this was one of the conditions in which the general election was held 
on March 24, 2019.
5. The March 24, 2019 Election
As mentioned above, the election may not mean the return to democracy as the 
junta, apparently, attempt to hold on to power in a different form than military rule. 
They have done so using several legal instruments. 
First, due to several restrictions and mandates in the election law, the result of the 
general election would likely produce no majority party. Thus, a weak and possibly 
fragmented coalition government is the likely outcome. 
Second, the constitution also allows a nonelected person be chosen as the prime 
minister. Given the fragmented coalition, it was expected long before the election that 
General Prayuth Chan-ocha, the head of the NPCO, would likely be chosen. 
Third, the upper house (the Senate) of the new parliament comprises of 250 
members, all of whom are all selected by the NCPO, with the majority being military 
officers. They are chosen without any election or broad-based selection criteria. 
Fourth, together with the 500 elected members of the lower house, these senators 
will take part in the selection of the prime minister. In addition, the senators serve a 
five-year term. Assuming a government lasts a full four-year term, these senators can 
choose two prime ministers.
Last but not least, the 2017 constitution mandates that every government must 
observe the “national strategic plan.” Drafted by the NPCO-appointed committee and 
approved before the election by the NPCO-appointed national assembly, the plan is 
the framework that all policies and projects by any elected government in the next 
twenty years must follow. Violations to the strategic framework could result in the 
disqualification of the government.
The March 24 election took place under these restrictions. Despite that, political 
parties and the public enthusiastically welcomed the election, as it could represent a 
fresh change of condition without severe limits to political freedom and freedom of 
expression. Many may have hoped that it would be the end of the downward spiral of 
popular democracy or the beginning of the end of the actual power of the NPCO. 
It remains to be seen if it would be the beginning of another attempt at popular 
democracy or if it is indeed the renewal of the authoritarian rule under a different 
cloak.
The election may help understand not only the future of popular democracy but also 
serve as a lens to examine the relationship between the military and the new king. 
The monarchists knew that they should not rely too heavily on the military. During 
the latter half of the reign of King Bhumbol, the military became monarchized, the 
“soldiers of the king.” The election may provide some hints about their power 
relations under the new king. The February 8, 2019 incident was significant in this 
regard as well. 
A few days earlier, the king’s elder sister, who had resigned from royalty decades 
ago to marry a foreigner, was nominated by a political party to be the candidate for 
the next prime minister. This was certainly a challenge to the NPCO’s plan for 
General Prayuth to remain the prime minister. After a few days of political 
maneuvers, on February 8, 2019, the king intervened, issuing a public statement, 
forbidding his sister from submitting herself as a candidate. The statement did not 
refer to any legal prohibition, since his sister is an ordinary citizen, legally speaking, 
and nobody counter-signed the statement8).  Regardless of these legal quandaries, as 
this happened in Thailand, the king’s statement was accepted as the final word by 
everyone. What did this incident tell us about the relationship between the palace and 
the NPCO? Unfortunately, information about the event remains inadequate for 
speculation. 
Conclusion
Even as the monarchists distrust popular sovereignty and the representative system, 
they also need “people” or popular support to bargain with the military. Meanwhile, 
the rapid ascendency of their power, especially their embeddedness in the state and 
society, suggests that the military have a vision for their eventual supremacy. They 
are here to stay for the long term, not merely as a caretaker for royal democracy and 
definitely not to return to barracks after the election. After all, they are the only 
political force with weapons, and a coup in Thailand is a relatively low-risk action 
(Mérieau 2019). 
Despite the initial popular support for the coup for the sake of peaceful and orderly 
society, people’s dissention to military authoritarianism is growing, especially in the 
past year as the economy has grown sluggish and the ruling junta has become 
shamelessly out of touch in many respects. Ordinary people, however, have no agency 
currently, other than political parties and politicians, who do not always represent 
their voice and interests. 
The political status quo under King Bhumibol meant the settlement of power 
Introduction
Even before the recent election in Thailand on March 24, 2019, Thai people and 
foreign observers alike wondered if this was simply another election in the repeated 
cycle of coups, military rule, new constitutions, and elections that end with the failure 
of democracy and the beginning of another coup. Was it another farce in Thailand’s 
political history? 
This seemingly repeating cycle of political history is a superficial observation of an 
apparent phenomenon. In fact, many elections, democratic breakthroughs, 
constitutions, and even coups and military rules, and constitutions in the past were 
meaningful in various ways in par ticular moments relating to the history of 
democratization in Thailand.
Thailand’s election on March 24, 2019 was a historic one in many respects. It was 
the first general election after almost five years of an authoritarian regime under 
military rule. It was either the beginning of another attempt at democracy or the 
renewal of the authoritarian rule under a different cloak. Perhaps it was both at the 
same time, as different political agents have attempted to push different agendas for 
the county’s future. It was also the first election and first major political event in the 
new reign of King Vajiralongkorn or Rama X.
This essay will provide the historical background and context to help understand 
the March 24, 2019 election. It looks at the election through the perspective of the 
long history of democratization in the country and within the context of Thailand’s 
ongoing political crisis since 2006 that eventually led to the 2014 coup. Then, the 
essay examines the two most important contextual factors surrounding the election; 
namely, the military regime under which the election was held and the royal 
succession and early years of King Rama X’s reign.
1. A Brief History of Democratization in Thailand
We may say summarily that the democratization process in Thailand has been a 
contest of power among three main political forces; namely, the military, the 
monarchists, and ordinary people for military rule, royalist rule, and popular 
sovereignty, respectively. Never theless, af ter nearly one hundred years of 
democratization, no single faction has achieved outright domination or sustained its 
desired regime; instead, they have had to settle for compromise or alliance with other 
forces. 
The concept of “democracy” was introduced to Siam, the former name of Thailand 
before 1939, around the turn of the twentieth century. At the time, it was simply 
dismissed by the elite of the absolute monarchy as an unsuitable idea for a country 
where people were mostly uneducated and unable to represent themselves and were 
thus content with rule by monarchy1).  Whereas the modern state and government 
were introduced by the absolute monarchy since the late nineteenth century as a 
consolidated and more efficient form of rule, the royals kept power to themselves, 
believing that only they could rule the country properly, including granting a 
democratic government from the top down at the appropriate time (Batson 1974).  
They did not realize the growing dissatisfaction with royal rule that eventually 
toppled the absolute monarchy in 1932. 
The revolutionaries—called the People’s Party—represented the rising power 
among the commoners, especially in the military, which was one of the most 
organized and developed institutions in Thai society at the time. However, the 
revolution was an “unfinished” transition (Ferrara 2015).  The monarchists kept 
t rying to return to power, not to revive the absolute monarchy, but to a new 
supremacy i n  t he  new pa rl iament a r y reg i me.  A n a l l iance be t ween t he  
nonrevolutionary army officers and the monarchists toppled the last government of 
the People’s Party in 1947 (Handley 2006, 80-89).  Then, the long period of military 
rule began.
The rocky alliance and the infighting among military factions eventually resulted 
in military rule in 1957 that groomed the young King Bhumibol (Rama IX, born 
1930; reigned 1946 and lived mostly abroad until 1951) for politics (Thak 2006, 
chapter 3).  Thanks to the Cold War, the United States joined the junta in promoting 
the monarchy as an instrument against communism (Nattapoll 2013, chapter 8).  The 
monarchy, the young Bhumibol in particular, grew in stature and popularity, as he 
worked hard to cultivate the people’s utmost loyalty. Ostensibly, the monarchy was 
“above” politics. The harder he worked beyond politics, the more his enormous moral 
authority increased politically. 
Military rule began to retreat thanks to the popular uprising for democracy in 1973. 
The monarchy took the opportunity to broker the end of violence by forcing the junta 
into exile. In doing so, the nonpolitical institution ascended to the highest authority in 
the land (albeit not a legal-political power but a moral one) and the supreme source of 
political legitimacy. Between 1973 and 1992, the tug-of-political-war and shifting 
alliances among the three political forces, including several coups, attempted coups, 
one massacre that was the most horrific in Thai history in 1976, and another uprising 
for democracy in 1992, resulted in the retreat of the military from politics, “back to 
the barracks” so to speak, and the triumph of royalist democracy (Thongchai 2008, 
15-21).  
Ostensibly, the royalist democracy in Thailand f rom 1992 to 2006 was a 
parliamentary democracy. Actually, however, it was a form of “guided democracy.” 
The elected authority was under the influence, supervision, and interference of the 
monarchists, who operated from the palace and beyond through formal mechanisms, 
such as the Privy Council, and informal networks (McCargo 2005; Thongchai 2019, 
290-300).  Every government during the time presented themselves as the government 
of the king (Chambers and Napisa 2017, chapter 1).  Furthermore, the military’s 
political and material interests were also increasingly attached to the monarchy. They 
became the “monarchized military” or “soldiers of the king.” 
The unprecedented popularity of Thaksin Shinawatra, who won landslide elections 
twice in 2001 and 2004, however, signaled the growing independence of popular 
sovereignty from the traditional ruling institutions, such as the monarchy and the 
military. Particularly in rural areas and in provinces distant from Bangkok, people 
found that the elected authority responded to their demands and interests better than 
the highly centralized and cumbersome bureaucracy. This made the elected 
authority—politicians—a threat to royalist democracy. 
2. Thailand’s Unstable Politics and the Crisis since 2006
The coup in 2006 was an attempt by the monarchists to secure their political 
dominance by curbing the growing demand for popular democracy. The monarchists 
did so by damaging all the necessary democratic institutions and components; 
namely, political parties, freedom of expression, especially the credibility and 
independence of the judiciary rule of law, and the election2).  They also brought the 
military back into politics. The discourse regarding corrupt politics was overblown, 
represented by the demonization of Thaksin. The demagoguery of Thaksin became 
the specter of royal democracy. Ultimately, only in Thailand was democracy 
considered worse than dictatorship.
The brief military rule after the 2006 coup, however, failed to stabilize the royalist 
dominance because the root of conf lict was not merely Thaksin versus the 
monarchists. Underneath the apparent political conflict was a structural change in 
relations among the three main political force with the dominance of the monarchists. 
In this macropolitical perspective, the March 24, 2019 election was the first important 
political action in the absence of the lynchpin of monarchist dominance but with the 
most powerful military since 1992. It was the first major attempt to construct the new 
power relations or the new status quo among the three forces. The election may reveal 
the shifting balance of power and may foretell possible future scenarios. 
The NCPO came to power claiming that the political and social divides had reached 
a dangerous point because of the failure of democracy and politicians. They claimed 
that Thailand urgently needed reforms of politics and many other aspects of the state 
and society. After five years of its rule, it is doubtful that the election was better 
prepared and the outcome was better or reformed Thailand politics. It is highly 
doubtful if the divides have been less acute. Some have argued that the NCPO rule 
probably made the divides more severe. The March 2019 election may ref lect the 
failure of the NCPO in this regard as well. 
However one wonders was it the failure of reform its actual success that the junta 
bore in mind when retaining power.
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Thailand’s socioeconomic and demographic structure that had occurred since the late 
1980s, in which dramatic rural transformation occurred alongside the rapid expansion 
of urbanization. Rural folks became urban dwellers in their ways of life, mentality, 
material interests, and anxieties (Somchai 2016).  The entire political landscape had 
changed because of this changing democracy (Apichat, Yukti and Niti 2013).  The 
centralized bureaucracy, however, cared more for and served the interests of the 
growing affluent middleclass in major cities, especially Bangkok. In short, Thaksin’s 
success was primarily not of his own making. He and his party responded to the 
structural changes, maximizing the opportunity for their political ascendency. 
The 2006 coup awakened Thaksin’s suppor ters throughout the country to 
understanding the politics of the monarchists. Discontent with the monarchists and 
the demand for popular democracy, therefore, remained strong, if not stronger and 
more determined (Thongchai 2014, 92-100).  Meanwhile, with committed support 
from the palace, the military’s political power expanded rapidly, like the demon that 
was released from the lamp and could not be put back. Thailand’s political crisis was 
protracted. 
Although the monarchy remained supreme throughout the crisis, its political power 
relied increasingly on the military, which was subservient to King Bhumibol. Popular 
democracy, on the other hand, could not be denied as every sector of the population 
and society wanted to have their voices heard and some power in the government. 
Democracy was also hard to resist  if Thailand were to attain recognition in the global 
community, especially in terms of economic and trade relations. 
In other words, the ongoing political crisis since 2006 to the present has been a 
contention between the traditional power elite (the alliance between the monarchy and 
military) on the one hand and the demand of popular sovereignty on the other.
A key factor to the crisis was the deteriorating health of King Bhumibol since the 
mid-2000s. Given his unparalleled moral authority, he had been the lynchpin of royal 
democracy. The royal succession—a supposedly nonpolitical matter in a typical 
constitution monarchy like the United Kingdom and Japan—became a matter of huge 
political consequence to royal democracy. The 2014 coup was another attempt to 
secure royal democracy in the final years of King Bhumibol. 
3. The Junta Regime since the 2014 Coup
The regime of the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) or the junta 
regime after the 2014 coup was one of the fiercest and most powerful military rules in 
Thai history. Its repressive measures were swift, effective, uncompromising, and even 
brutal at times in order to disrupt or decisively eliminate all political activities for 
democracy and protest against its rule. For a few years since the coup, especially in 
the immediate months after, a large number of people throughout the country were 
summoned or temporarily detained euphemistically for “attitude adjustment.” Many 
were charged, jailed, or mired in legal problems. Freedom of expression was severely 
limited, the lese majeste law was strictly enforced, and quite a number of ordinary 
people were penalized3).  Despite the protests, condemnations and sanctions of 
various degrees from the international community, the alliance of the military and the 
monarchists was able to secure their power. As King Bhumibol passed away in 
October 2016 and the succession occurred without a glitch, the task of securing the 
royal transition was accomplished.
The NCPO rule was not smooth, although popular dissatisfaction and opposition 
never amounted to a threat against it. In particular, in the early years after the coup, it 
faced serious pressures from the international community, particularly the European 
Union and the United States, which called for the return to democracy. However, 
these pressures did not bear any results for the military regime was able to turn to 
China for support in various ways. The pressure also fizzled out as the EU and the US 
did not want to push Thailand into China’s embrace (Zawacki 2017).  
Actually, the junta regime under General Prayuth Chan-ocha since 2014 has done 
much more than securing the royalist dominance and the regnal t ransit ion. 
Veerayooth Kanchoochat and Prajak Kongkirati characterized the agenda of the 
current junta regime as “embedded military and hierarchical capitalism.” They 
summarize what the regime has done succinctly:
Politically, we indicate how the junta has embedded its power in ways different 
from the past. It does not pursue a power-sharing governance … but tries to 
militarize the cabinet, parliament, and even state-owned enterprises. The new 
constitution is designed to institutionalize the power of the military and the 
traditional elite vis-à-vis the electoral forces. … Economically, the Prayuth 
regime forms a partnership with a group of Sino-Thai conglomerates to establish 
the [scheme that] … has become a platform through which the giant f irms 
perform the leading role of ‘Big Brother’ in supervising small businesses in their 
sectors, [ref lecting] the collective endeavors of the conglomerates to replace 
competitive markets with hierarchy, rather than encouraging local firms to 
catch-up with them (Veerayooth and Prajak 2018, 279).
 
This economic strategy resulted in the growth of the top conglomerates but a 
weakening economy overall. Economic disparity accelerated during the NCPO 
regime. 
After several delays, including the rejection of one constitution draft that had taken 
a year to complete, finally, the NCPO introduced a new constitution in 2017 and 
related laws in the following year in preparation for the return to the parliamentary 
system and new elections. According to the 2017 constitution and the related laws 
(elaborated below), however, it is obvious that the junta had been trying to remain in 
power even after the election and the alleged return to democracy. As Michael 
Nelson, a keen observer of Thai politics, has put it: 
… the end of the [NCPO’s] direct rule did not mean a return to ‘democracy.’ 
Rather, it would usher in what they called a ‘transition period’ of at least five 
years. Only afterwards, people could start thinking about moving towards a 
greater degree of democracy (Nelson 2019, 3-4). 
4. The Beginning of King Rama X
 
In theory, in Thailand and elsewhere, a constitutional monarchy is above politics. In 
reality, many scholars and observers have made it clear the Thai monarchy has played 
a crucial and sometimes active role in politics (Handley 2006; Thongchai 2019).  As 
described earlier in this article, the political crisis since 2006 has been related to the 
monarchy indirectly and directly and implicitly as well as explicitly. Royal democracy 
implies the presence of the monarchy in name as well as in action. In the last twenty 
years of Bhumibol’s reign, the stature of the king grew tremendously in tandem with 
his ever increasing significance as a pillar to Thailand’s royal democracy.
The passing of Bhumibol created political anxieties that should not have been the 
case had the monarchy been truly uninvolved in politics. The anxieties related to the 
future of royal democracy and the political domination of the monarchists since the 
cult of a charismatic and beloved king was a pillar of the successful royal democracy 
(Thongchai 2019, 287-290, 301-303).  Without this kind of cult, the dominance of the 
monarchy could be in trouble. Such a cult, however, relies on the accomplishment and 
charisma of the reigning monarch. 
Since the monarchy is an institution of one person (plus his followers and networks 
who often act in his name), his personal character and attributes, words, actions and 
inactions, and even rumors about him, could affect and shape the king’s aura. 
Currently, the shadow of Bhumibol’s cult remains beneficial to the new king. Sooner 
or later, the shadow will fade away, and King Rama X will be responsible for his own 
reputation.
The first few years of Rama X have been another cause for concern. The new king 
has been active in recreating the monarchy in his vision. He reorganized and 
expanded the Office of the Royal Household in 20174).  A few old buildings in the 
palace compound were demolished, and several new ones were constructed. Huge 
areas of former crown estate that had been turned into public space for decades, 
including military bases, government offices, roads, and Bangkok’s only public zoo, 
were reclaimed by the palace5).  All crown properties, including all the assets of the 
Thai monarchy over generations, have been declared the personal property of the new 
king6).  All properties are exempt from tax. These changes were executed legally. 
Several royal customs that had ended with the absolute monarchy have been revived, 
including the official, legal appointment of the royal consort7).  What these actions tell 
us and the political community in Thailand about the king and his probable role in 
politics remains a matter of speculation. 
Nevertheless, this was one of the conditions in which the general election was held 
on March 24, 2019.
5. The March 24, 2019 Election
As mentioned above, the election may not mean the return to democracy as the 
junta, apparently, attempt to hold on to power in a different form than military rule. 
They have done so using several legal instruments. 
First, due to several restrictions and mandates in the election law, the result of the 
general election would likely produce no majority party. Thus, a weak and possibly 
fragmented coalition government is the likely outcome. 
Second, the constitution also allows a nonelected person be chosen as the prime 
minister. Given the fragmented coalition, it was expected long before the election that 
General Prayuth Chan-ocha, the head of the NPCO, would likely be chosen. 
Third, the upper house (the Senate) of the new parliament comprises of 250 
members, all of whom are all selected by the NCPO, with the majority being military 
officers. They are chosen without any election or broad-based selection criteria. 
Fourth, together with the 500 elected members of the lower house, these senators 
will take part in the selection of the prime minister. In addition, the senators serve a 
five-year term. Assuming a government lasts a full four-year term, these senators can 
choose two prime ministers.
Last but not least, the 2017 constitution mandates that every government must 
observe the “national strategic plan.” Drafted by the NPCO-appointed committee and 
approved before the election by the NPCO-appointed national assembly, the plan is 
the framework that all policies and projects by any elected government in the next 
twenty years must follow. Violations to the strategic framework could result in the 
disqualification of the government.
The March 24 election took place under these restrictions. Despite that, political 
parties and the public enthusiastically welcomed the election, as it could represent a 
fresh change of condition without severe limits to political freedom and freedom of 
expression. Many may have hoped that it would be the end of the downward spiral of 
popular democracy or the beginning of the end of the actual power of the NPCO. 
It remains to be seen if it would be the beginning of another attempt at popular 
democracy or if it is indeed the renewal of the authoritarian rule under a different 
cloak.
The election may help understand not only the future of popular democracy but also 
serve as a lens to examine the relationship between the military and the new king. 
The monarchists knew that they should not rely too heavily on the military. During 
the latter half of the reign of King Bhumbol, the military became monarchized, the 
“soldiers of the king.” The election may provide some hints about their power 
relations under the new king. The February 8, 2019 incident was significant in this 
regard as well. 
A few days earlier, the king’s elder sister, who had resigned from royalty decades 
ago to marry a foreigner, was nominated by a political party to be the candidate for 
the next prime minister. This was certainly a challenge to the NPCO’s plan for 
General Prayuth to remain the prime minister. After a few days of political 
maneuvers, on February 8, 2019, the king intervened, issuing a public statement, 
forbidding his sister from submitting herself as a candidate. The statement did not 
refer to any legal prohibition, since his sister is an ordinary citizen, legally speaking, 
and nobody counter-signed the statement8).  Regardless of these legal quandaries, as 
this happened in Thailand, the king’s statement was accepted as the final word by 
everyone. What did this incident tell us about the relationship between the palace and 
the NPCO? Unfortunately, information about the event remains inadequate for 
speculation. 
Conclusion
Even as the monarchists distrust popular sovereignty and the representative system, 
they also need “people” or popular support to bargain with the military. Meanwhile, 
the rapid ascendency of their power, especially their embeddedness in the state and 
society, suggests that the military have a vision for their eventual supremacy. They 
are here to stay for the long term, not merely as a caretaker for royal democracy and 
definitely not to return to barracks after the election. After all, they are the only 
political force with weapons, and a coup in Thailand is a relatively low-risk action 
(Mérieau 2019). 
Despite the initial popular support for the coup for the sake of peaceful and orderly 
society, people’s dissention to military authoritarianism is growing, especially in the 
past year as the economy has grown sluggish and the ruling junta has become 
shamelessly out of touch in many respects. Ordinary people, however, have no agency 
currently, other than political parties and politicians, who do not always represent 
their voice and interests. 
The political status quo under King Bhumibol meant the settlement of power 
Introduction
Even before the recent election in Thailand on March 24, 2019, Thai people and 
foreign observers alike wondered if this was simply another election in the repeated 
cycle of coups, military rule, new constitutions, and elections that end with the failure 
of democracy and the beginning of another coup. Was it another farce in Thailand’s 
political history? 
This seemingly repeating cycle of political history is a superficial observation of an 
apparent phenomenon. In fact, many elections, democratic breakthroughs, 
constitutions, and even coups and military rules, and constitutions in the past were 
meaningful in various ways in par ticular moments relating to the history of 
democratization in Thailand.
Thailand’s election on March 24, 2019 was a historic one in many respects. It was 
the first general election after almost five years of an authoritarian regime under 
military rule. It was either the beginning of another attempt at democracy or the 
renewal of the authoritarian rule under a different cloak. Perhaps it was both at the 
same time, as different political agents have attempted to push different agendas for 
the county’s future. It was also the first election and first major political event in the 
new reign of King Vajiralongkorn or Rama X.
This essay will provide the historical background and context to help understand 
the March 24, 2019 election. It looks at the election through the perspective of the 
long history of democratization in the country and within the context of Thailand’s 
ongoing political crisis since 2006 that eventually led to the 2014 coup. Then, the 
essay examines the two most important contextual factors surrounding the election; 
namely, the military regime under which the election was held and the royal 
succession and early years of King Rama X’s reign.
1. A Brief History of Democratization in Thailand
We may say summarily that the democratization process in Thailand has been a 
contest of power among three main political forces; namely, the military, the 
monarchists, and ordinary people for military rule, royalist rule, and popular 
sovereignty, respectively. Never theless, af ter nearly one hundred years of 
democratization, no single faction has achieved outright domination or sustained its 
desired regime; instead, they have had to settle for compromise or alliance with other 
forces. 
The concept of “democracy” was introduced to Siam, the former name of Thailand 
before 1939, around the turn of the twentieth century. At the time, it was simply 
dismissed by the elite of the absolute monarchy as an unsuitable idea for a country 
where people were mostly uneducated and unable to represent themselves and were 
thus content with rule by monarchy1).  Whereas the modern state and government 
were introduced by the absolute monarchy since the late nineteenth century as a 
consolidated and more efficient form of rule, the royals kept power to themselves, 
believing that only they could rule the country properly, including granting a 
democratic government from the top down at the appropriate time (Batson 1974).  
They did not realize the growing dissatisfaction with royal rule that eventually 
toppled the absolute monarchy in 1932. 
The revolutionaries—called the People’s Party—represented the rising power 
among the commoners, especially in the military, which was one of the most 
organized and developed institutions in Thai society at the time. However, the 
revolution was an “unfinished” transition (Ferrara 2015).  The monarchists kept 
t rying to return to power, not to revive the absolute monarchy, but to a new 
supremacy i n  t he  new pa rl iament a r y reg i me.  A n a l l iance be t ween t he  
nonrevolutionary army officers and the monarchists toppled the last government of 
the People’s Party in 1947 (Handley 2006, 80-89).  Then, the long period of military 
rule began.
The rocky alliance and the infighting among military factions eventually resulted 
in military rule in 1957 that groomed the young King Bhumibol (Rama IX, born 
1930; reigned 1946 and lived mostly abroad until 1951) for politics (Thak 2006, 
chapter 3).  Thanks to the Cold War, the United States joined the junta in promoting 
the monarchy as an instrument against communism (Nattapoll 2013, chapter 8).  The 
monarchy, the young Bhumibol in particular, grew in stature and popularity, as he 
worked hard to cultivate the people’s utmost loyalty. Ostensibly, the monarchy was 
“above” politics. The harder he worked beyond politics, the more his enormous moral 
authority increased politically. 
Military rule began to retreat thanks to the popular uprising for democracy in 1973. 
The monarchy took the opportunity to broker the end of violence by forcing the junta 
into exile. In doing so, the nonpolitical institution ascended to the highest authority in 
the land (albeit not a legal-political power but a moral one) and the supreme source of 
political legitimacy. Between 1973 and 1992, the tug-of-political-war and shifting 
alliances among the three political forces, including several coups, attempted coups, 
one massacre that was the most horrific in Thai history in 1976, and another uprising 
for democracy in 1992, resulted in the retreat of the military from politics, “back to 
the barracks” so to speak, and the triumph of royalist democracy (Thongchai 2008, 
15-21).  
Ostensibly, the royalist democracy in Thailand f rom 1992 to 2006 was a 
parliamentary democracy. Actually, however, it was a form of “guided democracy.” 
The elected authority was under the influence, supervision, and interference of the 
monarchists, who operated from the palace and beyond through formal mechanisms, 
such as the Privy Council, and informal networks (McCargo 2005; Thongchai 2019, 
290-300).  Every government during the time presented themselves as the government 
of the king (Chambers and Napisa 2017, chapter 1).  Furthermore, the military’s 
political and material interests were also increasingly attached to the monarchy. They 
became the “monarchized military” or “soldiers of the king.” 
The unprecedented popularity of Thaksin Shinawatra, who won landslide elections 
twice in 2001 and 2004, however, signaled the growing independence of popular 
sovereignty from the traditional ruling institutions, such as the monarchy and the 
military. Particularly in rural areas and in provinces distant from Bangkok, people 
found that the elected authority responded to their demands and interests better than 
the highly centralized and cumbersome bureaucracy. This made the elected 
authority—politicians—a threat to royalist democracy. 
2. Thailand’s Unstable Politics and the Crisis since 2006
The coup in 2006 was an attempt by the monarchists to secure their political 
dominance by curbing the growing demand for popular democracy. The monarchists 
did so by damaging all the necessary democratic institutions and components; 
namely, political parties, freedom of expression, especially the credibility and 
independence of the judiciary rule of law, and the election2).  They also brought the 
military back into politics. The discourse regarding corrupt politics was overblown, 
represented by the demonization of Thaksin. The demagoguery of Thaksin became 
the specter of royal democracy. Ultimately, only in Thailand was democracy 
considered worse than dictatorship.
The brief military rule after the 2006 coup, however, failed to stabilize the royalist 
dominance because the root of conf lict was not merely Thaksin versus the 
monarchists. Underneath the apparent political conflict was a structural change in 
relations among the three main political force with the dominance of the monarchists. 
In this macropolitical perspective, the March 24, 2019 election was the first important 
political action in the absence of the lynchpin of monarchist dominance but with the 
most powerful military since 1992. It was the first major attempt to construct the new 
power relations or the new status quo among the three forces. The election may reveal 
the shifting balance of power and may foretell possible future scenarios. 
The NCPO came to power claiming that the political and social divides had reached 
a dangerous point because of the failure of democracy and politicians. They claimed 
that Thailand urgently needed reforms of politics and many other aspects of the state 
and society. After five years of its rule, it is doubtful that the election was better 
prepared and the outcome was better or reformed Thailand politics. It is highly 
doubtful if the divides have been less acute. Some have argued that the NCPO rule 
probably made the divides more severe. The March 2019 election may ref lect the 
failure of the NCPO in this regard as well. 
However one wonders was it the failure of reform its actual success that the junta 
bore in mind when retaining power.
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Thailand’s socioeconomic and demographic structure that had occurred since the late 
1980s, in which dramatic rural transformation occurred alongside the rapid expansion 
of urbanization. Rural folks became urban dwellers in their ways of life, mentality, 
material interests, and anxieties (Somchai 2016).  The entire political landscape had 
changed because of this changing democracy (Apichat, Yukti and Niti 2013).  The 
centralized bureaucracy, however, cared more for and served the interests of the 
growing affluent middleclass in major cities, especially Bangkok. In short, Thaksin’s 
success was primarily not of his own making. He and his party responded to the 
structural changes, maximizing the opportunity for their political ascendency. 
The 2006 coup awakened Thaksin’s suppor ters throughout the country to 
understanding the politics of the monarchists. Discontent with the monarchists and 
the demand for popular democracy, therefore, remained strong, if not stronger and 
more determined (Thongchai 2014, 92-100).  Meanwhile, with committed support 
from the palace, the military’s political power expanded rapidly, like the demon that 
was released from the lamp and could not be put back. Thailand’s political crisis was 
protracted. 
Although the monarchy remained supreme throughout the crisis, its political power 
relied increasingly on the military, which was subservient to King Bhumibol. Popular 
democracy, on the other hand, could not be denied as every sector of the population 
and society wanted to have their voices heard and some power in the government. 
Democracy was also hard to resist  if Thailand were to attain recognition in the global 
community, especially in terms of economic and trade relations. 
In other words, the ongoing political crisis since 2006 to the present has been a 
contention between the traditional power elite (the alliance between the monarchy and 
military) on the one hand and the demand of popular sovereignty on the other.
A key factor to the crisis was the deteriorating health of King Bhumibol since the 
mid-2000s. Given his unparalleled moral authority, he had been the lynchpin of royal 
democracy. The royal succession—a supposedly nonpolitical matter in a typical 
constitution monarchy like the United Kingdom and Japan—became a matter of huge 
political consequence to royal democracy. The 2014 coup was another attempt to 
secure royal democracy in the final years of King Bhumibol. 
3. The Junta Regime since the 2014 Coup
The regime of the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) or the junta 
regime after the 2014 coup was one of the fiercest and most powerful military rules in 
Thai history. Its repressive measures were swift, effective, uncompromising, and even 
brutal at times in order to disrupt or decisively eliminate all political activities for 
democracy and protest against its rule. For a few years since the coup, especially in 
the immediate months after, a large number of people throughout the country were 
summoned or temporarily detained euphemistically for “attitude adjustment.” Many 
were charged, jailed, or mired in legal problems. Freedom of expression was severely 
limited, the lese majeste law was strictly enforced, and quite a number of ordinary 
people were penalized3).  Despite the protests, condemnations and sanctions of 
various degrees from the international community, the alliance of the military and the 
monarchists was able to secure their power. As King Bhumibol passed away in 
October 2016 and the succession occurred without a glitch, the task of securing the 
royal transition was accomplished.
The NCPO rule was not smooth, although popular dissatisfaction and opposition 
never amounted to a threat against it. In particular, in the early years after the coup, it 
faced serious pressures from the international community, particularly the European 
Union and the United States, which called for the return to democracy. However, 
these pressures did not bear any results for the military regime was able to turn to 
China for support in various ways. The pressure also fizzled out as the EU and the US 
did not want to push Thailand into China’s embrace (Zawacki 2017).  
Actually, the junta regime under General Prayuth Chan-ocha since 2014 has done 
much more than securing the royalist dominance and the regnal t ransit ion. 
Veerayooth Kanchoochat and Prajak Kongkirati characterized the agenda of the 
current junta regime as “embedded military and hierarchical capitalism.” They 
summarize what the regime has done succinctly:
Politically, we indicate how the junta has embedded its power in ways different 
from the past. It does not pursue a power-sharing governance … but tries to 
militarize the cabinet, parliament, and even state-owned enterprises. The new 
constitution is designed to institutionalize the power of the military and the 
traditional elite vis-à-vis the electoral forces. … Economically, the Prayuth 
regime forms a partnership with a group of Sino-Thai conglomerates to establish 
the [scheme that] … has become a platform through which the giant f irms 
perform the leading role of ‘Big Brother’ in supervising small businesses in their 
sectors, [ref lecting] the collective endeavors of the conglomerates to replace 
competitive markets with hierarchy, rather than encouraging local firms to 
catch-up with them (Veerayooth and Prajak 2018, 279).
 
This economic strategy resulted in the growth of the top conglomerates but a 
weakening economy overall. Economic disparity accelerated during the NCPO 
regime. 
After several delays, including the rejection of one constitution draft that had taken 
a year to complete, finally, the NCPO introduced a new constitution in 2017 and 
related laws in the following year in preparation for the return to the parliamentary 
system and new elections. According to the 2017 constitution and the related laws 
(elaborated below), however, it is obvious that the junta had been trying to remain in 
power even after the election and the alleged return to democracy. As Michael 
Nelson, a keen observer of Thai politics, has put it: 
… the end of the [NCPO’s] direct rule did not mean a return to ‘democracy.’ 
Rather, it would usher in what they called a ‘transition period’ of at least five 
years. Only afterwards, people could start thinking about moving towards a 
greater degree of democracy (Nelson 2019, 3-4). 
4. The Beginning of King Rama X
 
In theory, in Thailand and elsewhere, a constitutional monarchy is above politics. In 
reality, many scholars and observers have made it clear the Thai monarchy has played 
a crucial and sometimes active role in politics (Handley 2006; Thongchai 2019).  As 
described earlier in this article, the political crisis since 2006 has been related to the 
monarchy indirectly and directly and implicitly as well as explicitly. Royal democracy 
implies the presence of the monarchy in name as well as in action. In the last twenty 
years of Bhumibol’s reign, the stature of the king grew tremendously in tandem with 
his ever increasing significance as a pillar to Thailand’s royal democracy.
The passing of Bhumibol created political anxieties that should not have been the 
case had the monarchy been truly uninvolved in politics. The anxieties related to the 
future of royal democracy and the political domination of the monarchists since the 
cult of a charismatic and beloved king was a pillar of the successful royal democracy 
(Thongchai 2019, 287-290, 301-303).  Without this kind of cult, the dominance of the 
monarchy could be in trouble. Such a cult, however, relies on the accomplishment and 
charisma of the reigning monarch. 
Since the monarchy is an institution of one person (plus his followers and networks 
who often act in his name), his personal character and attributes, words, actions and 
inactions, and even rumors about him, could affect and shape the king’s aura. 
Currently, the shadow of Bhumibol’s cult remains beneficial to the new king. Sooner 
or later, the shadow will fade away, and King Rama X will be responsible for his own 
reputation.
The first few years of Rama X have been another cause for concern. The new king 
has been active in recreating the monarchy in his vision. He reorganized and 
expanded the Office of the Royal Household in 20174).  A few old buildings in the 
palace compound were demolished, and several new ones were constructed. Huge 
areas of former crown estate that had been turned into public space for decades, 
including military bases, government offices, roads, and Bangkok’s only public zoo, 
were reclaimed by the palace5).  All crown properties, including all the assets of the 
Thai monarchy over generations, have been declared the personal property of the new 
king6).  All properties are exempt from tax. These changes were executed legally. 
Several royal customs that had ended with the absolute monarchy have been revived, 
including the official, legal appointment of the royal consort7).  What these actions tell 
us and the political community in Thailand about the king and his probable role in 
politics remains a matter of speculation. 
Nevertheless, this was one of the conditions in which the general election was held 
on March 24, 2019.
5. The March 24, 2019 Election
As mentioned above, the election may not mean the return to democracy as the 
junta, apparently, attempt to hold on to power in a different form than military rule. 
They have done so using several legal instruments. 
First, due to several restrictions and mandates in the election law, the result of the 
general election would likely produce no majority party. Thus, a weak and possibly 
fragmented coalition government is the likely outcome. 
Second, the constitution also allows a nonelected person be chosen as the prime 
minister. Given the fragmented coalition, it was expected long before the election that 
General Prayuth Chan-ocha, the head of the NPCO, would likely be chosen. 
Third, the upper house (the Senate) of the new parliament comprises of 250 
members, all of whom are all selected by the NCPO, with the majority being military 
officers. They are chosen without any election or broad-based selection criteria. 
Fourth, together with the 500 elected members of the lower house, these senators 
will take part in the selection of the prime minister. In addition, the senators serve a 
five-year term. Assuming a government lasts a full four-year term, these senators can 
choose two prime ministers.
Last but not least, the 2017 constitution mandates that every government must 
observe the “national strategic plan.” Drafted by the NPCO-appointed committee and 
approved before the election by the NPCO-appointed national assembly, the plan is 
the framework that all policies and projects by any elected government in the next 
twenty years must follow. Violations to the strategic framework could result in the 
disqualification of the government.
The March 24 election took place under these restrictions. Despite that, political 
parties and the public enthusiastically welcomed the election, as it could represent a 
fresh change of condition without severe limits to political freedom and freedom of 
expression. Many may have hoped that it would be the end of the downward spiral of 
popular democracy or the beginning of the end of the actual power of the NPCO. 
It remains to be seen if it would be the beginning of another attempt at popular 
democracy or if it is indeed the renewal of the authoritarian rule under a different 
cloak.
The election may help understand not only the future of popular democracy but also 
serve as a lens to examine the relationship between the military and the new king. 
The monarchists knew that they should not rely too heavily on the military. During 
the latter half of the reign of King Bhumbol, the military became monarchized, the 
“soldiers of the king.” The election may provide some hints about their power 
relations under the new king. The February 8, 2019 incident was significant in this 
regard as well. 
A few days earlier, the king’s elder sister, who had resigned from royalty decades 
ago to marry a foreigner, was nominated by a political party to be the candidate for 
the next prime minister. This was certainly a challenge to the NPCO’s plan for 
General Prayuth to remain the prime minister. After a few days of political 
maneuvers, on February 8, 2019, the king intervened, issuing a public statement, 
forbidding his sister from submitting herself as a candidate. The statement did not 
refer to any legal prohibition, since his sister is an ordinary citizen, legally speaking, 
and nobody counter-signed the statement8).  Regardless of these legal quandaries, as 
this happened in Thailand, the king’s statement was accepted as the final word by 
everyone. What did this incident tell us about the relationship between the palace and 
the NPCO? Unfortunately, information about the event remains inadequate for 
speculation. 
Conclusion
Even as the monarchists distrust popular sovereignty and the representative system, 
they also need “people” or popular support to bargain with the military. Meanwhile, 
the rapid ascendency of their power, especially their embeddedness in the state and 
society, suggests that the military have a vision for their eventual supremacy. They 
are here to stay for the long term, not merely as a caretaker for royal democracy and 
definitely not to return to barracks after the election. After all, they are the only 
political force with weapons, and a coup in Thailand is a relatively low-risk action 
(Mérieau 2019). 
Despite the initial popular support for the coup for the sake of peaceful and orderly 
society, people’s dissention to military authoritarianism is growing, especially in the 
past year as the economy has grown sluggish and the ruling junta has become 
shamelessly out of touch in many respects. Ordinary people, however, have no agency 
currently, other than political parties and politicians, who do not always represent 
their voice and interests. 
The political status quo under King Bhumibol meant the settlement of power 
Introduction
Even before the recent election in Thailand on March 24, 2019, Thai people and 
foreign observers alike wondered if this was simply another election in the repeated 
cycle of coups, military rule, new constitutions, and elections that end with the failure 
of democracy and the beginning of another coup. Was it another farce in Thailand’s 
political history? 
This seemingly repeating cycle of political history is a superficial observation of an 
apparent phenomenon. In fact, many elections, democratic breakthroughs, 
constitutions, and even coups and military rules, and constitutions in the past were 
meaningful in various ways in par ticular moments relating to the history of 
democratization in Thailand.
Thailand’s election on March 24, 2019 was a historic one in many respects. It was 
the first general election after almost five years of an authoritarian regime under 
military rule. It was either the beginning of another attempt at democracy or the 
renewal of the authoritarian rule under a different cloak. Perhaps it was both at the 
same time, as different political agents have attempted to push different agendas for 
the county’s future. It was also the first election and first major political event in the 
new reign of King Vajiralongkorn or Rama X.
This essay will provide the historical background and context to help understand 
the March 24, 2019 election. It looks at the election through the perspective of the 
long history of democratization in the country and within the context of Thailand’s 
ongoing political crisis since 2006 that eventually led to the 2014 coup. Then, the 
essay examines the two most important contextual factors surrounding the election; 
namely, the military regime under which the election was held and the royal 
succession and early years of King Rama X’s reign.
1. A Brief History of Democratization in Thailand
We may say summarily that the democratization process in Thailand has been a 
contest of power among three main political forces; namely, the military, the 
monarchists, and ordinary people for military rule, royalist rule, and popular 
sovereignty, respectively. Never theless, af ter nearly one hundred years of 
democratization, no single faction has achieved outright domination or sustained its 
desired regime; instead, they have had to settle for compromise or alliance with other 
forces. 
The concept of “democracy” was introduced to Siam, the former name of Thailand 
before 1939, around the turn of the twentieth century. At the time, it was simply 
dismissed by the elite of the absolute monarchy as an unsuitable idea for a country 
where people were mostly uneducated and unable to represent themselves and were 
thus content with rule by monarchy1).  Whereas the modern state and government 
were introduced by the absolute monarchy since the late nineteenth century as a 
consolidated and more efficient form of rule, the royals kept power to themselves, 
believing that only they could rule the country properly, including granting a 
democratic government from the top down at the appropriate time (Batson 1974).  
They did not realize the growing dissatisfaction with royal rule that eventually 
toppled the absolute monarchy in 1932. 
The revolutionaries—called the People’s Party—represented the rising power 
among the commoners, especially in the military, which was one of the most 
organized and developed institutions in Thai society at the time. However, the 
revolution was an “unfinished” transition (Ferrara 2015).  The monarchists kept 
t rying to return to power, not to revive the absolute monarchy, but to a new 
supremacy i n  t he  new pa rl iament a r y reg i me.  A n a l l iance be t ween t he  
nonrevolutionary army officers and the monarchists toppled the last government of 
the People’s Party in 1947 (Handley 2006, 80-89).  Then, the long period of military 
rule began.
The rocky alliance and the infighting among military factions eventually resulted 
in military rule in 1957 that groomed the young King Bhumibol (Rama IX, born 
1930; reigned 1946 and lived mostly abroad until 1951) for politics (Thak 2006, 
chapter 3).  Thanks to the Cold War, the United States joined the junta in promoting 
the monarchy as an instrument against communism (Nattapoll 2013, chapter 8).  The 
monarchy, the young Bhumibol in particular, grew in stature and popularity, as he 
worked hard to cultivate the people’s utmost loyalty. Ostensibly, the monarchy was 
“above” politics. The harder he worked beyond politics, the more his enormous moral 
authority increased politically. 
Military rule began to retreat thanks to the popular uprising for democracy in 1973. 
The monarchy took the opportunity to broker the end of violence by forcing the junta 
into exile. In doing so, the nonpolitical institution ascended to the highest authority in 
the land (albeit not a legal-political power but a moral one) and the supreme source of 
political legitimacy. Between 1973 and 1992, the tug-of-political-war and shifting 
alliances among the three political forces, including several coups, attempted coups, 
one massacre that was the most horrific in Thai history in 1976, and another uprising 
for democracy in 1992, resulted in the retreat of the military from politics, “back to 
the barracks” so to speak, and the triumph of royalist democracy (Thongchai 2008, 
15-21).  
Ostensibly, the royalist democracy in Thailand f rom 1992 to 2006 was a 
parliamentary democracy. Actually, however, it was a form of “guided democracy.” 
The elected authority was under the influence, supervision, and interference of the 
monarchists, who operated from the palace and beyond through formal mechanisms, 
such as the Privy Council, and informal networks (McCargo 2005; Thongchai 2019, 
290-300).  Every government during the time presented themselves as the government 
of the king (Chambers and Napisa 2017, chapter 1).  Furthermore, the military’s 
political and material interests were also increasingly attached to the monarchy. They 
became the “monarchized military” or “soldiers of the king.” 
The unprecedented popularity of Thaksin Shinawatra, who won landslide elections 
twice in 2001 and 2004, however, signaled the growing independence of popular 
sovereignty from the traditional ruling institutions, such as the monarchy and the 
military. Particularly in rural areas and in provinces distant from Bangkok, people 
found that the elected authority responded to their demands and interests better than 
the highly centralized and cumbersome bureaucracy. This made the elected 
authority—politicians—a threat to royalist democracy. 
2. Thailand’s Unstable Politics and the Crisis since 2006
The coup in 2006 was an attempt by the monarchists to secure their political 
dominance by curbing the growing demand for popular democracy. The monarchists 
did so by damaging all the necessary democratic institutions and components; 
namely, political parties, freedom of expression, especially the credibility and 
independence of the judiciary rule of law, and the election2).  They also brought the 
military back into politics. The discourse regarding corrupt politics was overblown, 
represented by the demonization of Thaksin. The demagoguery of Thaksin became 
the specter of royal democracy. Ultimately, only in Thailand was democracy 
considered worse than dictatorship.
The brief military rule after the 2006 coup, however, failed to stabilize the royalist 
dominance because the root of conf lict was not merely Thaksin versus the 
monarchists. Underneath the apparent political conflict was a structural change in 
relations among the three main political force with the dominance of the monarchists. 
In this macropolitical perspective, the March 24, 2019 election was the first important 
political action in the absence of the lynchpin of monarchist dominance but with the 
most powerful military since 1992. It was the first major attempt to construct the new 
power relations or the new status quo among the three forces. The election may reveal 
the shifting balance of power and may foretell possible future scenarios. 
The NCPO came to power claiming that the political and social divides had reached 
a dangerous point because of the failure of democracy and politicians. They claimed 
that Thailand urgently needed reforms of politics and many other aspects of the state 
and society. After five years of its rule, it is doubtful that the election was better 
prepared and the outcome was better or reformed Thailand politics. It is highly 
doubtful if the divides have been less acute. Some have argued that the NCPO rule 
probably made the divides more severe. The March 2019 election may ref lect the 
failure of the NCPO in this regard as well. 
However one wonders was it the failure of reform its actual success that the junta 
bore in mind when retaining power.
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Thailand’s socioeconomic and demographic structure that had occurred since the late 
1980s, in which dramatic rural transformation occurred alongside the rapid expansion 
of urbanization. Rural folks became urban dwellers in their ways of life, mentality, 
material interests, and anxieties (Somchai 2016).  The entire political landscape had 
changed because of this changing democracy (Apichat, Yukti and Niti 2013).  The 
centralized bureaucracy, however, cared more for and served the interests of the 
growing affluent middleclass in major cities, especially Bangkok. In short, Thaksin’s 
success was primarily not of his own making. He and his party responded to the 
structural changes, maximizing the opportunity for their political ascendency. 
The 2006 coup awakened Thaksin’s suppor ters throughout the country to 
understanding the politics of the monarchists. Discontent with the monarchists and 
the demand for popular democracy, therefore, remained strong, if not stronger and 
more determined (Thongchai 2014, 92-100).  Meanwhile, with committed support 
from the palace, the military’s political power expanded rapidly, like the demon that 
was released from the lamp and could not be put back. Thailand’s political crisis was 
protracted. 
Although the monarchy remained supreme throughout the crisis, its political power 
relied increasingly on the military, which was subservient to King Bhumibol. Popular 
democracy, on the other hand, could not be denied as every sector of the population 
and society wanted to have their voices heard and some power in the government. 
Democracy was also hard to resist  if Thailand were to attain recognition in the global 
community, especially in terms of economic and trade relations. 
In other words, the ongoing political crisis since 2006 to the present has been a 
contention between the traditional power elite (the alliance between the monarchy and 
military) on the one hand and the demand of popular sovereignty on the other.
A key factor to the crisis was the deteriorating health of King Bhumibol since the 
mid-2000s. Given his unparalleled moral authority, he had been the lynchpin of royal 
democracy. The royal succession—a supposedly nonpolitical matter in a typical 
constitution monarchy like the United Kingdom and Japan—became a matter of huge 
political consequence to royal democracy. The 2014 coup was another attempt to 
secure royal democracy in the final years of King Bhumibol. 
3. The Junta Regime since the 2014 Coup
The regime of the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) or the junta 
regime after the 2014 coup was one of the fiercest and most powerful military rules in 
Thai history. Its repressive measures were swift, effective, uncompromising, and even 
brutal at times in order to disrupt or decisively eliminate all political activities for 
democracy and protest against its rule. For a few years since the coup, especially in 
the immediate months after, a large number of people throughout the country were 
summoned or temporarily detained euphemistically for “attitude adjustment.” Many 
were charged, jailed, or mired in legal problems. Freedom of expression was severely 
limited, the lese majeste law was strictly enforced, and quite a number of ordinary 
people were penalized3).  Despite the protests, condemnations and sanctions of 
various degrees from the international community, the alliance of the military and the 
monarchists was able to secure their power. As King Bhumibol passed away in 
October 2016 and the succession occurred without a glitch, the task of securing the 
royal transition was accomplished.
The NCPO rule was not smooth, although popular dissatisfaction and opposition 
never amounted to a threat against it. In particular, in the early years after the coup, it 
faced serious pressures from the international community, particularly the European 
Union and the United States, which called for the return to democracy. However, 
these pressures did not bear any results for the military regime was able to turn to 
China for support in various ways. The pressure also fizzled out as the EU and the US 
did not want to push Thailand into China’s embrace (Zawacki 2017).  
Actually, the junta regime under General Prayuth Chan-ocha since 2014 has done 
much more than securing the royalist dominance and the regnal t ransit ion. 
Veerayooth Kanchoochat and Prajak Kongkirati characterized the agenda of the 
current junta regime as “embedded military and hierarchical capitalism.” They 
summarize what the regime has done succinctly:
Politically, we indicate how the junta has embedded its power in ways different 
from the past. It does not pursue a power-sharing governance … but tries to 
militarize the cabinet, parliament, and even state-owned enterprises. The new 
constitution is designed to institutionalize the power of the military and the 
traditional elite vis-à-vis the electoral forces. … Economically, the Prayuth 
regime forms a partnership with a group of Sino-Thai conglomerates to establish 
the [scheme that] … has become a platform through which the giant f irms 
perform the leading role of ‘Big Brother’ in supervising small businesses in their 
sectors, [ref lecting] the collective endeavors of the conglomerates to replace 
competitive markets with hierarchy, rather than encouraging local firms to 
catch-up with them (Veerayooth and Prajak 2018, 279).
 
This economic strategy resulted in the growth of the top conglomerates but a 
weakening economy overall. Economic disparity accelerated during the NCPO 
regime. 
After several delays, including the rejection of one constitution draft that had taken 
a year to complete, finally, the NCPO introduced a new constitution in 2017 and 
related laws in the following year in preparation for the return to the parliamentary 
system and new elections. According to the 2017 constitution and the related laws 
(elaborated below), however, it is obvious that the junta had been trying to remain in 
power even after the election and the alleged return to democracy. As Michael 
Nelson, a keen observer of Thai politics, has put it: 
… the end of the [NCPO’s] direct rule did not mean a return to ‘democracy.’ 
Rather, it would usher in what they called a ‘transition period’ of at least five 
years. Only afterwards, people could start thinking about moving towards a 
greater degree of democracy (Nelson 2019, 3-4). 
4. The Beginning of King Rama X
 
In theory, in Thailand and elsewhere, a constitutional monarchy is above politics. In 
reality, many scholars and observers have made it clear the Thai monarchy has played 
a crucial and sometimes active role in politics (Handley 2006; Thongchai 2019).  As 
described earlier in this article, the political crisis since 2006 has been related to the 
monarchy indirectly and directly and implicitly as well as explicitly. Royal democracy 
implies the presence of the monarchy in name as well as in action. In the last twenty 
years of Bhumibol’s reign, the stature of the king grew tremendously in tandem with 
his ever increasing significance as a pillar to Thailand’s royal democracy.
The passing of Bhumibol created political anxieties that should not have been the 
case had the monarchy been truly uninvolved in politics. The anxieties related to the 
future of royal democracy and the political domination of the monarchists since the 
cult of a charismatic and beloved king was a pillar of the successful royal democracy 
(Thongchai 2019, 287-290, 301-303).  Without this kind of cult, the dominance of the 
monarchy could be in trouble. Such a cult, however, relies on the accomplishment and 
charisma of the reigning monarch. 
Since the monarchy is an institution of one person (plus his followers and networks 
who often act in his name), his personal character and attributes, words, actions and 
inactions, and even rumors about him, could affect and shape the king’s aura. 
Currently, the shadow of Bhumibol’s cult remains beneficial to the new king. Sooner 
or later, the shadow will fade away, and King Rama X will be responsible for his own 
reputation.
The first few years of Rama X have been another cause for concern. The new king 
has been active in recreating the monarchy in his vision. He reorganized and 
expanded the Office of the Royal Household in 20174).  A few old buildings in the 
palace compound were demolished, and several new ones were constructed. Huge 
areas of former crown estate that had been turned into public space for decades, 
including military bases, government offices, roads, and Bangkok’s only public zoo, 
were reclaimed by the palace5).  All crown properties, including all the assets of the 
Thai monarchy over generations, have been declared the personal property of the new 
king6).  All properties are exempt from tax. These changes were executed legally. 
Several royal customs that had ended with the absolute monarchy have been revived, 
including the official, legal appointment of the royal consort7).  What these actions tell 
us and the political community in Thailand about the king and his probable role in 
politics remains a matter of speculation. 
Nevertheless, this was one of the conditions in which the general election was held 
on March 24, 2019.
5. The March 24, 2019 Election
As mentioned above, the election may not mean the return to democracy as the 
junta, apparently, attempt to hold on to power in a different form than military rule. 
They have done so using several legal instruments. 
First, due to several restrictions and mandates in the election law, the result of the 
general election would likely produce no majority party. Thus, a weak and possibly 
fragmented coalition government is the likely outcome. 
Second, the constitution also allows a nonelected person be chosen as the prime 
minister. Given the fragmented coalition, it was expected long before the election that 
General Prayuth Chan-ocha, the head of the NPCO, would likely be chosen. 
Third, the upper house (the Senate) of the new parliament comprises of 250 
members, all of whom are all selected by the NCPO, with the majority being military 
officers. They are chosen without any election or broad-based selection criteria. 
Fourth, together with the 500 elected members of the lower house, these senators 
will take part in the selection of the prime minister. In addition, the senators serve a 
five-year term. Assuming a government lasts a full four-year term, these senators can 
choose two prime ministers.
Last but not least, the 2017 constitution mandates that every government must 
observe the “national strategic plan.” Drafted by the NPCO-appointed committee and 
approved before the election by the NPCO-appointed national assembly, the plan is 
the framework that all policies and projects by any elected government in the next 
twenty years must follow. Violations to the strategic framework could result in the 
disqualification of the government.
The March 24 election took place under these restrictions. Despite that, political 
parties and the public enthusiastically welcomed the election, as it could represent a 
fresh change of condition without severe limits to political freedom and freedom of 
expression. Many may have hoped that it would be the end of the downward spiral of 
popular democracy or the beginning of the end of the actual power of the NPCO. 
It remains to be seen if it would be the beginning of another attempt at popular 
democracy or if it is indeed the renewal of the authoritarian rule under a different 
cloak.
The election may help understand not only the future of popular democracy but also 
serve as a lens to examine the relationship between the military and the new king. 
The monarchists knew that they should not rely too heavily on the military. During 
the latter half of the reign of King Bhumbol, the military became monarchized, the 
“soldiers of the king.” The election may provide some hints about their power 
relations under the new king. The February 8, 2019 incident was significant in this 
regard as well. 
A few days earlier, the king’s elder sister, who had resigned from royalty decades 
ago to marry a foreigner, was nominated by a political party to be the candidate for 
the next prime minister. This was certainly a challenge to the NPCO’s plan for 
General Prayuth to remain the prime minister. After a few days of political 
maneuvers, on February 8, 2019, the king intervened, issuing a public statement, 
forbidding his sister from submitting herself as a candidate. The statement did not 
refer to any legal prohibition, since his sister is an ordinary citizen, legally speaking, 
and nobody counter-signed the statement8).  Regardless of these legal quandaries, as 
this happened in Thailand, the king’s statement was accepted as the final word by 
everyone. What did this incident tell us about the relationship between the palace and 
the NPCO? Unfortunately, information about the event remains inadequate for 
speculation. 
Conclusion
Even as the monarchists distrust popular sovereignty and the representative system, 
they also need “people” or popular support to bargain with the military. Meanwhile, 
the rapid ascendency of their power, especially their embeddedness in the state and 
society, suggests that the military have a vision for their eventual supremacy. They 
are here to stay for the long term, not merely as a caretaker for royal democracy and 
definitely not to return to barracks after the election. After all, they are the only 
political force with weapons, and a coup in Thailand is a relatively low-risk action 
(Mérieau 2019). 
Despite the initial popular support for the coup for the sake of peaceful and orderly 
society, people’s dissention to military authoritarianism is growing, especially in the 
past year as the economy has grown sluggish and the ruling junta has become 
shamelessly out of touch in many respects. Ordinary people, however, have no agency 
currently, other than political parties and politicians, who do not always represent 
their voice and interests. 
The political status quo under King Bhumibol meant the settlement of power 
Introduction
Even before the recent election in Thailand on March 24, 2019, Thai people and 
foreign observers alike wondered if this was simply another election in the repeated 
cycle of coups, military rule, new constitutions, and elections that end with the failure 
of democracy and the beginning of another coup. Was it another farce in Thailand’s 
political history? 
This seemingly repeating cycle of political history is a superficial observation of an 
apparent phenomenon. In fact, many elections, democratic breakthroughs, 
constitutions, and even coups and military rules, and constitutions in the past were 
meaningful in various ways in par ticular moments relating to the history of 
democratization in Thailand.
Thailand’s election on March 24, 2019 was a historic one in many respects. It was 
the first general election after almost five years of an authoritarian regime under 
military rule. It was either the beginning of another attempt at democracy or the 
renewal of the authoritarian rule under a different cloak. Perhaps it was both at the 
same time, as different political agents have attempted to push different agendas for 
the county’s future. It was also the first election and first major political event in the 
new reign of King Vajiralongkorn or Rama X.
This essay will provide the historical background and context to help understand 
the March 24, 2019 election. It looks at the election through the perspective of the 
long history of democratization in the country and within the context of Thailand’s 
ongoing political crisis since 2006 that eventually led to the 2014 coup. Then, the 
essay examines the two most important contextual factors surrounding the election; 
namely, the military regime under which the election was held and the royal 
succession and early years of King Rama X’s reign.
1. A Brief History of Democratization in Thailand
We may say summarily that the democratization process in Thailand has been a 
contest of power among three main political forces; namely, the military, the 
monarchists, and ordinary people for military rule, royalist rule, and popular 
sovereignty, respectively. Never theless, af ter nearly one hundred years of 
democratization, no single faction has achieved outright domination or sustained its 
desired regime; instead, they have had to settle for compromise or alliance with other 
forces. 
The concept of “democracy” was introduced to Siam, the former name of Thailand 
before 1939, around the turn of the twentieth century. At the time, it was simply 
dismissed by the elite of the absolute monarchy as an unsuitable idea for a country 
where people were mostly uneducated and unable to represent themselves and were 
thus content with rule by monarchy1).  Whereas the modern state and government 
were introduced by the absolute monarchy since the late nineteenth century as a 
consolidated and more efficient form of rule, the royals kept power to themselves, 
believing that only they could rule the country properly, including granting a 
democratic government from the top down at the appropriate time (Batson 1974).  
They did not realize the growing dissatisfaction with royal rule that eventually 
toppled the absolute monarchy in 1932. 
The revolutionaries—called the People’s Party—represented the rising power 
among the commoners, especially in the military, which was one of the most 
organized and developed institutions in Thai society at the time. However, the 
revolution was an “unfinished” transition (Ferrara 2015).  The monarchists kept 
t rying to return to power, not to revive the absolute monarchy, but to a new 
supremacy i n  t he  new pa rl iament a r y reg i me.  A n a l l iance be t ween t he  
nonrevolutionary army officers and the monarchists toppled the last government of 
the People’s Party in 1947 (Handley 2006, 80-89).  Then, the long period of military 
rule began.
The rocky alliance and the infighting among military factions eventually resulted 
in military rule in 1957 that groomed the young King Bhumibol (Rama IX, born 
1930; reigned 1946 and lived mostly abroad until 1951) for politics (Thak 2006, 
chapter 3).  Thanks to the Cold War, the United States joined the junta in promoting 
the monarchy as an instrument against communism (Nattapoll 2013, chapter 8).  The 
monarchy, the young Bhumibol in particular, grew in stature and popularity, as he 
worked hard to cultivate the people’s utmost loyalty. Ostensibly, the monarchy was 
“above” politics. The harder he worked beyond politics, the more his enormous moral 
authority increased politically. 
Military rule began to retreat thanks to the popular uprising for democracy in 1973. 
The monarchy took the opportunity to broker the end of violence by forcing the junta 
into exile. In doing so, the nonpolitical institution ascended to the highest authority in 
the land (albeit not a legal-political power but a moral one) and the supreme source of 
political legitimacy. Between 1973 and 1992, the tug-of-political-war and shifting 
alliances among the three political forces, including several coups, attempted coups, 
one massacre that was the most horrific in Thai history in 1976, and another uprising 
for democracy in 1992, resulted in the retreat of the military from politics, “back to 
the barracks” so to speak, and the triumph of royalist democracy (Thongchai 2008, 
15-21).  
Ostensibly, the royalist democracy in Thailand f rom 1992 to 2006 was a 
parliamentary democracy. Actually, however, it was a form of “guided democracy.” 
The elected authority was under the influence, supervision, and interference of the 
monarchists, who operated from the palace and beyond through formal mechanisms, 
such as the Privy Council, and informal networks (McCargo 2005; Thongchai 2019, 
290-300).  Every government during the time presented themselves as the government 
of the king (Chambers and Napisa 2017, chapter 1).  Furthermore, the military’s 
political and material interests were also increasingly attached to the monarchy. They 
became the “monarchized military” or “soldiers of the king.” 
The unprecedented popularity of Thaksin Shinawatra, who won landslide elections 
twice in 2001 and 2004, however, signaled the growing independence of popular 
sovereignty from the traditional ruling institutions, such as the monarchy and the 
military. Particularly in rural areas and in provinces distant from Bangkok, people 
found that the elected authority responded to their demands and interests better than 
the highly centralized and cumbersome bureaucracy. This made the elected 
authority—politicians—a threat to royalist democracy. 
2. Thailand’s Unstable Politics and the Crisis since 2006
The coup in 2006 was an attempt by the monarchists to secure their political 
dominance by curbing the growing demand for popular democracy. The monarchists 
did so by damaging all the necessary democratic institutions and components; 
namely, political parties, freedom of expression, especially the credibility and 
independence of the judiciary rule of law, and the election2).  They also brought the 
military back into politics. The discourse regarding corrupt politics was overblown, 
represented by the demonization of Thaksin. The demagoguery of Thaksin became 
the specter of royal democracy. Ultimately, only in Thailand was democracy 
considered worse than dictatorship.
The brief military rule after the 2006 coup, however, failed to stabilize the royalist 
dominance because the root of conf lict was not merely Thaksin versus the 
monarchists. Underneath the apparent political conflict was a structural change in 
relations among the three main political force with the dominance of the monarchists. 
In this macropolitical perspective, the March 24, 2019 election was the first important 
political action in the absence of the lynchpin of monarchist dominance but with the 
most powerful military since 1992. It was the first major attempt to construct the new 
power relations or the new status quo among the three forces. The election may reveal 
the shifting balance of power and may foretell possible future scenarios. 
The NCPO came to power claiming that the political and social divides had reached 
a dangerous point because of the failure of democracy and politicians. They claimed 
that Thailand urgently needed reforms of politics and many other aspects of the state 
and society. After five years of its rule, it is doubtful that the election was better 
prepared and the outcome was better or reformed Thailand politics. It is highly 
doubtful if the divides have been less acute. Some have argued that the NCPO rule 
probably made the divides more severe. The March 2019 election may ref lect the 
failure of the NCPO in this regard as well. 
However one wonders was it the failure of reform its actual success that the junta 
bore in mind when retaining power.
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Thailand’s socioeconomic and demographic structure that had occurred since the late 
1980s, in which dramatic rural transformation occurred alongside the rapid expansion 
of urbanization. Rural folks became urban dwellers in their ways of life, mentality, 
material interests, and anxieties (Somchai 2016).  The entire political landscape had 
changed because of this changing democracy (Apichat, Yukti and Niti 2013).  The 
centralized bureaucracy, however, cared more for and served the interests of the 
growing affluent middleclass in major cities, especially Bangkok. In short, Thaksin’s 
success was primarily not of his own making. He and his party responded to the 
structural changes, maximizing the opportunity for their political ascendency. 
The 2006 coup awakened Thaksin’s suppor ters throughout the country to 
understanding the politics of the monarchists. Discontent with the monarchists and 
the demand for popular democracy, therefore, remained strong, if not stronger and 
more determined (Thongchai 2014, 92-100).  Meanwhile, with committed support 
from the palace, the military’s political power expanded rapidly, like the demon that 
was released from the lamp and could not be put back. Thailand’s political crisis was 
protracted. 
Although the monarchy remained supreme throughout the crisis, its political power 
relied increasingly on the military, which was subservient to King Bhumibol. Popular 
democracy, on the other hand, could not be denied as every sector of the population 
and society wanted to have their voices heard and some power in the government. 
Democracy was also hard to resist  if Thailand were to attain recognition in the global 
community, especially in terms of economic and trade relations. 
In other words, the ongoing political crisis since 2006 to the present has been a 
contention between the traditional power elite (the alliance between the monarchy and 
military) on the one hand and the demand of popular sovereignty on the other.
A key factor to the crisis was the deteriorating health of King Bhumibol since the 
mid-2000s. Given his unparalleled moral authority, he had been the lynchpin of royal 
democracy. The royal succession—a supposedly nonpolitical matter in a typical 
constitution monarchy like the United Kingdom and Japan—became a matter of huge 
political consequence to royal democracy. The 2014 coup was another attempt to 
secure royal democracy in the final years of King Bhumibol. 
3. The Junta Regime since the 2014 Coup
The regime of the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) or the junta 
regime after the 2014 coup was one of the fiercest and most powerful military rules in 
Thai history. Its repressive measures were swift, effective, uncompromising, and even 
brutal at times in order to disrupt or decisively eliminate all political activities for 
democracy and protest against its rule. For a few years since the coup, especially in 
the immediate months after, a large number of people throughout the country were 
summoned or temporarily detained euphemistically for “attitude adjustment.” Many 
were charged, jailed, or mired in legal problems. Freedom of expression was severely 
limited, the lese majeste law was strictly enforced, and quite a number of ordinary 
people were penalized3).  Despite the protests, condemnations and sanctions of 
various degrees from the international community, the alliance of the military and the 
monarchists was able to secure their power. As King Bhumibol passed away in 
October 2016 and the succession occurred without a glitch, the task of securing the 
royal transition was accomplished.
The NCPO rule was not smooth, although popular dissatisfaction and opposition 
never amounted to a threat against it. In particular, in the early years after the coup, it 
faced serious pressures from the international community, particularly the European 
Union and the United States, which called for the return to democracy. However, 
these pressures did not bear any results for the military regime was able to turn to 
China for support in various ways. The pressure also fizzled out as the EU and the US 
did not want to push Thailand into China’s embrace (Zawacki 2017).  
Actually, the junta regime under General Prayuth Chan-ocha since 2014 has done 
much more than securing the royalist dominance and the regnal t ransit ion. 
Veerayooth Kanchoochat and Prajak Kongkirati characterized the agenda of the 
current junta regime as “embedded military and hierarchical capitalism.” They 
summarize what the regime has done succinctly:
Politically, we indicate how the junta has embedded its power in ways different 
from the past. It does not pursue a power-sharing governance … but tries to 
militarize the cabinet, parliament, and even state-owned enterprises. The new 
constitution is designed to institutionalize the power of the military and the 
traditional elite vis-à-vis the electoral forces. … Economically, the Prayuth 
regime forms a partnership with a group of Sino-Thai conglomerates to establish 
the [scheme that] … has become a platform through which the giant f irms 
perform the leading role of ‘Big Brother’ in supervising small businesses in their 
sectors, [ref lecting] the collective endeavors of the conglomerates to replace 
competitive markets with hierarchy, rather than encouraging local firms to 
catch-up with them (Veerayooth and Prajak 2018, 279).
 
This economic strategy resulted in the growth of the top conglomerates but a 
weakening economy overall. Economic disparity accelerated during the NCPO 
regime. 
After several delays, including the rejection of one constitution draft that had taken 
a year to complete, finally, the NCPO introduced a new constitution in 2017 and 
related laws in the following year in preparation for the return to the parliamentary 
system and new elections. According to the 2017 constitution and the related laws 
(elaborated below), however, it is obvious that the junta had been trying to remain in 
power even after the election and the alleged return to democracy. As Michael 
Nelson, a keen observer of Thai politics, has put it: 
… the end of the [NCPO’s] direct rule did not mean a return to ‘democracy.’ 
Rather, it would usher in what they called a ‘transition period’ of at least five 
years. Only afterwards, people could start thinking about moving towards a 
greater degree of democracy (Nelson 2019, 3-4). 
4. The Beginning of King Rama X
 
In theory, in Thailand and elsewhere, a constitutional monarchy is above politics. In 
reality, many scholars and observers have made it clear the Thai monarchy has played 
a crucial and sometimes active role in politics (Handley 2006; Thongchai 2019).  As 
described earlier in this article, the political crisis since 2006 has been related to the 
monarchy indirectly and directly and implicitly as well as explicitly. Royal democracy 
implies the presence of the monarchy in name as well as in action. In the last twenty 
years of Bhumibol’s reign, the stature of the king grew tremendously in tandem with 
his ever increasing significance as a pillar to Thailand’s royal democracy.
The passing of Bhumibol created political anxieties that should not have been the 
case had the monarchy been truly uninvolved in politics. The anxieties related to the 
future of royal democracy and the political domination of the monarchists since the 
cult of a charismatic and beloved king was a pillar of the successful royal democracy 
(Thongchai 2019, 287-290, 301-303).  Without this kind of cult, the dominance of the 
monarchy could be in trouble. Such a cult, however, relies on the accomplishment and 
charisma of the reigning monarch. 
Since the monarchy is an institution of one person (plus his followers and networks 
who often act in his name), his personal character and attributes, words, actions and 
inactions, and even rumors about him, could affect and shape the king’s aura. 
Currently, the shadow of Bhumibol’s cult remains beneficial to the new king. Sooner 
or later, the shadow will fade away, and King Rama X will be responsible for his own 
reputation.
The first few years of Rama X have been another cause for concern. The new king 
has been active in recreating the monarchy in his vision. He reorganized and 
expanded the Office of the Royal Household in 20174).  A few old buildings in the 
palace compound were demolished, and several new ones were constructed. Huge 
areas of former crown estate that had been turned into public space for decades, 
including military bases, government offices, roads, and Bangkok’s only public zoo, 
were reclaimed by the palace5).  All crown properties, including all the assets of the 
Thai monarchy over generations, have been declared the personal property of the new 
king6).  All properties are exempt from tax. These changes were executed legally. 
Several royal customs that had ended with the absolute monarchy have been revived, 
including the official, legal appointment of the royal consort7).  What these actions tell 
us and the political community in Thailand about the king and his probable role in 
politics remains a matter of speculation. 
Nevertheless, this was one of the conditions in which the general election was held 
on March 24, 2019.
5. The March 24, 2019 Election
As mentioned above, the election may not mean the return to democracy as the 
junta, apparently, attempt to hold on to power in a different form than military rule. 
They have done so using several legal instruments. 
First, due to several restrictions and mandates in the election law, the result of the 
general election would likely produce no majority party. Thus, a weak and possibly 
fragmented coalition government is the likely outcome. 
Second, the constitution also allows a nonelected person be chosen as the prime 
minister. Given the fragmented coalition, it was expected long before the election that 
General Prayuth Chan-ocha, the head of the NPCO, would likely be chosen. 
Third, the upper house (the Senate) of the new parliament comprises of 250 
members, all of whom are all selected by the NCPO, with the majority being military 
officers. They are chosen without any election or broad-based selection criteria. 
Fourth, together with the 500 elected members of the lower house, these senators 
will take part in the selection of the prime minister. In addition, the senators serve a 
five-year term. Assuming a government lasts a full four-year term, these senators can 
choose two prime ministers.
Last but not least, the 2017 constitution mandates that every government must 
observe the “national strategic plan.” Drafted by the NPCO-appointed committee and 
approved before the election by the NPCO-appointed national assembly, the plan is 
the framework that all policies and projects by any elected government in the next 
twenty years must follow. Violations to the strategic framework could result in the 
disqualification of the government.
The March 24 election took place under these restrictions. Despite that, political 
parties and the public enthusiastically welcomed the election, as it could represent a 
fresh change of condition without severe limits to political freedom and freedom of 
expression. Many may have hoped that it would be the end of the downward spiral of 
popular democracy or the beginning of the end of the actual power of the NPCO. 
It remains to be seen if it would be the beginning of another attempt at popular 
democracy or if it is indeed the renewal of the authoritarian rule under a different 
cloak.
The election may help understand not only the future of popular democracy but also 
serve as a lens to examine the relationship between the military and the new king. 
The monarchists knew that they should not rely too heavily on the military. During 
the latter half of the reign of King Bhumbol, the military became monarchized, the 
“soldiers of the king.” The election may provide some hints about their power 
relations under the new king. The February 8, 2019 incident was significant in this 
regard as well. 
A few days earlier, the king’s elder sister, who had resigned from royalty decades 
ago to marry a foreigner, was nominated by a political party to be the candidate for 
the next prime minister. This was certainly a challenge to the NPCO’s plan for 
General Prayuth to remain the prime minister. After a few days of political 
maneuvers, on February 8, 2019, the king intervened, issuing a public statement, 
forbidding his sister from submitting herself as a candidate. The statement did not 
refer to any legal prohibition, since his sister is an ordinary citizen, legally speaking, 
and nobody counter-signed the statement8).  Regardless of these legal quandaries, as 
this happened in Thailand, the king’s statement was accepted as the final word by 
everyone. What did this incident tell us about the relationship between the palace and 
the NPCO? Unfortunately, information about the event remains inadequate for 
speculation. 
Conclusion
Even as the monarchists distrust popular sovereignty and the representative system, 
they also need “people” or popular support to bargain with the military. Meanwhile, 
the rapid ascendency of their power, especially their embeddedness in the state and 
society, suggests that the military have a vision for their eventual supremacy. They 
are here to stay for the long term, not merely as a caretaker for royal democracy and 
definitely not to return to barracks after the election. After all, they are the only 
political force with weapons, and a coup in Thailand is a relatively low-risk action 
(Mérieau 2019). 
Despite the initial popular support for the coup for the sake of peaceful and orderly 
society, people’s dissention to military authoritarianism is growing, especially in the 
past year as the economy has grown sluggish and the ruling junta has become 
shamelessly out of touch in many respects. Ordinary people, however, have no agency 
currently, other than political parties and politicians, who do not always represent 
their voice and interests. 
The political status quo under King Bhumibol meant the settlement of power 
Introduction
Even before the recent election in Thailand on March 24, 2019, Thai people and 
foreign observers alike wondered if this was simply another election in the repeated 
cycle of coups, military rule, new constitutions, and elections that end with the failure 
of democracy and the beginning of another coup. Was it another farce in Thailand’s 
political history? 
This seemingly repeating cycle of political history is a superficial observation of an 
apparent phenomenon. In fact, many elections, democratic breakthroughs, 
constitutions, and even coups and military rules, and constitutions in the past were 
meaningful in various ways in par ticular moments relating to the history of 
democratization in Thailand.
Thailand’s election on March 24, 2019 was a historic one in many respects. It was 
the first general election after almost five years of an authoritarian regime under 
military rule. It was either the beginning of another attempt at democracy or the 
renewal of the authoritarian rule under a different cloak. Perhaps it was both at the 
same time, as different political agents have attempted to push different agendas for 
the county’s future. It was also the first election and first major political event in the 
new reign of King Vajiralongkorn or Rama X.
This essay will provide the historical background and context to help understand 
the March 24, 2019 election. It looks at the election through the perspective of the 
long history of democratization in the country and within the context of Thailand’s 
ongoing political crisis since 2006 that eventually led to the 2014 coup. Then, the 
essay examines the two most important contextual factors surrounding the election; 
namely, the military regime under which the election was held and the royal 
succession and early years of King Rama X’s reign.
1. A Brief History of Democratization in Thailand
We may say summarily that the democratization process in Thailand has been a 
contest of power among three main political forces; namely, the military, the 
monarchists, and ordinary people for military rule, royalist rule, and popular 
sovereignty, respectively. Never theless, af ter nearly one hundred years of 
democratization, no single faction has achieved outright domination or sustained its 
desired regime; instead, they have had to settle for compromise or alliance with other 
forces. 
The concept of “democracy” was introduced to Siam, the former name of Thailand 
before 1939, around the turn of the twentieth century. At the time, it was simply 
dismissed by the elite of the absolute monarchy as an unsuitable idea for a country 
where people were mostly uneducated and unable to represent themselves and were 
thus content with rule by monarchy1).  Whereas the modern state and government 
were introduced by the absolute monarchy since the late nineteenth century as a 
consolidated and more efficient form of rule, the royals kept power to themselves, 
believing that only they could rule the country properly, including granting a 
democratic government from the top down at the appropriate time (Batson 1974).  
They did not realize the growing dissatisfaction with royal rule that eventually 
toppled the absolute monarchy in 1932. 
The revolutionaries—called the People’s Party—represented the rising power 
among the commoners, especially in the military, which was one of the most 
organized and developed institutions in Thai society at the time. However, the 
revolution was an “unfinished” transition (Ferrara 2015).  The monarchists kept 
t rying to return to power, not to revive the absolute monarchy, but to a new 
supremacy i n  t he  new pa rl iament a r y reg i me.  A n a l l iance be t ween t he  
nonrevolutionary army officers and the monarchists toppled the last government of 
the People’s Party in 1947 (Handley 2006, 80-89).  Then, the long period of military 
rule began.
The rocky alliance and the infighting among military factions eventually resulted 
in military rule in 1957 that groomed the young King Bhumibol (Rama IX, born 
1930; reigned 1946 and lived mostly abroad until 1951) for politics (Thak 2006, 
chapter 3).  Thanks to the Cold War, the United States joined the junta in promoting 
the monarchy as an instrument against communism (Nattapoll 2013, chapter 8).  The 
monarchy, the young Bhumibol in particular, grew in stature and popularity, as he 
worked hard to cultivate the people’s utmost loyalty. Ostensibly, the monarchy was 
“above” politics. The harder he worked beyond politics, the more his enormous moral 
authority increased politically. 
Military rule began to retreat thanks to the popular uprising for democracy in 1973. 
The monarchy took the opportunity to broker the end of violence by forcing the junta 
into exile. In doing so, the nonpolitical institution ascended to the highest authority in 
the land (albeit not a legal-political power but a moral one) and the supreme source of 
political legitimacy. Between 1973 and 1992, the tug-of-political-war and shifting 
alliances among the three political forces, including several coups, attempted coups, 
one massacre that was the most horrific in Thai history in 1976, and another uprising 
for democracy in 1992, resulted in the retreat of the military from politics, “back to 
the barracks” so to speak, and the triumph of royalist democracy (Thongchai 2008, 
15-21).  
Ostensibly, the royalist democracy in Thailand f rom 1992 to 2006 was a 
parliamentary democracy. Actually, however, it was a form of “guided democracy.” 
The elected authority was under the influence, supervision, and interference of the 
monarchists, who operated from the palace and beyond through formal mechanisms, 
such as the Privy Council, and informal networks (McCargo 2005; Thongchai 2019, 
290-300).  Every government during the time presented themselves as the government 
of the king (Chambers and Napisa 2017, chapter 1).  Furthermore, the military’s 
political and material interests were also increasingly attached to the monarchy. They 
became the “monarchized military” or “soldiers of the king.” 
The unprecedented popularity of Thaksin Shinawatra, who won landslide elections 
twice in 2001 and 2004, however, signaled the growing independence of popular 
sovereignty from the traditional ruling institutions, such as the monarchy and the 
military. Particularly in rural areas and in provinces distant from Bangkok, people 
found that the elected authority responded to their demands and interests better than 
the highly centralized and cumbersome bureaucracy. This made the elected 
authority—politicians—a threat to royalist democracy. 
2. Thailand’s Unstable Politics and the Crisis since 2006
The coup in 2006 was an attempt by the monarchists to secure their political 
dominance by curbing the growing demand for popular democracy. The monarchists 
did so by damaging all the necessary democratic institutions and components; 
namely, political parties, freedom of expression, especially the credibility and 
independence of the judiciary rule of law, and the election2).  They also brought the 
military back into politics. The discourse regarding corrupt politics was overblown, 
represented by the demonization of Thaksin. The demagoguery of Thaksin became 
the specter of royal democracy. Ultimately, only in Thailand was democracy 
considered worse than dictatorship.
The brief military rule after the 2006 coup, however, failed to stabilize the royalist 
dominance because the root of conf lict was not merely Thaksin versus the 
monarchists. Underneath the apparent political conflict was a structural change in 
relations among the three main political force with the dominance of the monarchists. 
In this macropolitical perspective, the March 24, 2019 election was the first important 
political action in the absence of the lynchpin of monarchist dominance but with the 
most powerful military since 1992. It was the first major attempt to construct the new 
power relations or the new status quo among the three forces. The election may reveal 
the shifting balance of power and may foretell possible future scenarios. 
The NCPO came to power claiming that the political and social divides had reached 
a dangerous point because of the failure of democracy and politicians. They claimed 
that Thailand urgently needed reforms of politics and many other aspects of the state 
and society. After five years of its rule, it is doubtful that the election was better 
prepared and the outcome was better or reformed Thailand politics. It is highly 
doubtful if the divides have been less acute. Some have argued that the NCPO rule 
probably made the divides more severe. The March 2019 election may ref lect the 
failure of the NCPO in this regard as well. 
However one wonders was it the failure of reform its actual success that the junta 
bore in mind when retaining power.
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Thailand’s socioeconomic and demographic structure that had occurred since the late 
1980s, in which dramatic rural transformation occurred alongside the rapid expansion 
of urbanization. Rural folks became urban dwellers in their ways of life, mentality, 
material interests, and anxieties (Somchai 2016).  The entire political landscape had 
changed because of this changing democracy (Apichat, Yukti and Niti 2013).  The 
centralized bureaucracy, however, cared more for and served the interests of the 
growing affluent middleclass in major cities, especially Bangkok. In short, Thaksin’s 
success was primarily not of his own making. He and his party responded to the 
structural changes, maximizing the opportunity for their political ascendency. 
The 2006 coup awakened Thaksin’s suppor ters throughout the country to 
understanding the politics of the monarchists. Discontent with the monarchists and 
the demand for popular democracy, therefore, remained strong, if not stronger and 
more determined (Thongchai 2014, 92-100).  Meanwhile, with committed support 
from the palace, the military’s political power expanded rapidly, like the demon that 
was released from the lamp and could not be put back. Thailand’s political crisis was 
protracted. 
Although the monarchy remained supreme throughout the crisis, its political power 
relied increasingly on the military, which was subservient to King Bhumibol. Popular 
democracy, on the other hand, could not be denied as every sector of the population 
and society wanted to have their voices heard and some power in the government. 
Democracy was also hard to resist  if Thailand were to attain recognition in the global 
community, especially in terms of economic and trade relations. 
In other words, the ongoing political crisis since 2006 to the present has been a 
contention between the traditional power elite (the alliance between the monarchy and 
military) on the one hand and the demand of popular sovereignty on the other.
A key factor to the crisis was the deteriorating health of King Bhumibol since the 
mid-2000s. Given his unparalleled moral authority, he had been the lynchpin of royal 
democracy. The royal succession—a supposedly nonpolitical matter in a typical 
constitution monarchy like the United Kingdom and Japan—became a matter of huge 
political consequence to royal democracy. The 2014 coup was another attempt to 
secure royal democracy in the final years of King Bhumibol. 
3. The Junta Regime since the 2014 Coup
The regime of the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) or the junta 
regime after the 2014 coup was one of the fiercest and most powerful military rules in 
Thai history. Its repressive measures were swift, effective, uncompromising, and even 
brutal at times in order to disrupt or decisively eliminate all political activities for 
democracy and protest against its rule. For a few years since the coup, especially in 
the immediate months after, a large number of people throughout the country were 
summoned or temporarily detained euphemistically for “attitude adjustment.” Many 
were charged, jailed, or mired in legal problems. Freedom of expression was severely 
limited, the lese majeste law was strictly enforced, and quite a number of ordinary 
people were penalized3).  Despite the protests, condemnations and sanctions of 
various degrees from the international community, the alliance of the military and the 
monarchists was able to secure their power. As King Bhumibol passed away in 
October 2016 and the succession occurred without a glitch, the task of securing the 
royal transition was accomplished.
The NCPO rule was not smooth, although popular dissatisfaction and opposition 
never amounted to a threat against it. In particular, in the early years after the coup, it 
faced serious pressures from the international community, particularly the European 
Union and the United States, which called for the return to democracy. However, 
these pressures did not bear any results for the military regime was able to turn to 
China for support in various ways. The pressure also fizzled out as the EU and the US 
did not want to push Thailand into China’s embrace (Zawacki 2017).  
Actually, the junta regime under General Prayuth Chan-ocha since 2014 has done 
much more than securing the royalist dominance and the regnal t ransit ion. 
Veerayooth Kanchoochat and Prajak Kongkirati characterized the agenda of the 
current junta regime as “embedded military and hierarchical capitalism.” They 
summarize what the regime has done succinctly:
Politically, we indicate how the junta has embedded its power in ways different 
from the past. It does not pursue a power-sharing governance … but tries to 
militarize the cabinet, parliament, and even state-owned enterprises. The new 
constitution is designed to institutionalize the power of the military and the 
traditional elite vis-à-vis the electoral forces. … Economically, the Prayuth 
regime forms a partnership with a group of Sino-Thai conglomerates to establish 
the [scheme that] … has become a platform through which the giant f irms 
perform the leading role of ‘Big Brother’ in supervising small businesses in their 
sectors, [ref lecting] the collective endeavors of the conglomerates to replace 
competitive markets with hierarchy, rather than encouraging local firms to 
catch-up with them (Veerayooth and Prajak 2018, 279).
 
This economic strategy resulted in the growth of the top conglomerates but a 
weakening economy overall. Economic disparity accelerated during the NCPO 
regime. 
After several delays, including the rejection of one constitution draft that had taken 
a year to complete, finally, the NCPO introduced a new constitution in 2017 and 
related laws in the following year in preparation for the return to the parliamentary 
system and new elections. According to the 2017 constitution and the related laws 
(elaborated below), however, it is obvious that the junta had been trying to remain in 
power even after the election and the alleged return to democracy. As Michael 
Nelson, a keen observer of Thai politics, has put it: 
… the end of the [NCPO’s] direct rule did not mean a return to ‘democracy.’ 
Rather, it would usher in what they called a ‘transition period’ of at least five 
years. Only afterwards, people could start thinking about moving towards a 
greater degree of democracy (Nelson 2019, 3-4). 
4. The Beginning of King Rama X
 
In theory, in Thailand and elsewhere, a constitutional monarchy is above politics. In 
reality, many scholars and observers have made it clear the Thai monarchy has played 
a crucial and sometimes active role in politics (Handley 2006; Thongchai 2019).  As 
described earlier in this article, the political crisis since 2006 has been related to the 
monarchy indirectly and directly and implicitly as well as explicitly. Royal democracy 
implies the presence of the monarchy in name as well as in action. In the last twenty 
years of Bhumibol’s reign, the stature of the king grew tremendously in tandem with 
his ever increasing significance as a pillar to Thailand’s royal democracy.
The passing of Bhumibol created political anxieties that should not have been the 
case had the monarchy been truly uninvolved in politics. The anxieties related to the 
future of royal democracy and the political domination of the monarchists since the 
cult of a charismatic and beloved king was a pillar of the successful royal democracy 
(Thongchai 2019, 287-290, 301-303).  Without this kind of cult, the dominance of the 
monarchy could be in trouble. Such a cult, however, relies on the accomplishment and 
charisma of the reigning monarch. 
Since the monarchy is an institution of one person (plus his followers and networks 
who often act in his name), his personal character and attributes, words, actions and 
inactions, and even rumors about him, could affect and shape the king’s aura. 
Currently, the shadow of Bhumibol’s cult remains beneficial to the new king. Sooner 
or later, the shadow will fade away, and King Rama X will be responsible for his own 
reputation.
The first few years of Rama X have been another cause for concern. The new king 
has been active in recreating the monarchy in his vision. He reorganized and 
expanded the Office of the Royal Household in 20174).  A few old buildings in the 
palace compound were demolished, and several new ones were constructed. Huge 
areas of former crown estate that had been turned into public space for decades, 
including military bases, government offices, roads, and Bangkok’s only public zoo, 
were reclaimed by the palace5).  All crown properties, including all the assets of the 
Thai monarchy over generations, have been declared the personal property of the new 
king6).  All properties are exempt from tax. These changes were executed legally. 
Several royal customs that had ended with the absolute monarchy have been revived, 
including the official, legal appointment of the royal consort7).  What these actions tell 
us and the political community in Thailand about the king and his probable role in 
politics remains a matter of speculation. 
Nevertheless, this was one of the conditions in which the general election was held 
on March 24, 2019.
5. The March 24, 2019 Election
As mentioned above, the election may not mean the return to democracy as the 
junta, apparently, attempt to hold on to power in a different form than military rule. 
They have done so using several legal instruments. 
First, due to several restrictions and mandates in the election law, the result of the 
general election would likely produce no majority party. Thus, a weak and possibly 
fragmented coalition government is the likely outcome. 
Second, the constitution also allows a nonelected person be chosen as the prime 
minister. Given the fragmented coalition, it was expected long before the election that 
General Prayuth Chan-ocha, the head of the NPCO, would likely be chosen. 
Third, the upper house (the Senate) of the new parliament comprises of 250 
members, all of whom are all selected by the NCPO, with the majority being military 
officers. They are chosen without any election or broad-based selection criteria. 
Fourth, together with the 500 elected members of the lower house, these senators 
will take part in the selection of the prime minister. In addition, the senators serve a 
five-year term. Assuming a government lasts a full four-year term, these senators can 
choose two prime ministers.
Last but not least, the 2017 constitution mandates that every government must 
observe the “national strategic plan.” Drafted by the NPCO-appointed committee and 
approved before the election by the NPCO-appointed national assembly, the plan is 
the framework that all policies and projects by any elected government in the next 
twenty years must follow. Violations to the strategic framework could result in the 
disqualification of the government.
The March 24 election took place under these restrictions. Despite that, political 
parties and the public enthusiastically welcomed the election, as it could represent a 
fresh change of condition without severe limits to political freedom and freedom of 
expression. Many may have hoped that it would be the end of the downward spiral of 
popular democracy or the beginning of the end of the actual power of the NPCO. 
It remains to be seen if it would be the beginning of another attempt at popular 
democracy or if it is indeed the renewal of the authoritarian rule under a different 
cloak.
The election may help understand not only the future of popular democracy but also 
serve as a lens to examine the relationship between the military and the new king. 
The monarchists knew that they should not rely too heavily on the military. During 
the latter half of the reign of King Bhumbol, the military became monarchized, the 
“soldiers of the king.” The election may provide some hints about their power 
relations under the new king. The February 8, 2019 incident was significant in this 
regard as well. 
A few days earlier, the king’s elder sister, who had resigned from royalty decades 
ago to marry a foreigner, was nominated by a political party to be the candidate for 
the next prime minister. This was certainly a challenge to the NPCO’s plan for 
General Prayuth to remain the prime minister. After a few days of political 
maneuvers, on February 8, 2019, the king intervened, issuing a public statement, 
forbidding his sister from submitting herself as a candidate. The statement did not 
refer to any legal prohibition, since his sister is an ordinary citizen, legally speaking, 
and nobody counter-signed the statement8).  Regardless of these legal quandaries, as 
this happened in Thailand, the king’s statement was accepted as the final word by 
everyone. What did this incident tell us about the relationship between the palace and 
the NPCO? Unfortunately, information about the event remains inadequate for 
speculation. 
Conclusion
Even as the monarchists distrust popular sovereignty and the representative system, 
they also need “people” or popular support to bargain with the military. Meanwhile, 
the rapid ascendency of their power, especially their embeddedness in the state and 
society, suggests that the military have a vision for their eventual supremacy. They 
are here to stay for the long term, not merely as a caretaker for royal democracy and 
definitely not to return to barracks after the election. After all, they are the only 
political force with weapons, and a coup in Thailand is a relatively low-risk action 
(Mérieau 2019). 
Despite the initial popular support for the coup for the sake of peaceful and orderly 
society, people’s dissention to military authoritarianism is growing, especially in the 
past year as the economy has grown sluggish and the ruling junta has become 
shamelessly out of touch in many respects. Ordinary people, however, have no agency 
currently, other than political parties and politicians, who do not always represent 
their voice and interests. 
The political status quo under King Bhumibol meant the settlement of power 
Introduction
Even before the recent election in Thailand on March 24, 2019, Thai people and 
foreign observers alike wondered if this was simply another election in the repeated 
cycle of coups, military rule, new constitutions, and elections that end with the failure 
of democracy and the beginning of another coup. Was it another farce in Thailand’s 
political history? 
This seemingly repeating cycle of political history is a superficial observation of an 
apparent phenomenon. In fact, many elections, democratic breakthroughs, 
constitutions, and even coups and military rules, and constitutions in the past were 
meaningful in various ways in par ticular moments relating to the history of 
democratization in Thailand.
Thailand’s election on March 24, 2019 was a historic one in many respects. It was 
the first general election after almost five years of an authoritarian regime under 
military rule. It was either the beginning of another attempt at democracy or the 
renewal of the authoritarian rule under a different cloak. Perhaps it was both at the 
same time, as different political agents have attempted to push different agendas for 
the county’s future. It was also the first election and first major political event in the 
new reign of King Vajiralongkorn or Rama X.
This essay will provide the historical background and context to help understand 
the March 24, 2019 election. It looks at the election through the perspective of the 
long history of democratization in the country and within the context of Thailand’s 
ongoing political crisis since 2006 that eventually led to the 2014 coup. Then, the 
essay examines the two most important contextual factors surrounding the election; 
namely, the military regime under which the election was held and the royal 
succession and early years of King Rama X’s reign.
1. A Brief History of Democratization in Thailand
We may say summarily that the democratization process in Thailand has been a 
contest of power among three main political forces; namely, the military, the 
monarchists, and ordinary people for military rule, royalist rule, and popular 
sovereignty, respectively. Never theless, af ter nearly one hundred years of 
democratization, no single faction has achieved outright domination or sustained its 
desired regime; instead, they have had to settle for compromise or alliance with other 
forces. 
The concept of “democracy” was introduced to Siam, the former name of Thailand 
before 1939, around the turn of the twentieth century. At the time, it was simply 
dismissed by the elite of the absolute monarchy as an unsuitable idea for a country 
where people were mostly uneducated and unable to represent themselves and were 
thus content with rule by monarchy1).  Whereas the modern state and government 
were introduced by the absolute monarchy since the late nineteenth century as a 
consolidated and more efficient form of rule, the royals kept power to themselves, 
believing that only they could rule the country properly, including granting a 
democratic government from the top down at the appropriate time (Batson 1974).  
They did not realize the growing dissatisfaction with royal rule that eventually 
toppled the absolute monarchy in 1932. 
The revolutionaries—called the People’s Party—represented the rising power 
among the commoners, especially in the military, which was one of the most 
organized and developed institutions in Thai society at the time. However, the 
revolution was an “unfinished” transition (Ferrara 2015).  The monarchists kept 
t rying to return to power, not to revive the absolute monarchy, but to a new 
supremacy i n  t he  new pa rl iament a r y reg i me.  A n a l l iance be t ween t he  
nonrevolutionary army officers and the monarchists toppled the last government of 
the People’s Party in 1947 (Handley 2006, 80-89).  Then, the long period of military 
rule began.
The rocky alliance and the infighting among military factions eventually resulted 
in military rule in 1957 that groomed the young King Bhumibol (Rama IX, born 
1930; reigned 1946 and lived mostly abroad until 1951) for politics (Thak 2006, 
chapter 3).  Thanks to the Cold War, the United States joined the junta in promoting 
the monarchy as an instrument against communism (Nattapoll 2013, chapter 8).  The 
monarchy, the young Bhumibol in particular, grew in stature and popularity, as he 
worked hard to cultivate the people’s utmost loyalty. Ostensibly, the monarchy was 
“above” politics. The harder he worked beyond politics, the more his enormous moral 
authority increased politically. 
Military rule began to retreat thanks to the popular uprising for democracy in 1973. 
The monarchy took the opportunity to broker the end of violence by forcing the junta 
into exile. In doing so, the nonpolitical institution ascended to the highest authority in 
the land (albeit not a legal-political power but a moral one) and the supreme source of 
political legitimacy. Between 1973 and 1992, the tug-of-political-war and shifting 
alliances among the three political forces, including several coups, attempted coups, 
one massacre that was the most horrific in Thai history in 1976, and another uprising 
for democracy in 1992, resulted in the retreat of the military from politics, “back to 
the barracks” so to speak, and the triumph of royalist democracy (Thongchai 2008, 
15-21).  
Ostensibly, the royalist democracy in Thailand f rom 1992 to 2006 was a 
parliamentary democracy. Actually, however, it was a form of “guided democracy.” 
The elected authority was under the influence, supervision, and interference of the 
monarchists, who operated from the palace and beyond through formal mechanisms, 
such as the Privy Council, and informal networks (McCargo 2005; Thongchai 2019, 
290-300).  Every government during the time presented themselves as the government 
of the king (Chambers and Napisa 2017, chapter 1).  Furthermore, the military’s 
political and material interests were also increasingly attached to the monarchy. They 
became the “monarchized military” or “soldiers of the king.” 
The unprecedented popularity of Thaksin Shinawatra, who won landslide elections 
twice in 2001 and 2004, however, signaled the growing independence of popular 
sovereignty from the traditional ruling institutions, such as the monarchy and the 
military. Particularly in rural areas and in provinces distant from Bangkok, people 
found that the elected authority responded to their demands and interests better than 
the highly centralized and cumbersome bureaucracy. This made the elected 
authority—politicians—a threat to royalist democracy. 
2. Thailand’s Unstable Politics and the Crisis since 2006
The coup in 2006 was an attempt by the monarchists to secure their political 
dominance by curbing the growing demand for popular democracy. The monarchists 
did so by damaging all the necessary democratic institutions and components; 
namely, political parties, freedom of expression, especially the credibility and 
independence of the judiciary rule of law, and the election2).  They also brought the 
military back into politics. The discourse regarding corrupt politics was overblown, 
represented by the demonization of Thaksin. The demagoguery of Thaksin became 
the specter of royal democracy. Ultimately, only in Thailand was democracy 
considered worse than dictatorship.
The brief military rule after the 2006 coup, however, failed to stabilize the royalist 
dominance because the root of conf lict was not merely Thaksin versus the 
monarchists. Underneath the apparent political conflict was a structural change in 
relations among the three main political force with the dominance of the monarchists. 
In this macropolitical perspective, the March 24, 2019 election was the first important 
political action in the absence of the lynchpin of monarchist dominance but with the 
most powerful military since 1992. It was the first major attempt to construct the new 
power relations or the new status quo among the three forces. The election may reveal 
the shifting balance of power and may foretell possible future scenarios. 
The NCPO came to power claiming that the political and social divides had reached 
a dangerous point because of the failure of democracy and politicians. They claimed 
that Thailand urgently needed reforms of politics and many other aspects of the state 
and society. After five years of its rule, it is doubtful that the election was better 
prepared and the outcome was better or reformed Thailand politics. It is highly 
doubtful if the divides have been less acute. Some have argued that the NCPO rule 
probably made the divides more severe. The March 2019 election may ref lect the 
failure of the NCPO in this regard as well. 
However one wonders was it the failure of reform its actual success that the junta 
bore in mind when retaining power.
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Thailand’s socioeconomic and demographic structure that had occurred since the late 
1980s, in which dramatic rural transformation occurred alongside the rapid expansion 
of urbanization. Rural folks became urban dwellers in their ways of life, mentality, 
material interests, and anxieties (Somchai 2016).  The entire political landscape had 
changed because of this changing democracy (Apichat, Yukti and Niti 2013).  The 
centralized bureaucracy, however, cared more for and served the interests of the 
growing affluent middleclass in major cities, especially Bangkok. In short, Thaksin’s 
success was primarily not of his own making. He and his party responded to the 
structural changes, maximizing the opportunity for their political ascendency. 
The 2006 coup awakened Thaksin’s suppor ters throughout the country to 
understanding the politics of the monarchists. Discontent with the monarchists and 
the demand for popular democracy, therefore, remained strong, if not stronger and 
more determined (Thongchai 2014, 92-100).  Meanwhile, with committed support 
from the palace, the military’s political power expanded rapidly, like the demon that 
was released from the lamp and could not be put back. Thailand’s political crisis was 
protracted. 
Although the monarchy remained supreme throughout the crisis, its political power 
relied increasingly on the military, which was subservient to King Bhumibol. Popular 
democracy, on the other hand, could not be denied as every sector of the population 
and society wanted to have their voices heard and some power in the government. 
Democracy was also hard to resist  if Thailand were to attain recognition in the global 
community, especially in terms of economic and trade relations. 
In other words, the ongoing political crisis since 2006 to the present has been a 
contention between the traditional power elite (the alliance between the monarchy and 
military) on the one hand and the demand of popular sovereignty on the other.
A key factor to the crisis was the deteriorating health of King Bhumibol since the 
mid-2000s. Given his unparalleled moral authority, he had been the lynchpin of royal 
democracy. The royal succession—a supposedly nonpolitical matter in a typical 
constitution monarchy like the United Kingdom and Japan—became a matter of huge 
political consequence to royal democracy. The 2014 coup was another attempt to 
secure royal democracy in the final years of King Bhumibol. 
3. The Junta Regime since the 2014 Coup
The regime of the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) or the junta 
regime after the 2014 coup was one of the fiercest and most powerful military rules in 
Thai history. Its repressive measures were swift, effective, uncompromising, and even 
brutal at times in order to disrupt or decisively eliminate all political activities for 
democracy and protest against its rule. For a few years since the coup, especially in 
the immediate months after, a large number of people throughout the country were 
summoned or temporarily detained euphemistically for “attitude adjustment.” Many 
were charged, jailed, or mired in legal problems. Freedom of expression was severely 
limited, the lese majeste law was strictly enforced, and quite a number of ordinary 
people were penalized3).  Despite the protests, condemnations and sanctions of 
various degrees from the international community, the alliance of the military and the 
monarchists was able to secure their power. As King Bhumibol passed away in 
October 2016 and the succession occurred without a glitch, the task of securing the 
royal transition was accomplished.
The NCPO rule was not smooth, although popular dissatisfaction and opposition 
never amounted to a threat against it. In particular, in the early years after the coup, it 
faced serious pressures from the international community, particularly the European 
Union and the United States, which called for the return to democracy. However, 
these pressures did not bear any results for the military regime was able to turn to 
China for support in various ways. The pressure also fizzled out as the EU and the US 
did not want to push Thailand into China’s embrace (Zawacki 2017).  
Actually, the junta regime under General Prayuth Chan-ocha since 2014 has done 
much more than securing the royalist dominance and the regnal t ransit ion. 
Veerayooth Kanchoochat and Prajak Kongkirati characterized the agenda of the 
current junta regime as “embedded military and hierarchical capitalism.” They 
summarize what the regime has done succinctly:
Politically, we indicate how the junta has embedded its power in ways different 
from the past. It does not pursue a power-sharing governance … but tries to 
militarize the cabinet, parliament, and even state-owned enterprises. The new 
constitution is designed to institutionalize the power of the military and the 
traditional elite vis-à-vis the electoral forces. … Economically, the Prayuth 
regime forms a partnership with a group of Sino-Thai conglomerates to establish 
the [scheme that] … has become a platform through which the giant f irms 
perform the leading role of ‘Big Brother’ in supervising small businesses in their 
sectors, [ref lecting] the collective endeavors of the conglomerates to replace 
competitive markets with hierarchy, rather than encouraging local firms to 
catch-up with them (Veerayooth and Prajak 2018, 279).
 
This economic strategy resulted in the growth of the top conglomerates but a 
weakening economy overall. Economic disparity accelerated during the NCPO 
regime. 
After several delays, including the rejection of one constitution draft that had taken 
a year to complete, finally, the NCPO introduced a new constitution in 2017 and 
related laws in the following year in preparation for the return to the parliamentary 
system and new elections. According to the 2017 constitution and the related laws 
(elaborated below), however, it is obvious that the junta had been trying to remain in 
power even after the election and the alleged return to democracy. As Michael 
Nelson, a keen observer of Thai politics, has put it: 
… the end of the [NCPO’s] direct rule did not mean a return to ‘democracy.’ 
Rather, it would usher in what they called a ‘transition period’ of at least five 
years. Only afterwards, people could start thinking about moving towards a 
greater degree of democracy (Nelson 2019, 3-4). 
4. The Beginning of King Rama X
 
In theory, in Thailand and elsewhere, a constitutional monarchy is above politics. In 
reality, many scholars and observers have made it clear the Thai monarchy has played 
a crucial and sometimes active role in politics (Handley 2006; Thongchai 2019).  As 
described earlier in this article, the political crisis since 2006 has been related to the 
monarchy indirectly and directly and implicitly as well as explicitly. Royal democracy 
implies the presence of the monarchy in name as well as in action. In the last twenty 
years of Bhumibol’s reign, the stature of the king grew tremendously in tandem with 
his ever increasing significance as a pillar to Thailand’s royal democracy.
The passing of Bhumibol created political anxieties that should not have been the 
case had the monarchy been truly uninvolved in politics. The anxieties related to the 
future of royal democracy and the political domination of the monarchists since the 
cult of a charismatic and beloved king was a pillar of the successful royal democracy 
(Thongchai 2019, 287-290, 301-303).  Without this kind of cult, the dominance of the 
monarchy could be in trouble. Such a cult, however, relies on the accomplishment and 
charisma of the reigning monarch. 
Since the monarchy is an institution of one person (plus his followers and networks 
who often act in his name), his personal character and attributes, words, actions and 
inactions, and even rumors about him, could affect and shape the king’s aura. 
Currently, the shadow of Bhumibol’s cult remains beneficial to the new king. Sooner 
or later, the shadow will fade away, and King Rama X will be responsible for his own 
reputation.
The first few years of Rama X have been another cause for concern. The new king 
has been active in recreating the monarchy in his vision. He reorganized and 
expanded the Office of the Royal Household in 20174).  A few old buildings in the 
palace compound were demolished, and several new ones were constructed. Huge 
areas of former crown estate that had been turned into public space for decades, 
including military bases, government offices, roads, and Bangkok’s only public zoo, 
were reclaimed by the palace5).  All crown properties, including all the assets of the 
Thai monarchy over generations, have been declared the personal property of the new 
king6).  All properties are exempt from tax. These changes were executed legally. 
Several royal customs that had ended with the absolute monarchy have been revived, 
including the official, legal appointment of the royal consort7).  What these actions tell 
us and the political community in Thailand about the king and his probable role in 
politics remains a matter of speculation. 
Nevertheless, this was one of the conditions in which the general election was held 
on March 24, 2019.
5. The March 24, 2019 Election
As mentioned above, the election may not mean the return to democracy as the 
junta, apparently, attempt to hold on to power in a different form than military rule. 
They have done so using several legal instruments. 
First, due to several restrictions and mandates in the election law, the result of the 
general election would likely produce no majority party. Thus, a weak and possibly 
fragmented coalition government is the likely outcome. 
Second, the constitution also allows a nonelected person be chosen as the prime 
minister. Given the fragmented coalition, it was expected long before the election that 
General Prayuth Chan-ocha, the head of the NPCO, would likely be chosen. 
Third, the upper house (the Senate) of the new parliament comprises of 250 
members, all of whom are all selected by the NCPO, with the majority being military 
officers. They are chosen without any election or broad-based selection criteria. 
Fourth, together with the 500 elected members of the lower house, these senators 
will take part in the selection of the prime minister. In addition, the senators serve a 
five-year term. Assuming a government lasts a full four-year term, these senators can 
choose two prime ministers.
Last but not least, the 2017 constitution mandates that every government must 
observe the “national strategic plan.” Drafted by the NPCO-appointed committee and 
approved before the election by the NPCO-appointed national assembly, the plan is 
the framework that all policies and projects by any elected government in the next 
twenty years must follow. Violations to the strategic framework could result in the 
disqualification of the government.
The March 24 election took place under these restrictions. Despite that, political 
parties and the public enthusiastically welcomed the election, as it could represent a 
fresh change of condition without severe limits to political freedom and freedom of 
expression. Many may have hoped that it would be the end of the downward spiral of 
popular democracy or the beginning of the end of the actual power of the NPCO. 
It remains to be seen if it would be the beginning of another attempt at popular 
democracy or if it is indeed the renewal of the authoritarian rule under a different 
cloak.
The election may help understand not only the future of popular democracy but also 
serve as a lens to examine the relationship between the military and the new king. 
The monarchists knew that they should not rely too heavily on the military. During 
the latter half of the reign of King Bhumbol, the military became monarchized, the 
“soldiers of the king.” The election may provide some hints about their power 
relations under the new king. The February 8, 2019 incident was significant in this 
regard as well. 
A few days earlier, the king’s elder sister, who had resigned from royalty decades 
ago to marry a foreigner, was nominated by a political party to be the candidate for 
the next prime minister. This was certainly a challenge to the NPCO’s plan for 
General Prayuth to remain the prime minister. After a few days of political 
maneuvers, on February 8, 2019, the king intervened, issuing a public statement, 
forbidding his sister from submitting herself as a candidate. The statement did not 
refer to any legal prohibition, since his sister is an ordinary citizen, legally speaking, 
and nobody counter-signed the statement8).  Regardless of these legal quandaries, as 
this happened in Thailand, the king’s statement was accepted as the final word by 
everyone. What did this incident tell us about the relationship between the palace and 
the NPCO? Unfortunately, information about the event remains inadequate for 
speculation. 
Conclusion
Even as the monarchists distrust popular sovereignty and the representative system, 
they also need “people” or popular support to bargain with the military. Meanwhile, 
the rapid ascendency of their power, especially their embeddedness in the state and 
society, suggests that the military have a vision for their eventual supremacy. They 
are here to stay for the long term, not merely as a caretaker for royal democracy and 
definitely not to return to barracks after the election. After all, they are the only 
political force with weapons, and a coup in Thailand is a relatively low-risk action 
(Mérieau 2019). 
Despite the initial popular support for the coup for the sake of peaceful and orderly 
society, people’s dissention to military authoritarianism is growing, especially in the 
past year as the economy has grown sluggish and the ruling junta has become 
shamelessly out of touch in many respects. Ordinary people, however, have no agency 
currently, other than political parties and politicians, who do not always represent 
their voice and interests. 
The political status quo under King Bhumibol meant the settlement of power 
Introduction
Even before the recent election in Thailand on March 24, 2019, Thai people and 
foreign observers alike wondered if this was simply another election in the repeated 
cycle of coups, military rule, new constitutions, and elections that end with the failure 
of democracy and the beginning of another coup. Was it another farce in Thailand’s 
political history? 
This seemingly repeating cycle of political history is a superficial observation of an 
apparent phenomenon. In fact, many elections, democratic breakthroughs, 
constitutions, and even coups and military rules, and constitutions in the past were 
meaningful in various ways in par ticular moments relating to the history of 
democratization in Thailand.
Thailand’s election on March 24, 2019 was a historic one in many respects. It was 
the first general election after almost five years of an authoritarian regime under 
military rule. It was either the beginning of another attempt at democracy or the 
renewal of the authoritarian rule under a different cloak. Perhaps it was both at the 
same time, as different political agents have attempted to push different agendas for 
the county’s future. It was also the first election and first major political event in the 
new reign of King Vajiralongkorn or Rama X.
This essay will provide the historical background and context to help understand 
the March 24, 2019 election. It looks at the election through the perspective of the 
long history of democratization in the country and within the context of Thailand’s 
ongoing political crisis since 2006 that eventually led to the 2014 coup. Then, the 
essay examines the two most important contextual factors surrounding the election; 
namely, the military regime under which the election was held and the royal 
succession and early years of King Rama X’s reign.
1. A Brief History of Democratization in Thailand
We may say summarily that the democratization process in Thailand has been a 
contest of power among three main political forces; namely, the military, the 
monarchists, and ordinary people for military rule, royalist rule, and popular 
sovereignty, respectively. Never theless, af ter nearly one hundred years of 
democratization, no single faction has achieved outright domination or sustained its 
desired regime; instead, they have had to settle for compromise or alliance with other 
forces. 
The concept of “democracy” was introduced to Siam, the former name of Thailand 
before 1939, around the turn of the twentieth century. At the time, it was simply 
dismissed by the elite of the absolute monarchy as an unsuitable idea for a country 
where people were mostly uneducated and unable to represent themselves and were 
thus content with rule by monarchy1).  Whereas the modern state and government 
were introduced by the absolute monarchy since the late nineteenth century as a 
consolidated and more efficient form of rule, the royals kept power to themselves, 
believing that only they could rule the country properly, including granting a 
democratic government from the top down at the appropriate time (Batson 1974).  
They did not realize the growing dissatisfaction with royal rule that eventually 
toppled the absolute monarchy in 1932. 
The revolutionaries—called the People’s Party—represented the rising power 
among the commoners, especially in the military, which was one of the most 
organized and developed institutions in Thai society at the time. However, the 
revolution was an “unfinished” transition (Ferrara 2015).  The monarchists kept 
t rying to return to power, not to revive the absolute monarchy, but to a new 
supremacy i n  t he  new pa rl iament a r y reg i me.  A n a l l iance be t ween t he  
nonrevolutionary army officers and the monarchists toppled the last government of 
the People’s Party in 1947 (Handley 2006, 80-89).  Then, the long period of military 
rule began.
The rocky alliance and the infighting among military factions eventually resulted 
in military rule in 1957 that groomed the young King Bhumibol (Rama IX, born 
1930; reigned 1946 and lived mostly abroad until 1951) for politics (Thak 2006, 
chapter 3).  Thanks to the Cold War, the United States joined the junta in promoting 
the monarchy as an instrument against communism (Nattapoll 2013, chapter 8).  The 
monarchy, the young Bhumibol in particular, grew in stature and popularity, as he 
worked hard to cultivate the people’s utmost loyalty. Ostensibly, the monarchy was 
“above” politics. The harder he worked beyond politics, the more his enormous moral 
authority increased politically. 
Military rule began to retreat thanks to the popular uprising for democracy in 1973. 
The monarchy took the opportunity to broker the end of violence by forcing the junta 
into exile. In doing so, the nonpolitical institution ascended to the highest authority in 
the land (albeit not a legal-political power but a moral one) and the supreme source of 
political legitimacy. Between 1973 and 1992, the tug-of-political-war and shifting 
alliances among the three political forces, including several coups, attempted coups, 
one massacre that was the most horrific in Thai history in 1976, and another uprising 
for democracy in 1992, resulted in the retreat of the military from politics, “back to 
the barracks” so to speak, and the triumph of royalist democracy (Thongchai 2008, 
15-21).  
Ostensibly, the royalist democracy in Thailand f rom 1992 to 2006 was a 
parliamentary democracy. Actually, however, it was a form of “guided democracy.” 
The elected authority was under the influence, supervision, and interference of the 
monarchists, who operated from the palace and beyond through formal mechanisms, 
such as the Privy Council, and informal networks (McCargo 2005; Thongchai 2019, 
290-300).  Every government during the time presented themselves as the government 
of the king (Chambers and Napisa 2017, chapter 1).  Furthermore, the military’s 
political and material interests were also increasingly attached to the monarchy. They 
became the “monarchized military” or “soldiers of the king.” 
The unprecedented popularity of Thaksin Shinawatra, who won landslide elections 
twice in 2001 and 2004, however, signaled the growing independence of popular 
sovereignty from the traditional ruling institutions, such as the monarchy and the 
military. Particularly in rural areas and in provinces distant from Bangkok, people 
found that the elected authority responded to their demands and interests better than 
the highly centralized and cumbersome bureaucracy. This made the elected 
authority—politicians—a threat to royalist democracy. 
2. Thailand’s Unstable Politics and the Crisis since 2006
The coup in 2006 was an attempt by the monarchists to secure their political 
dominance by curbing the growing demand for popular democracy. The monarchists 
did so by damaging all the necessary democratic institutions and components; 
namely, political parties, freedom of expression, especially the credibility and 
independence of the judiciary rule of law, and the election2).  They also brought the 
military back into politics. The discourse regarding corrupt politics was overblown, 
represented by the demonization of Thaksin. The demagoguery of Thaksin became 
the specter of royal democracy. Ultimately, only in Thailand was democracy 
considered worse than dictatorship.
The brief military rule after the 2006 coup, however, failed to stabilize the royalist 
dominance because the root of conf lict was not merely Thaksin versus the 
monarchists. Underneath the apparent political conflict was a structural change in 
relations among the three main political force with the dominance of the monarchists. 
In this macropolitical perspective, the March 24, 2019 election was the first important 
political action in the absence of the lynchpin of monarchist dominance but with the 
most powerful military since 1992. It was the first major attempt to construct the new 
power relations or the new status quo among the three forces. The election may reveal 
the shifting balance of power and may foretell possible future scenarios. 
The NCPO came to power claiming that the political and social divides had reached 
a dangerous point because of the failure of democracy and politicians. They claimed 
that Thailand urgently needed reforms of politics and many other aspects of the state 
and society. After five years of its rule, it is doubtful that the election was better 
prepared and the outcome was better or reformed Thailand politics. It is highly 
doubtful if the divides have been less acute. Some have argued that the NCPO rule 
probably made the divides more severe. The March 2019 election may ref lect the 
failure of the NCPO in this regard as well. 
However one wonders was it the failure of reform its actual success that the junta 
bore in mind when retaining power.
 
 References
Apichat Sathitniramai, Yukti Mukdawijitra, and Niti Pawapapan 2013. Thopthuan phumithat 
knamuang thai [Re-examining the political landscape of Thailand], Chiang Mai: Public 
Policy Studies Institute.
Batson, Benjamin 1974. Siam’s Political Future: Documents from the End of Absolute Monarchy, 
Ithaca: Cornell Southeast Asia Program.
Chambers, Paul and Napisa Waitoolkiat 2017. Khaki Capital: the Political Economy of the Military 
in Southeast Asia, Copenhagen: NIAS Press.
??? 2016. “The Resilience of the Monarchised Military in Thailand,” Journal of Contemporary 
Asia, 46(3):?425-444.
Chulalongkorn, King, 1989. “Waduai khwamsamakkhi” [On Unity]. In Ekkasan kanmueang 
kanpokkhrong thai [Documents in Thai politics and Administration], edited by Chai-Anan 
Samudavanija and Khattiya Kannasutra. Bangkok: Social Science Association of Thailand, 
Southeast Asia, 6(2): 279-305.
Zawacki, Benjamin 2017. Thailand: Shifting Ground between the US and a Rising China, London: 
Zed Books.
Tamada, Yoshifumi 2017. “Tai ni okeru Sihoka to Kunshusei” (The Judicialization of Thai Politics), 
In Seiji no Shihoka to Minshuka (Judicialization and Democratization of Politics) edited by 
Tamada, Kyoto: Koyo Shobo printings.
????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????
8? Every daily newspaper in Thailand reported this news, many with the publication of the king’s 
statement in full?
55
second printing (The original document was written in 1903).
Ferrara, Federico 2015. The Political Development of Modern Thailand. Combridge: Cambridge 
University Press.
Handley, Paul?2006. The King Never Smiles: a Biography of Thailand’s King Bhumibol Adulyadej. 
New Haven: Yale University Press.
McCargo, Duncan 2005. “Network Monarchy and Legitimacy Crises in Thailand,” Pacific Review, 
18(4): 499-519.
Mérieau, Eugénie 2016. “Thailand’s Deep State, Royal Power and the Constitutional Court 
(1997-2015),” Journal of Contemporary Asia, 46(3): 445-466
??? 2019. “How Thailand Became the World’s Last Military Dictatorship,” The Atlantic, Mar 20; 
https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/ 2019/03/thailand-military-junta- 
election-king/585274 (accessed online Aug 30, 2019).
Nattapoll Chaiching 2013. Kho fanfai nai fan an-lueachuea [To dream the impossible dream]. 
Nonthaburi: Same Sky Books.
Nelson, Michael 2019. “Thailand’s Flawed 2019 Eection Confirms the Country’s Deep Political 
Divide” on Academic.edu , 21 pp. https://www.academia.edu/38933076/Thailands_Flawed_ 
2019_Election_Confirms_the_Countrys_Deep_Political_Divide_draft (accessed Aug 30, 
2019).
Prajak Kongkirati 2016, “Thailand’s Failed 2014 Election: The Anti-Election Movement, Violence 
and Democratic Breakdown” Journal of Contemporary Asia, 46(3): 467-485.
Somchai Phattharathananunth 2016. “Rural Transformations and Democracy in Northeast 
Thailand,” Journal of Contemporary Asia, 46(3): 504-519.
Thak Chaloemtiarana 2006. Thailand: The Politics of Despotic Paternalism, revised Edition. Ithaca, 
NY: Cornell Southeast Asia Program Publications.
Thongchai Winichakul 2008. “Toppling Democracy.” Journal of Contemporary Asia 38(1): 11-37.
??? 2014. “Monarchy and Anti-Monarchy: Two Elephants in the Room and the State of Denial in 
Thailand.” In Good Coup Gone Bad: Thailand's Political Developments since Thaksin's 
Downfall, edited by Pavin Chachavalpongpun. Singapore: ISEAS Yusuf Ishak Institute.
??? 2016. “Thailand’s Hyper-Royalism: Its Past Success and Present Predicament,” Trends in 
Southeast Asia, no.7, Singapore: ISEAS Yusuf Ishak Institute.
??? 2019. “Thailand’s Royal Democracy in Crisis” In After the Coup: The National Council for 
Peace and Order Era and the Future of Thailand, edited by Michael J. Montesano, Terence 
Chong and Mark Heng, Singapore: ISEAS Yusof Ishak Institute.
Veerayooth Kanchoochat and Prajak Kongkirati 2018. “The Prayuth Regime: Embedded Military 
and Hierarchical Capitalism in Thailand” , TRaNS: Trans-Regional and -National Studies of 
Thailand’s socioeconomic and demographic structure that had occurred since the late 
1980s, in which dramatic rural transformation occurred alongside the rapid expansion 
of urbanization. Rural folks became urban dwellers in their ways of life, mentality, 
material interests, and anxieties (Somchai 2016).  The entire political landscape had 
changed because of this changing democracy (Apichat, Yukti and Niti 2013).  The 
centralized bureaucracy, however, cared more for and served the interests of the 
growing affluent middleclass in major cities, especially Bangkok. In short, Thaksin’s 
success was primarily not of his own making. He and his party responded to the 
structural changes, maximizing the opportunity for their political ascendency. 
The 2006 coup awakened Thaksin’s suppor ters throughout the country to 
understanding the politics of the monarchists. Discontent with the monarchists and 
the demand for popular democracy, therefore, remained strong, if not stronger and 
more determined (Thongchai 2014, 92-100).  Meanwhile, with committed support 
from the palace, the military’s political power expanded rapidly, like the demon that 
was released from the lamp and could not be put back. Thailand’s political crisis was 
protracted. 
Although the monarchy remained supreme throughout the crisis, its political power 
relied increasingly on the military, which was subservient to King Bhumibol. Popular 
democracy, on the other hand, could not be denied as every sector of the population 
and society wanted to have their voices heard and some power in the government. 
Democracy was also hard to resist  if Thailand were to attain recognition in the global 
community, especially in terms of economic and trade relations. 
In other words, the ongoing political crisis since 2006 to the present has been a 
contention between the traditional power elite (the alliance between the monarchy and 
military) on the one hand and the demand of popular sovereignty on the other.
A key factor to the crisis was the deteriorating health of King Bhumibol since the 
mid-2000s. Given his unparalleled moral authority, he had been the lynchpin of royal 
democracy. The royal succession—a supposedly nonpolitical matter in a typical 
constitution monarchy like the United Kingdom and Japan—became a matter of huge 
political consequence to royal democracy. The 2014 coup was another attempt to 
secure royal democracy in the final years of King Bhumibol. 
3. The Junta Regime since the 2014 Coup
The regime of the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) or the junta 
regime after the 2014 coup was one of the fiercest and most powerful military rules in 
Thai history. Its repressive measures were swift, effective, uncompromising, and even 
brutal at times in order to disrupt or decisively eliminate all political activities for 
democracy and protest against its rule. For a few years since the coup, especially in 
the immediate months after, a large number of people throughout the country were 
summoned or temporarily detained euphemistically for “attitude adjustment.” Many 
were charged, jailed, or mired in legal problems. Freedom of expression was severely 
limited, the lese majeste law was strictly enforced, and quite a number of ordinary 
people were penalized3).  Despite the protests, condemnations and sanctions of 
various degrees from the international community, the alliance of the military and the 
monarchists was able to secure their power. As King Bhumibol passed away in 
October 2016 and the succession occurred without a glitch, the task of securing the 
royal transition was accomplished.
The NCPO rule was not smooth, although popular dissatisfaction and opposition 
never amounted to a threat against it. In particular, in the early years after the coup, it 
faced serious pressures from the international community, particularly the European 
Union and the United States, which called for the return to democracy. However, 
these pressures did not bear any results for the military regime was able to turn to 
China for support in various ways. The pressure also fizzled out as the EU and the US 
did not want to push Thailand into China’s embrace (Zawacki 2017).  
Actually, the junta regime under General Prayuth Chan-ocha since 2014 has done 
much more than securing the royalist dominance and the regnal t ransit ion. 
Veerayooth Kanchoochat and Prajak Kongkirati characterized the agenda of the 
current junta regime as “embedded military and hierarchical capitalism.” They 
summarize what the regime has done succinctly:
Politically, we indicate how the junta has embedded its power in ways different 
from the past. It does not pursue a power-sharing governance … but tries to 
militarize the cabinet, parliament, and even state-owned enterprises. The new 
constitution is designed to institutionalize the power of the military and the 
traditional elite vis-à-vis the electoral forces. … Economically, the Prayuth 
regime forms a partnership with a group of Sino-Thai conglomerates to establish 
the [scheme that] … has become a platform through which the giant f irms 
perform the leading role of ‘Big Brother’ in supervising small businesses in their 
sectors, [ref lecting] the collective endeavors of the conglomerates to replace 
competitive markets with hierarchy, rather than encouraging local firms to 
catch-up with them (Veerayooth and Prajak 2018, 279).
 
This economic strategy resulted in the growth of the top conglomerates but a 
weakening economy overall. Economic disparity accelerated during the NCPO 
regime. 
After several delays, including the rejection of one constitution draft that had taken 
a year to complete, finally, the NCPO introduced a new constitution in 2017 and 
related laws in the following year in preparation for the return to the parliamentary 
system and new elections. According to the 2017 constitution and the related laws 
(elaborated below), however, it is obvious that the junta had been trying to remain in 
power even after the election and the alleged return to democracy. As Michael 
Nelson, a keen observer of Thai politics, has put it: 
… the end of the [NCPO’s] direct rule did not mean a return to ‘democracy.’ 
Rather, it would usher in what they called a ‘transition period’ of at least five 
years. Only afterwards, people could start thinking about moving towards a 
greater degree of democracy (Nelson 2019, 3-4). 
4. The Beginning of King Rama X
 
In theory, in Thailand and elsewhere, a constitutional monarchy is above politics. In 
reality, many scholars and observers have made it clear the Thai monarchy has played 
a crucial and sometimes active role in politics (Handley 2006; Thongchai 2019).  As 
described earlier in this article, the political crisis since 2006 has been related to the 
monarchy indirectly and directly and implicitly as well as explicitly. Royal democracy 
implies the presence of the monarchy in name as well as in action. In the last twenty 
years of Bhumibol’s reign, the stature of the king grew tremendously in tandem with 
his ever increasing significance as a pillar to Thailand’s royal democracy.
The passing of Bhumibol created political anxieties that should not have been the 
case had the monarchy been truly uninvolved in politics. The anxieties related to the 
future of royal democracy and the political domination of the monarchists since the 
cult of a charismatic and beloved king was a pillar of the successful royal democracy 
(Thongchai 2019, 287-290, 301-303).  Without this kind of cult, the dominance of the 
monarchy could be in trouble. Such a cult, however, relies on the accomplishment and 
charisma of the reigning monarch. 
Since the monarchy is an institution of one person (plus his followers and networks 
who often act in his name), his personal character and attributes, words, actions and 
inactions, and even rumors about him, could affect and shape the king’s aura. 
Currently, the shadow of Bhumibol’s cult remains beneficial to the new king. Sooner 
or later, the shadow will fade away, and King Rama X will be responsible for his own 
reputation.
The first few years of Rama X have been another cause for concern. The new king 
has been active in recreating the monarchy in his vision. He reorganized and 
expanded the Office of the Royal Household in 20174).  A few old buildings in the 
palace compound were demolished, and several new ones were constructed. Huge 
areas of former crown estate that had been turned into public space for decades, 
including military bases, government offices, roads, and Bangkok’s only public zoo, 
were reclaimed by the palace5).  All crown properties, including all the assets of the 
Thai monarchy over generations, have been declared the personal property of the new 
king6).  All properties are exempt from tax. These changes were executed legally. 
Several royal customs that had ended with the absolute monarchy have been revived, 
including the official, legal appointment of the royal consort7).  What these actions tell 
us and the political community in Thailand about the king and his probable role in 
politics remains a matter of speculation. 
Nevertheless, this was one of the conditions in which the general election was held 
on March 24, 2019.
5. The March 24, 2019 Election
As mentioned above, the election may not mean the return to democracy as the 
junta, apparently, attempt to hold on to power in a different form than military rule. 
They have done so using several legal instruments. 
First, due to several restrictions and mandates in the election law, the result of the 
general election would likely produce no majority party. Thus, a weak and possibly 
fragmented coalition government is the likely outcome. 
Second, the constitution also allows a nonelected person be chosen as the prime 
minister. Given the fragmented coalition, it was expected long before the election that 
General Prayuth Chan-ocha, the head of the NPCO, would likely be chosen. 
Third, the upper house (the Senate) of the new parliament comprises of 250 
members, all of whom are all selected by the NCPO, with the majority being military 
officers. They are chosen without any election or broad-based selection criteria. 
Fourth, together with the 500 elected members of the lower house, these senators 
will take part in the selection of the prime minister. In addition, the senators serve a 
five-year term. Assuming a government lasts a full four-year term, these senators can 
choose two prime ministers.
Last but not least, the 2017 constitution mandates that every government must 
observe the “national strategic plan.” Drafted by the NPCO-appointed committee and 
approved before the election by the NPCO-appointed national assembly, the plan is 
the framework that all policies and projects by any elected government in the next 
twenty years must follow. Violations to the strategic framework could result in the 
disqualification of the government.
The March 24 election took place under these restrictions. Despite that, political 
parties and the public enthusiastically welcomed the election, as it could represent a 
fresh change of condition without severe limits to political freedom and freedom of 
expression. Many may have hoped that it would be the end of the downward spiral of 
popular democracy or the beginning of the end of the actual power of the NPCO. 
It remains to be seen if it would be the beginning of another attempt at popular 
democracy or if it is indeed the renewal of the authoritarian rule under a different 
cloak.
The election may help understand not only the future of popular democracy but also 
serve as a lens to examine the relationship between the military and the new king. 
The monarchists knew that they should not rely too heavily on the military. During 
the latter half of the reign of King Bhumbol, the military became monarchized, the 
“soldiers of the king.” The election may provide some hints about their power 
relations under the new king. The February 8, 2019 incident was significant in this 
regard as well. 
A few days earlier, the king’s elder sister, who had resigned from royalty decades 
ago to marry a foreigner, was nominated by a political party to be the candidate for 
the next prime minister. This was certainly a challenge to the NPCO’s plan for 
General Prayuth to remain the prime minister. After a few days of political 
maneuvers, on February 8, 2019, the king intervened, issuing a public statement, 
forbidding his sister from submitting herself as a candidate. The statement did not 
refer to any legal prohibition, since his sister is an ordinary citizen, legally speaking, 
and nobody counter-signed the statement8).  Regardless of these legal quandaries, as 
this happened in Thailand, the king’s statement was accepted as the final word by 
everyone. What did this incident tell us about the relationship between the palace and 
the NPCO? Unfortunately, information about the event remains inadequate for 
speculation. 
Conclusion
Even as the monarchists distrust popular sovereignty and the representative system, 
they also need “people” or popular support to bargain with the military. Meanwhile, 
the rapid ascendency of their power, especially their embeddedness in the state and 
society, suggests that the military have a vision for their eventual supremacy. They 
are here to stay for the long term, not merely as a caretaker for royal democracy and 
definitely not to return to barracks after the election. After all, they are the only 
political force with weapons, and a coup in Thailand is a relatively low-risk action 
(Mérieau 2019). 
Despite the initial popular support for the coup for the sake of peaceful and orderly 
society, people’s dissention to military authoritarianism is growing, especially in the 
past year as the economy has grown sluggish and the ruling junta has become 
shamelessly out of touch in many respects. Ordinary people, however, have no agency 
currently, other than political parties and politicians, who do not always represent 
their voice and interests. 
The political status quo under King Bhumibol meant the settlement of power 
Introduction
Even before the recent election in Thailand on March 24, 2019, Thai people and 
foreign observers alike wondered if this was simply another election in the repeated 
cycle of coups, military rule, new constitutions, and elections that end with the failure 
of democracy and the beginning of another coup. Was it another farce in Thailand’s 
political history? 
This seemingly repeating cycle of political history is a superficial observation of an 
apparent phenomenon. In fact, many elections, democratic breakthroughs, 
constitutions, and even coups and military rules, and constitutions in the past were 
meaningful in various ways in par ticular moments relating to the history of 
democratization in Thailand.
Thailand’s election on March 24, 2019 was a historic one in many respects. It was 
the first general election after almost five years of an authoritarian regime under 
military rule. It was either the beginning of another attempt at democracy or the 
renewal of the authoritarian rule under a different cloak. Perhaps it was both at the 
same time, as different political agents have attempted to push different agendas for 
the county’s future. It was also the first election and first major political event in the 
new reign of King Vajiralongkorn or Rama X.
This essay will provide the historical background and context to help understand 
the March 24, 2019 election. It looks at the election through the perspective of the 
long history of democratization in the country and within the context of Thailand’s 
ongoing political crisis since 2006 that eventually led to the 2014 coup. Then, the 
essay examines the two most important contextual factors surrounding the election; 
namely, the military regime under which the election was held and the royal 
succession and early years of King Rama X’s reign.
1. A Brief History of Democratization in Thailand
We may say summarily that the democratization process in Thailand has been a 
contest of power among three main political forces; namely, the military, the 
monarchists, and ordinary people for military rule, royalist rule, and popular 
sovereignty, respectively. Never theless, af ter nearly one hundred years of 
democratization, no single faction has achieved outright domination or sustained its 
desired regime; instead, they have had to settle for compromise or alliance with other 
forces. 
The concept of “democracy” was introduced to Siam, the former name of Thailand 
before 1939, around the turn of the twentieth century. At the time, it was simply 
dismissed by the elite of the absolute monarchy as an unsuitable idea for a country 
where people were mostly uneducated and unable to represent themselves and were 
thus content with rule by monarchy1).  Whereas the modern state and government 
were introduced by the absolute monarchy since the late nineteenth century as a 
consolidated and more efficient form of rule, the royals kept power to themselves, 
believing that only they could rule the country properly, including granting a 
democratic government from the top down at the appropriate time (Batson 1974).  
They did not realize the growing dissatisfaction with royal rule that eventually 
toppled the absolute monarchy in 1932. 
The revolutionaries—called the People’s Party—represented the rising power 
among the commoners, especially in the military, which was one of the most 
organized and developed institutions in Thai society at the time. However, the 
revolution was an “unfinished” transition (Ferrara 2015).  The monarchists kept 
t rying to return to power, not to revive the absolute monarchy, but to a new 
supremacy i n  t he  new pa rl iament a r y reg i me.  A n a l l iance be t ween t he  
nonrevolutionary army officers and the monarchists toppled the last government of 
the People’s Party in 1947 (Handley 2006, 80-89).  Then, the long period of military 
rule began.
The rocky alliance and the infighting among military factions eventually resulted 
in military rule in 1957 that groomed the young King Bhumibol (Rama IX, born 
1930; reigned 1946 and lived mostly abroad until 1951) for politics (Thak 2006, 
chapter 3).  Thanks to the Cold War, the United States joined the junta in promoting 
the monarchy as an instrument against communism (Nattapoll 2013, chapter 8).  The 
monarchy, the young Bhumibol in particular, grew in stature and popularity, as he 
worked hard to cultivate the people’s utmost loyalty. Ostensibly, the monarchy was 
“above” politics. The harder he worked beyond politics, the more his enormous moral 
authority increased politically. 
Military rule began to retreat thanks to the popular uprising for democracy in 1973. 
The monarchy took the opportunity to broker the end of violence by forcing the junta 
into exile. In doing so, the nonpolitical institution ascended to the highest authority in 
the land (albeit not a legal-political power but a moral one) and the supreme source of 
political legitimacy. Between 1973 and 1992, the tug-of-political-war and shifting 
alliances among the three political forces, including several coups, attempted coups, 
one massacre that was the most horrific in Thai history in 1976, and another uprising 
for democracy in 1992, resulted in the retreat of the military from politics, “back to 
the barracks” so to speak, and the triumph of royalist democracy (Thongchai 2008, 
15-21).  
Ostensibly, the royalist democracy in Thailand f rom 1992 to 2006 was a 
parliamentary democracy. Actually, however, it was a form of “guided democracy.” 
The elected authority was under the influence, supervision, and interference of the 
monarchists, who operated from the palace and beyond through formal mechanisms, 
such as the Privy Council, and informal networks (McCargo 2005; Thongchai 2019, 
290-300).  Every government during the time presented themselves as the government 
of the king (Chambers and Napisa 2017, chapter 1).  Furthermore, the military’s 
political and material interests were also increasingly attached to the monarchy. They 
became the “monarchized military” or “soldiers of the king.” 
The unprecedented popularity of Thaksin Shinawatra, who won landslide elections 
twice in 2001 and 2004, however, signaled the growing independence of popular 
sovereignty from the traditional ruling institutions, such as the monarchy and the 
military. Particularly in rural areas and in provinces distant from Bangkok, people 
found that the elected authority responded to their demands and interests better than 
the highly centralized and cumbersome bureaucracy. This made the elected 
authority—politicians—a threat to royalist democracy. 
2. Thailand’s Unstable Politics and the Crisis since 2006
The coup in 2006 was an attempt by the monarchists to secure their political 
dominance by curbing the growing demand for popular democracy. The monarchists 
did so by damaging all the necessary democratic institutions and components; 
namely, political parties, freedom of expression, especially the credibility and 
independence of the judiciary rule of law, and the election2).  They also brought the 
military back into politics. The discourse regarding corrupt politics was overblown, 
represented by the demonization of Thaksin. The demagoguery of Thaksin became 
the specter of royal democracy. Ultimately, only in Thailand was democracy 
considered worse than dictatorship.
The brief military rule after the 2006 coup, however, failed to stabilize the royalist 
dominance because the root of conf lict was not merely Thaksin versus the 
monarchists. Underneath the apparent political conflict was a structural change in 
relations among the three main political force with the dominance of the monarchists. 
In this macropolitical perspective, the March 24, 2019 election was the first important 
political action in the absence of the lynchpin of monarchist dominance but with the 
most powerful military since 1992. It was the first major attempt to construct the new 
power relations or the new status quo among the three forces. The election may reveal 
the shifting balance of power and may foretell possible future scenarios. 
The NCPO came to power claiming that the political and social divides had reached 
a dangerous point because of the failure of democracy and politicians. They claimed 
that Thailand urgently needed reforms of politics and many other aspects of the state 
and society. After five years of its rule, it is doubtful that the election was better 
prepared and the outcome was better or reformed Thailand politics. It is highly 
doubtful if the divides have been less acute. Some have argued that the NCPO rule 
probably made the divides more severe. The March 2019 election may ref lect the 
failure of the NCPO in this regard as well. 
However one wonders was it the failure of reform its actual success that the junta 
bore in mind when retaining power.
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Thailand’s socioeconomic and demographic structure that had occurred since the late 
1980s, in which dramatic rural transformation occurred alongside the rapid expansion 
of urbanization. Rural folks became urban dwellers in their ways of life, mentality, 
material interests, and anxieties (Somchai 2016).  The entire political landscape had 
changed because of this changing democracy (Apichat, Yukti and Niti 2013).  The 
centralized bureaucracy, however, cared more for and served the interests of the 
growing affluent middleclass in major cities, especially Bangkok. In short, Thaksin’s 
success was primarily not of his own making. He and his party responded to the 
structural changes, maximizing the opportunity for their political ascendency. 
The 2006 coup awakened Thaksin’s suppor ters throughout the country to 
understanding the politics of the monarchists. Discontent with the monarchists and 
the demand for popular democracy, therefore, remained strong, if not stronger and 
more determined (Thongchai 2014, 92-100).  Meanwhile, with committed support 
from the palace, the military’s political power expanded rapidly, like the demon that 
was released from the lamp and could not be put back. Thailand’s political crisis was 
protracted. 
Although the monarchy remained supreme throughout the crisis, its political power 
relied increasingly on the military, which was subservient to King Bhumibol. Popular 
democracy, on the other hand, could not be denied as every sector of the population 
and society wanted to have their voices heard and some power in the government. 
Democracy was also hard to resist  if Thailand were to attain recognition in the global 
community, especially in terms of economic and trade relations. 
In other words, the ongoing political crisis since 2006 to the present has been a 
contention between the traditional power elite (the alliance between the monarchy and 
military) on the one hand and the demand of popular sovereignty on the other.
A key factor to the crisis was the deteriorating health of King Bhumibol since the 
mid-2000s. Given his unparalleled moral authority, he had been the lynchpin of royal 
democracy. The royal succession—a supposedly nonpolitical matter in a typical 
constitution monarchy like the United Kingdom and Japan—became a matter of huge 
political consequence to royal democracy. The 2014 coup was another attempt to 
secure royal democracy in the final years of King Bhumibol. 
3. The Junta Regime since the 2014 Coup
The regime of the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) or the junta 
regime after the 2014 coup was one of the fiercest and most powerful military rules in 
Thai history. Its repressive measures were swift, effective, uncompromising, and even 
brutal at times in order to disrupt or decisively eliminate all political activities for 
democracy and protest against its rule. For a few years since the coup, especially in 
the immediate months after, a large number of people throughout the country were 
summoned or temporarily detained euphemistically for “attitude adjustment.” Many 
were charged, jailed, or mired in legal problems. Freedom of expression was severely 
limited, the lese majeste law was strictly enforced, and quite a number of ordinary 
people were penalized3).  Despite the protests, condemnations and sanctions of 
various degrees from the international community, the alliance of the military and the 
monarchists was able to secure their power. As King Bhumibol passed away in 
October 2016 and the succession occurred without a glitch, the task of securing the 
royal transition was accomplished.
The NCPO rule was not smooth, although popular dissatisfaction and opposition 
never amounted to a threat against it. In particular, in the early years after the coup, it 
faced serious pressures from the international community, particularly the European 
Union and the United States, which called for the return to democracy. However, 
these pressures did not bear any results for the military regime was able to turn to 
China for support in various ways. The pressure also fizzled out as the EU and the US 
did not want to push Thailand into China’s embrace (Zawacki 2017).  
Actually, the junta regime under General Prayuth Chan-ocha since 2014 has done 
much more than securing the royalist dominance and the regnal t ransit ion. 
Veerayooth Kanchoochat and Prajak Kongkirati characterized the agenda of the 
current junta regime as “embedded military and hierarchical capitalism.” They 
summarize what the regime has done succinctly:
Politically, we indicate how the junta has embedded its power in ways different 
from the past. It does not pursue a power-sharing governance … but tries to 
militarize the cabinet, parliament, and even state-owned enterprises. The new 
constitution is designed to institutionalize the power of the military and the 
traditional elite vis-à-vis the electoral forces. … Economically, the Prayuth 
regime forms a partnership with a group of Sino-Thai conglomerates to establish 
the [scheme that] … has become a platform through which the giant f irms 
perform the leading role of ‘Big Brother’ in supervising small businesses in their 
sectors, [ref lecting] the collective endeavors of the conglomerates to replace 
competitive markets with hierarchy, rather than encouraging local firms to 
catch-up with them (Veerayooth and Prajak 2018, 279).
 
This economic strategy resulted in the growth of the top conglomerates but a 
weakening economy overall. Economic disparity accelerated during the NCPO 
regime. 
After several delays, including the rejection of one constitution draft that had taken 
a year to complete, finally, the NCPO introduced a new constitution in 2017 and 
related laws in the following year in preparation for the return to the parliamentary 
system and new elections. According to the 2017 constitution and the related laws 
(elaborated below), however, it is obvious that the junta had been trying to remain in 
power even after the election and the alleged return to democracy. As Michael 
Nelson, a keen observer of Thai politics, has put it: 
… the end of the [NCPO’s] direct rule did not mean a return to ‘democracy.’ 
Rather, it would usher in what they called a ‘transition period’ of at least five 
years. Only afterwards, people could start thinking about moving towards a 
greater degree of democracy (Nelson 2019, 3-4). 
4. The Beginning of King Rama X
 
In theory, in Thailand and elsewhere, a constitutional monarchy is above politics. In 
reality, many scholars and observers have made it clear the Thai monarchy has played 
a crucial and sometimes active role in politics (Handley 2006; Thongchai 2019).  As 
described earlier in this article, the political crisis since 2006 has been related to the 
monarchy indirectly and directly and implicitly as well as explicitly. Royal democracy 
implies the presence of the monarchy in name as well as in action. In the last twenty 
years of Bhumibol’s reign, the stature of the king grew tremendously in tandem with 
his ever increasing significance as a pillar to Thailand’s royal democracy.
The passing of Bhumibol created political anxieties that should not have been the 
case had the monarchy been truly uninvolved in politics. The anxieties related to the 
future of royal democracy and the political domination of the monarchists since the 
cult of a charismatic and beloved king was a pillar of the successful royal democracy 
(Thongchai 2019, 287-290, 301-303).  Without this kind of cult, the dominance of the 
monarchy could be in trouble. Such a cult, however, relies on the accomplishment and 
charisma of the reigning monarch. 
Since the monarchy is an institution of one person (plus his followers and networks 
who often act in his name), his personal character and attributes, words, actions and 
inactions, and even rumors about him, could affect and shape the king’s aura. 
Currently, the shadow of Bhumibol’s cult remains beneficial to the new king. Sooner 
or later, the shadow will fade away, and King Rama X will be responsible for his own 
reputation.
The first few years of Rama X have been another cause for concern. The new king 
has been active in recreating the monarchy in his vision. He reorganized and 
expanded the Office of the Royal Household in 20174).  A few old buildings in the 
palace compound were demolished, and several new ones were constructed. Huge 
areas of former crown estate that had been turned into public space for decades, 
including military bases, government offices, roads, and Bangkok’s only public zoo, 
were reclaimed by the palace5).  All crown properties, including all the assets of the 
Thai monarchy over generations, have been declared the personal property of the new 
king6).  All properties are exempt from tax. These changes were executed legally. 
Several royal customs that had ended with the absolute monarchy have been revived, 
including the official, legal appointment of the royal consort7).  What these actions tell 
us and the political community in Thailand about the king and his probable role in 
politics remains a matter of speculation. 
Nevertheless, this was one of the conditions in which the general election was held 
on March 24, 2019.
5. The March 24, 2019 Election
As mentioned above, the election may not mean the return to democracy as the 
junta, apparently, attempt to hold on to power in a different form than military rule. 
They have done so using several legal instruments. 
First, due to several restrictions and mandates in the election law, the result of the 
general election would likely produce no majority party. Thus, a weak and possibly 
fragmented coalition government is the likely outcome. 
Second, the constitution also allows a nonelected person be chosen as the prime 
minister. Given the fragmented coalition, it was expected long before the election that 
General Prayuth Chan-ocha, the head of the NPCO, would likely be chosen. 
Third, the upper house (the Senate) of the new parliament comprises of 250 
members, all of whom are all selected by the NCPO, with the majority being military 
officers. They are chosen without any election or broad-based selection criteria. 
Fourth, together with the 500 elected members of the lower house, these senators 
will take part in the selection of the prime minister. In addition, the senators serve a 
five-year term. Assuming a government lasts a full four-year term, these senators can 
choose two prime ministers.
Last but not least, the 2017 constitution mandates that every government must 
observe the “national strategic plan.” Drafted by the NPCO-appointed committee and 
approved before the election by the NPCO-appointed national assembly, the plan is 
the framework that all policies and projects by any elected government in the next 
twenty years must follow. Violations to the strategic framework could result in the 
disqualification of the government.
The March 24 election took place under these restrictions. Despite that, political 
parties and the public enthusiastically welcomed the election, as it could represent a 
fresh change of condition without severe limits to political freedom and freedom of 
expression. Many may have hoped that it would be the end of the downward spiral of 
popular democracy or the beginning of the end of the actual power of the NPCO. 
It remains to be seen if it would be the beginning of another attempt at popular 
democracy or if it is indeed the renewal of the authoritarian rule under a different 
cloak.
The election may help understand not only the future of popular democracy but also 
serve as a lens to examine the relationship between the military and the new king. 
The monarchists knew that they should not rely too heavily on the military. During 
the latter half of the reign of King Bhumbol, the military became monarchized, the 
“soldiers of the king.” The election may provide some hints about their power 
relations under the new king. The February 8, 2019 incident was significant in this 
regard as well. 
A few days earlier, the king’s elder sister, who had resigned from royalty decades 
ago to marry a foreigner, was nominated by a political party to be the candidate for 
the next prime minister. This was certainly a challenge to the NPCO’s plan for 
General Prayuth to remain the prime minister. After a few days of political 
maneuvers, on February 8, 2019, the king intervened, issuing a public statement, 
forbidding his sister from submitting herself as a candidate. The statement did not 
refer to any legal prohibition, since his sister is an ordinary citizen, legally speaking, 
and nobody counter-signed the statement8).  Regardless of these legal quandaries, as 
this happened in Thailand, the king’s statement was accepted as the final word by 
everyone. What did this incident tell us about the relationship between the palace and 
the NPCO? Unfortunately, information about the event remains inadequate for 
speculation. 
Conclusion
Even as the monarchists distrust popular sovereignty and the representative system, 
they also need “people” or popular support to bargain with the military. Meanwhile, 
the rapid ascendency of their power, especially their embeddedness in the state and 
society, suggests that the military have a vision for their eventual supremacy. They 
are here to stay for the long term, not merely as a caretaker for royal democracy and 
definitely not to return to barracks after the election. After all, they are the only 
political force with weapons, and a coup in Thailand is a relatively low-risk action 
(Mérieau 2019). 
Despite the initial popular support for the coup for the sake of peaceful and orderly 
society, people’s dissention to military authoritarianism is growing, especially in the 
past year as the economy has grown sluggish and the ruling junta has become 
shamelessly out of touch in many respects. Ordinary people, however, have no agency 
currently, other than political parties and politicians, who do not always represent 
their voice and interests. 
The political status quo under King Bhumibol meant the settlement of power 
Introduction
Even before the recent election in Thailand on March 24, 2019, Thai people and 
foreign observers alike wondered if this was simply another election in the repeated 
cycle of coups, military rule, new constitutions, and elections that end with the failure 
of democracy and the beginning of another coup. Was it another farce in Thailand’s 
political history? 
This seemingly repeating cycle of political history is a superficial observation of an 
apparent phenomenon. In fact, many elections, democratic breakthroughs, 
constitutions, and even coups and military rules, and constitutions in the past were 
meaningful in various ways in par ticular moments relating to the history of 
democratization in Thailand.
Thailand’s election on March 24, 2019 was a historic one in many respects. It was 
the first general election after almost five years of an authoritarian regime under 
military rule. It was either the beginning of another attempt at democracy or the 
renewal of the authoritarian rule under a different cloak. Perhaps it was both at the 
same time, as different political agents have attempted to push different agendas for 
the county’s future. It was also the first election and first major political event in the 
new reign of King Vajiralongkorn or Rama X.
This essay will provide the historical background and context to help understand 
the March 24, 2019 election. It looks at the election through the perspective of the 
long history of democratization in the country and within the context of Thailand’s 
ongoing political crisis since 2006 that eventually led to the 2014 coup. Then, the 
essay examines the two most important contextual factors surrounding the election; 
namely, the military regime under which the election was held and the royal 
succession and early years of King Rama X’s reign.
1. A Brief History of Democratization in Thailand
We may say summarily that the democratization process in Thailand has been a 
contest of power among three main political forces; namely, the military, the 
monarchists, and ordinary people for military rule, royalist rule, and popular 
sovereignty, respectively. Never theless, af ter nearly one hundred years of 
democratization, no single faction has achieved outright domination or sustained its 
desired regime; instead, they have had to settle for compromise or alliance with other 
forces. 
The concept of “democracy” was introduced to Siam, the former name of Thailand 
before 1939, around the turn of the twentieth century. At the time, it was simply 
dismissed by the elite of the absolute monarchy as an unsuitable idea for a country 
where people were mostly uneducated and unable to represent themselves and were 
thus content with rule by monarchy1).  Whereas the modern state and government 
were introduced by the absolute monarchy since the late nineteenth century as a 
consolidated and more efficient form of rule, the royals kept power to themselves, 
believing that only they could rule the country properly, including granting a 
democratic government from the top down at the appropriate time (Batson 1974).  
They did not realize the growing dissatisfaction with royal rule that eventually 
toppled the absolute monarchy in 1932. 
The revolutionaries—called the People’s Party—represented the rising power 
among the commoners, especially in the military, which was one of the most 
organized and developed institutions in Thai society at the time. However, the 
revolution was an “unfinished” transition (Ferrara 2015).  The monarchists kept 
t rying to return to power, not to revive the absolute monarchy, but to a new 
supremacy i n  t he  new pa rl iament a r y reg i me.  A n a l l iance be t ween t he  
nonrevolutionary army officers and the monarchists toppled the last government of 
the People’s Party in 1947 (Handley 2006, 80-89).  Then, the long period of military 
rule began.
The rocky alliance and the infighting among military factions eventually resulted 
in military rule in 1957 that groomed the young King Bhumibol (Rama IX, born 
1930; reigned 1946 and lived mostly abroad until 1951) for politics (Thak 2006, 
chapter 3).  Thanks to the Cold War, the United States joined the junta in promoting 
the monarchy as an instrument against communism (Nattapoll 2013, chapter 8).  The 
monarchy, the young Bhumibol in particular, grew in stature and popularity, as he 
worked hard to cultivate the people’s utmost loyalty. Ostensibly, the monarchy was 
“above” politics. The harder he worked beyond politics, the more his enormous moral 
authority increased politically. 
Military rule began to retreat thanks to the popular uprising for democracy in 1973. 
The monarchy took the opportunity to broker the end of violence by forcing the junta 
into exile. In doing so, the nonpolitical institution ascended to the highest authority in 
the land (albeit not a legal-political power but a moral one) and the supreme source of 
political legitimacy. Between 1973 and 1992, the tug-of-political-war and shifting 
alliances among the three political forces, including several coups, attempted coups, 
one massacre that was the most horrific in Thai history in 1976, and another uprising 
for democracy in 1992, resulted in the retreat of the military from politics, “back to 
the barracks” so to speak, and the triumph of royalist democracy (Thongchai 2008, 
15-21).  
Ostensibly, the royalist democracy in Thailand f rom 1992 to 2006 was a 
parliamentary democracy. Actually, however, it was a form of “guided democracy.” 
The elected authority was under the influence, supervision, and interference of the 
monarchists, who operated from the palace and beyond through formal mechanisms, 
such as the Privy Council, and informal networks (McCargo 2005; Thongchai 2019, 
290-300).  Every government during the time presented themselves as the government 
of the king (Chambers and Napisa 2017, chapter 1).  Furthermore, the military’s 
political and material interests were also increasingly attached to the monarchy. They 
became the “monarchized military” or “soldiers of the king.” 
The unprecedented popularity of Thaksin Shinawatra, who won landslide elections 
twice in 2001 and 2004, however, signaled the growing independence of popular 
sovereignty from the traditional ruling institutions, such as the monarchy and the 
military. Particularly in rural areas and in provinces distant from Bangkok, people 
found that the elected authority responded to their demands and interests better than 
the highly centralized and cumbersome bureaucracy. This made the elected 
authority—politicians—a threat to royalist democracy. 
2. Thailand’s Unstable Politics and the Crisis since 2006
The coup in 2006 was an attempt by the monarchists to secure their political 
dominance by curbing the growing demand for popular democracy. The monarchists 
did so by damaging all the necessary democratic institutions and components; 
namely, political parties, freedom of expression, especially the credibility and 
independence of the judiciary rule of law, and the election2).  They also brought the 
military back into politics. The discourse regarding corrupt politics was overblown, 
represented by the demonization of Thaksin. The demagoguery of Thaksin became 
the specter of royal democracy. Ultimately, only in Thailand was democracy 
considered worse than dictatorship.
The brief military rule after the 2006 coup, however, failed to stabilize the royalist 
dominance because the root of conf lict was not merely Thaksin versus the 
monarchists. Underneath the apparent political conflict was a structural change in 
relations among the three main political force with the dominance of the monarchists. 
In this macropolitical perspective, the March 24, 2019 election was the first important 
political action in the absence of the lynchpin of monarchist dominance but with the 
most powerful military since 1992. It was the first major attempt to construct the new 
power relations or the new status quo among the three forces. The election may reveal 
the shifting balance of power and may foretell possible future scenarios. 
The NCPO came to power claiming that the political and social divides had reached 
a dangerous point because of the failure of democracy and politicians. They claimed 
that Thailand urgently needed reforms of politics and many other aspects of the state 
and society. After five years of its rule, it is doubtful that the election was better 
prepared and the outcome was better or reformed Thailand politics. It is highly 
doubtful if the divides have been less acute. Some have argued that the NCPO rule 
probably made the divides more severe. The March 2019 election may ref lect the 
failure of the NCPO in this regard as well. 
However one wonders was it the failure of reform its actual success that the junta 
bore in mind when retaining power.
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Thailand’s socioeconomic and demographic structure that had occurred since the late 
1980s, in which dramatic rural transformation occurred alongside the rapid expansion 
of urbanization. Rural folks became urban dwellers in their ways of life, mentality, 
material interests, and anxieties (Somchai 2016).  The entire political landscape had 
changed because of this changing democracy (Apichat, Yukti and Niti 2013).  The 
centralized bureaucracy, however, cared more for and served the interests of the 
growing affluent middleclass in major cities, especially Bangkok. In short, Thaksin’s 
success was primarily not of his own making. He and his party responded to the 
structural changes, maximizing the opportunity for their political ascendency. 
The 2006 coup awakened Thaksin’s suppor ters throughout the country to 
understanding the politics of the monarchists. Discontent with the monarchists and 
the demand for popular democracy, therefore, remained strong, if not stronger and 
more determined (Thongchai 2014, 92-100).  Meanwhile, with committed support 
from the palace, the military’s political power expanded rapidly, like the demon that 
was released from the lamp and could not be put back. Thailand’s political crisis was 
protracted. 
Although the monarchy remained supreme throughout the crisis, its political power 
relied increasingly on the military, which was subservient to King Bhumibol. Popular 
democracy, on the other hand, could not be denied as every sector of the population 
and society wanted to have their voices heard and some power in the government. 
Democracy was also hard to resist  if Thailand were to attain recognition in the global 
community, especially in terms of economic and trade relations. 
In other words, the ongoing political crisis since 2006 to the present has been a 
contention between the traditional power elite (the alliance between the monarchy and 
military) on the one hand and the demand of popular sovereignty on the other.
A key factor to the crisis was the deteriorating health of King Bhumibol since the 
mid-2000s. Given his unparalleled moral authority, he had been the lynchpin of royal 
democracy. The royal succession—a supposedly nonpolitical matter in a typical 
constitution monarchy like the United Kingdom and Japan—became a matter of huge 
political consequence to royal democracy. The 2014 coup was another attempt to 
secure royal democracy in the final years of King Bhumibol. 
3. The Junta Regime since the 2014 Coup
The regime of the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) or the junta 
regime after the 2014 coup was one of the fiercest and most powerful military rules in 
Thai history. Its repressive measures were swift, effective, uncompromising, and even 
brutal at times in order to disrupt or decisively eliminate all political activities for 
democracy and protest against its rule. For a few years since the coup, especially in 
the immediate months after, a large number of people throughout the country were 
summoned or temporarily detained euphemistically for “attitude adjustment.” Many 
were charged, jailed, or mired in legal problems. Freedom of expression was severely 
limited, the lese majeste law was strictly enforced, and quite a number of ordinary 
people were penalized3).  Despite the protests, condemnations and sanctions of 
various degrees from the international community, the alliance of the military and the 
monarchists was able to secure their power. As King Bhumibol passed away in 
October 2016 and the succession occurred without a glitch, the task of securing the 
royal transition was accomplished.
The NCPO rule was not smooth, although popular dissatisfaction and opposition 
never amounted to a threat against it. In particular, in the early years after the coup, it 
faced serious pressures from the international community, particularly the European 
Union and the United States, which called for the return to democracy. However, 
these pressures did not bear any results for the military regime was able to turn to 
China for support in various ways. The pressure also fizzled out as the EU and the US 
did not want to push Thailand into China’s embrace (Zawacki 2017).  
Actually, the junta regime under General Prayuth Chan-ocha since 2014 has done 
much more than securing the royalist dominance and the regnal t ransit ion. 
Veerayooth Kanchoochat and Prajak Kongkirati characterized the agenda of the 
current junta regime as “embedded military and hierarchical capitalism.” They 
summarize what the regime has done succinctly:
Politically, we indicate how the junta has embedded its power in ways different 
from the past. It does not pursue a power-sharing governance … but tries to 
militarize the cabinet, parliament, and even state-owned enterprises. The new 
constitution is designed to institutionalize the power of the military and the 
traditional elite vis-à-vis the electoral forces. … Economically, the Prayuth 
regime forms a partnership with a group of Sino-Thai conglomerates to establish 
the [scheme that] … has become a platform through which the giant f irms 
perform the leading role of ‘Big Brother’ in supervising small businesses in their 
sectors, [ref lecting] the collective endeavors of the conglomerates to replace 
competitive markets with hierarchy, rather than encouraging local firms to 
catch-up with them (Veerayooth and Prajak 2018, 279).
 
This economic strategy resulted in the growth of the top conglomerates but a 
weakening economy overall. Economic disparity accelerated during the NCPO 
regime. 
After several delays, including the rejection of one constitution draft that had taken 
a year to complete, finally, the NCPO introduced a new constitution in 2017 and 
related laws in the following year in preparation for the return to the parliamentary 
system and new elections. According to the 2017 constitution and the related laws 
(elaborated below), however, it is obvious that the junta had been trying to remain in 
power even after the election and the alleged return to democracy. As Michael 
Nelson, a keen observer of Thai politics, has put it: 
… the end of the [NCPO’s] direct rule did not mean a return to ‘democracy.’ 
Rather, it would usher in what they called a ‘transition period’ of at least five 
years. Only afterwards, people could start thinking about moving towards a 
greater degree of democracy (Nelson 2019, 3-4). 
4. The Beginning of King Rama X
 
In theory, in Thailand and elsewhere, a constitutional monarchy is above politics. In 
reality, many scholars and observers have made it clear the Thai monarchy has played 
a crucial and sometimes active role in politics (Handley 2006; Thongchai 2019).  As 
described earlier in this article, the political crisis since 2006 has been related to the 
monarchy indirectly and directly and implicitly as well as explicitly. Royal democracy 
implies the presence of the monarchy in name as well as in action. In the last twenty 
years of Bhumibol’s reign, the stature of the king grew tremendously in tandem with 
his ever increasing significance as a pillar to Thailand’s royal democracy.
The passing of Bhumibol created political anxieties that should not have been the 
case had the monarchy been truly uninvolved in politics. The anxieties related to the 
future of royal democracy and the political domination of the monarchists since the 
cult of a charismatic and beloved king was a pillar of the successful royal democracy 
(Thongchai 2019, 287-290, 301-303).  Without this kind of cult, the dominance of the 
monarchy could be in trouble. Such a cult, however, relies on the accomplishment and 
charisma of the reigning monarch. 
Since the monarchy is an institution of one person (plus his followers and networks 
who often act in his name), his personal character and attributes, words, actions and 
inactions, and even rumors about him, could affect and shape the king’s aura. 
Currently, the shadow of Bhumibol’s cult remains beneficial to the new king. Sooner 
or later, the shadow will fade away, and King Rama X will be responsible for his own 
reputation.
The first few years of Rama X have been another cause for concern. The new king 
has been active in recreating the monarchy in his vision. He reorganized and 
expanded the Office of the Royal Household in 20174).  A few old buildings in the 
palace compound were demolished, and several new ones were constructed. Huge 
areas of former crown estate that had been turned into public space for decades, 
including military bases, government offices, roads, and Bangkok’s only public zoo, 
were reclaimed by the palace5).  All crown properties, including all the assets of the 
Thai monarchy over generations, have been declared the personal property of the new 
king6).  All properties are exempt from tax. These changes were executed legally. 
Several royal customs that had ended with the absolute monarchy have been revived, 
including the official, legal appointment of the royal consort7).  What these actions tell 
us and the political community in Thailand about the king and his probable role in 
politics remains a matter of speculation. 
Nevertheless, this was one of the conditions in which the general election was held 
on March 24, 2019.
5. The March 24, 2019 Election
As mentioned above, the election may not mean the return to democracy as the 
junta, apparently, attempt to hold on to power in a different form than military rule. 
They have done so using several legal instruments. 
First, due to several restrictions and mandates in the election law, the result of the 
general election would likely produce no majority party. Thus, a weak and possibly 
fragmented coalition government is the likely outcome. 
Second, the constitution also allows a nonelected person be chosen as the prime 
minister. Given the fragmented coalition, it was expected long before the election that 
General Prayuth Chan-ocha, the head of the NPCO, would likely be chosen. 
Third, the upper house (the Senate) of the new parliament comprises of 250 
members, all of whom are all selected by the NCPO, with the majority being military 
officers. They are chosen without any election or broad-based selection criteria. 
Fourth, together with the 500 elected members of the lower house, these senators 
will take part in the selection of the prime minister. In addition, the senators serve a 
five-year term. Assuming a government lasts a full four-year term, these senators can 
choose two prime ministers.
Last but not least, the 2017 constitution mandates that every government must 
observe the “national strategic plan.” Drafted by the NPCO-appointed committee and 
approved before the election by the NPCO-appointed national assembly, the plan is 
the framework that all policies and projects by any elected government in the next 
twenty years must follow. Violations to the strategic framework could result in the 
disqualification of the government.
The March 24 election took place under these restrictions. Despite that, political 
parties and the public enthusiastically welcomed the election, as it could represent a 
fresh change of condition without severe limits to political freedom and freedom of 
expression. Many may have hoped that it would be the end of the downward spiral of 
popular democracy or the beginning of the end of the actual power of the NPCO. 
It remains to be seen if it would be the beginning of another attempt at popular 
democracy or if it is indeed the renewal of the authoritarian rule under a different 
cloak.
The election may help understand not only the future of popular democracy but also 
serve as a lens to examine the relationship between the military and the new king. 
The monarchists knew that they should not rely too heavily on the military. During 
the latter half of the reign of King Bhumbol, the military became monarchized, the 
“soldiers of the king.” The election may provide some hints about their power 
relations under the new king. The February 8, 2019 incident was significant in this 
regard as well. 
A few days earlier, the king’s elder sister, who had resigned from royalty decades 
ago to marry a foreigner, was nominated by a political party to be the candidate for 
the next prime minister. This was certainly a challenge to the NPCO’s plan for 
General Prayuth to remain the prime minister. After a few days of political 
maneuvers, on February 8, 2019, the king intervened, issuing a public statement, 
forbidding his sister from submitting herself as a candidate. The statement did not 
refer to any legal prohibition, since his sister is an ordinary citizen, legally speaking, 
and nobody counter-signed the statement8).  Regardless of these legal quandaries, as 
this happened in Thailand, the king’s statement was accepted as the final word by 
everyone. What did this incident tell us about the relationship between the palace and 
the NPCO? Unfortunately, information about the event remains inadequate for 
speculation. 
Conclusion
Even as the monarchists distrust popular sovereignty and the representative system, 
they also need “people” or popular support to bargain with the military. Meanwhile, 
the rapid ascendency of their power, especially their embeddedness in the state and 
society, suggests that the military have a vision for their eventual supremacy. They 
are here to stay for the long term, not merely as a caretaker for royal democracy and 
definitely not to return to barracks after the election. After all, they are the only 
political force with weapons, and a coup in Thailand is a relatively low-risk action 
(Mérieau 2019). 
Despite the initial popular support for the coup for the sake of peaceful and orderly 
society, people’s dissention to military authoritarianism is growing, especially in the 
past year as the economy has grown sluggish and the ruling junta has become 
shamelessly out of touch in many respects. Ordinary people, however, have no agency 
currently, other than political parties and politicians, who do not always represent 
their voice and interests. 
The political status quo under King Bhumibol meant the settlement of power 
Introduction
Even before the recent election in Thailand on March 24, 2019, Thai people and 
foreign observers alike wondered if this was simply another election in the repeated 
cycle of coups, military rule, new constitutions, and elections that end with the failure 
of democracy and the beginning of another coup. Was it another farce in Thailand’s 
political history? 
This seemingly repeating cycle of political history is a superficial observation of an 
apparent phenomenon. In fact, many elections, democratic breakthroughs, 
constitutions, and even coups and military rules, and constitutions in the past were 
meaningful in various ways in par ticular moments relating to the history of 
democratization in Thailand.
Thailand’s election on March 24, 2019 was a historic one in many respects. It was 
the first general election after almost five years of an authoritarian regime under 
military rule. It was either the beginning of another attempt at democracy or the 
renewal of the authoritarian rule under a different cloak. Perhaps it was both at the 
same time, as different political agents have attempted to push different agendas for 
the county’s future. It was also the first election and first major political event in the 
new reign of King Vajiralongkorn or Rama X.
This essay will provide the historical background and context to help understand 
the March 24, 2019 election. It looks at the election through the perspective of the 
long history of democratization in the country and within the context of Thailand’s 
ongoing political crisis since 2006 that eventually led to the 2014 coup. Then, the 
essay examines the two most important contextual factors surrounding the election; 
namely, the military regime under which the election was held and the royal 
succession and early years of King Rama X’s reign.
1. A Brief History of Democratization in Thailand
We may say summarily that the democratization process in Thailand has been a 
contest of power among three main political forces; namely, the military, the 
monarchists, and ordinary people for military rule, royalist rule, and popular 
sovereignty, respectively. Never theless, af ter nearly one hundred years of 
democratization, no single faction has achieved outright domination or sustained its 
desired regime; instead, they have had to settle for compromise or alliance with other 
forces. 
The concept of “democracy” was introduced to Siam, the former name of Thailand 
before 1939, around the turn of the twentieth century. At the time, it was simply 
dismissed by the elite of the absolute monarchy as an unsuitable idea for a country 
where people were mostly uneducated and unable to represent themselves and were 
thus content with rule by monarchy1).  Whereas the modern state and government 
were introduced by the absolute monarchy since the late nineteenth century as a 
consolidated and more efficient form of rule, the royals kept power to themselves, 
believing that only they could rule the country properly, including granting a 
democratic government from the top down at the appropriate time (Batson 1974).  
They did not realize the growing dissatisfaction with royal rule that eventually 
toppled the absolute monarchy in 1932. 
The revolutionaries—called the People’s Party—represented the rising power 
among the commoners, especially in the military, which was one of the most 
organized and developed institutions in Thai society at the time. However, the 
revolution was an “unfinished” transition (Ferrara 2015).  The monarchists kept 
t rying to return to power, not to revive the absolute monarchy, but to a new 
supremacy i n  t he  new pa rl iament a r y reg i me.  A n a l l iance be t ween t he  
nonrevolutionary army officers and the monarchists toppled the last government of 
the People’s Party in 1947 (Handley 2006, 80-89).  Then, the long period of military 
rule began.
The rocky alliance and the infighting among military factions eventually resulted 
in military rule in 1957 that groomed the young King Bhumibol (Rama IX, born 
1930; reigned 1946 and lived mostly abroad until 1951) for politics (Thak 2006, 
chapter 3).  Thanks to the Cold War, the United States joined the junta in promoting 
the monarchy as an instrument against communism (Nattapoll 2013, chapter 8).  The 
monarchy, the young Bhumibol in particular, grew in stature and popularity, as he 
worked hard to cultivate the people’s utmost loyalty. Ostensibly, the monarchy was 
“above” politics. The harder he worked beyond politics, the more his enormous moral 
authority increased politically. 
Military rule began to retreat thanks to the popular uprising for democracy in 1973. 
The monarchy took the opportunity to broker the end of violence by forcing the junta 
into exile. In doing so, the nonpolitical institution ascended to the highest authority in 
the land (albeit not a legal-political power but a moral one) and the supreme source of 
political legitimacy. Between 1973 and 1992, the tug-of-political-war and shifting 
alliances among the three political forces, including several coups, attempted coups, 
one massacre that was the most horrific in Thai history in 1976, and another uprising 
for democracy in 1992, resulted in the retreat of the military from politics, “back to 
the barracks” so to speak, and the triumph of royalist democracy (Thongchai 2008, 
15-21).  
Ostensibly, the royalist democracy in Thailand f rom 1992 to 2006 was a 
parliamentary democracy. Actually, however, it was a form of “guided democracy.” 
The elected authority was under the influence, supervision, and interference of the 
monarchists, who operated from the palace and beyond through formal mechanisms, 
such as the Privy Council, and informal networks (McCargo 2005; Thongchai 2019, 
290-300).  Every government during the time presented themselves as the government 
of the king (Chambers and Napisa 2017, chapter 1).  Furthermore, the military’s 
political and material interests were also increasingly attached to the monarchy. They 
became the “monarchized military” or “soldiers of the king.” 
The unprecedented popularity of Thaksin Shinawatra, who won landslide elections 
twice in 2001 and 2004, however, signaled the growing independence of popular 
sovereignty from the traditional ruling institutions, such as the monarchy and the 
military. Particularly in rural areas and in provinces distant from Bangkok, people 
found that the elected authority responded to their demands and interests better than 
the highly centralized and cumbersome bureaucracy. This made the elected 
authority—politicians—a threat to royalist democracy. 
2. Thailand’s Unstable Politics and the Crisis since 2006
The coup in 2006 was an attempt by the monarchists to secure their political 
dominance by curbing the growing demand for popular democracy. The monarchists 
did so by damaging all the necessary democratic institutions and components; 
namely, political parties, freedom of expression, especially the credibility and 
independence of the judiciary rule of law, and the election2).  They also brought the 
military back into politics. The discourse regarding corrupt politics was overblown, 
represented by the demonization of Thaksin. The demagoguery of Thaksin became 
the specter of royal democracy. Ultimately, only in Thailand was democracy 
considered worse than dictatorship.
The brief military rule after the 2006 coup, however, failed to stabilize the royalist 
dominance because the root of conf lict was not merely Thaksin versus the 
monarchists. Underneath the apparent political conflict was a structural change in 
relations among the three main political force with the dominance of the monarchists. 
In this macropolitical perspective, the March 24, 2019 election was the first important 
political action in the absence of the lynchpin of monarchist dominance but with the 
most powerful military since 1992. It was the first major attempt to construct the new 
power relations or the new status quo among the three forces. The election may reveal 
the shifting balance of power and may foretell possible future scenarios. 
The NCPO came to power claiming that the political and social divides had reached 
a dangerous point because of the failure of democracy and politicians. They claimed 
that Thailand urgently needed reforms of politics and many other aspects of the state 
and society. After five years of its rule, it is doubtful that the election was better 
prepared and the outcome was better or reformed Thailand politics. It is highly 
doubtful if the divides have been less acute. Some have argued that the NCPO rule 
probably made the divides more severe. The March 2019 election may ref lect the 
failure of the NCPO in this regard as well. 
However one wonders was it the failure of reform its actual success that the junta 
bore in mind when retaining power.
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Thailand’s socioeconomic and demographic structure that had occurred since the late 
1980s, in which dramatic rural transformation occurred alongside the rapid expansion 
of urbanization. Rural folks became urban dwellers in their ways of life, mentality, 
material interests, and anxieties (Somchai 2016).  The entire political landscape had 
changed because of this changing democracy (Apichat, Yukti and Niti 2013).  The 
centralized bureaucracy, however, cared more for and served the interests of the 
growing affluent middleclass in major cities, especially Bangkok. In short, Thaksin’s 
success was primarily not of his own making. He and his party responded to the 
structural changes, maximizing the opportunity for their political ascendency. 
The 2006 coup awakened Thaksin’s suppor ters throughout the country to 
understanding the politics of the monarchists. Discontent with the monarchists and 
the demand for popular democracy, therefore, remained strong, if not stronger and 
more determined (Thongchai 2014, 92-100).  Meanwhile, with committed support 
from the palace, the military’s political power expanded rapidly, like the demon that 
was released from the lamp and could not be put back. Thailand’s political crisis was 
protracted. 
Although the monarchy remained supreme throughout the crisis, its political power 
relied increasingly on the military, which was subservient to King Bhumibol. Popular 
democracy, on the other hand, could not be denied as every sector of the population 
and society wanted to have their voices heard and some power in the government. 
Democracy was also hard to resist  if Thailand were to attain recognition in the global 
community, especially in terms of economic and trade relations. 
In other words, the ongoing political crisis since 2006 to the present has been a 
contention between the traditional power elite (the alliance between the monarchy and 
military) on the one hand and the demand of popular sovereignty on the other.
A key factor to the crisis was the deteriorating health of King Bhumibol since the 
mid-2000s. Given his unparalleled moral authority, he had been the lynchpin of royal 
democracy. The royal succession—a supposedly nonpolitical matter in a typical 
constitution monarchy like the United Kingdom and Japan—became a matter of huge 
political consequence to royal democracy. The 2014 coup was another attempt to 
secure royal democracy in the final years of King Bhumibol. 
3. The Junta Regime since the 2014 Coup
The regime of the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) or the junta 
regime after the 2014 coup was one of the fiercest and most powerful military rules in 
Thai history. Its repressive measures were swift, effective, uncompromising, and even 
brutal at times in order to disrupt or decisively eliminate all political activities for 
democracy and protest against its rule. For a few years since the coup, especially in 
the immediate months after, a large number of people throughout the country were 
summoned or temporarily detained euphemistically for “attitude adjustment.” Many 
were charged, jailed, or mired in legal problems. Freedom of expression was severely 
limited, the lese majeste law was strictly enforced, and quite a number of ordinary 
people were penalized3).  Despite the protests, condemnations and sanctions of 
various degrees from the international community, the alliance of the military and the 
monarchists was able to secure their power. As King Bhumibol passed away in 
October 2016 and the succession occurred without a glitch, the task of securing the 
royal transition was accomplished.
The NCPO rule was not smooth, although popular dissatisfaction and opposition 
never amounted to a threat against it. In particular, in the early years after the coup, it 
faced serious pressures from the international community, particularly the European 
Union and the United States, which called for the return to democracy. However, 
these pressures did not bear any results for the military regime was able to turn to 
China for support in various ways. The pressure also fizzled out as the EU and the US 
did not want to push Thailand into China’s embrace (Zawacki 2017).  
Actually, the junta regime under General Prayuth Chan-ocha since 2014 has done 
much more than securing the royalist dominance and the regnal t ransit ion. 
Veerayooth Kanchoochat and Prajak Kongkirati characterized the agenda of the 
current junta regime as “embedded military and hierarchical capitalism.” They 
summarize what the regime has done succinctly:
Politically, we indicate how the junta has embedded its power in ways different 
from the past. It does not pursue a power-sharing governance … but tries to 
militarize the cabinet, parliament, and even state-owned enterprises. The new 
constitution is designed to institutionalize the power of the military and the 
traditional elite vis-à-vis the electoral forces. … Economically, the Prayuth 
regime forms a partnership with a group of Sino-Thai conglomerates to establish 
the [scheme that] … has become a platform through which the giant f irms 
perform the leading role of ‘Big Brother’ in supervising small businesses in their 
sectors, [ref lecting] the collective endeavors of the conglomerates to replace 
competitive markets with hierarchy, rather than encouraging local firms to 
catch-up with them (Veerayooth and Prajak 2018, 279).
 
This economic strategy resulted in the growth of the top conglomerates but a 
weakening economy overall. Economic disparity accelerated during the NCPO 
regime. 
After several delays, including the rejection of one constitution draft that had taken 
a year to complete, finally, the NCPO introduced a new constitution in 2017 and 
related laws in the following year in preparation for the return to the parliamentary 
system and new elections. According to the 2017 constitution and the related laws 
(elaborated below), however, it is obvious that the junta had been trying to remain in 
power even after the election and the alleged return to democracy. As Michael 
Nelson, a keen observer of Thai politics, has put it: 
… the end of the [NCPO’s] direct rule did not mean a return to ‘democracy.’ 
Rather, it would usher in what they called a ‘transition period’ of at least five 
years. Only afterwards, people could start thinking about moving towards a 
greater degree of democracy (Nelson 2019, 3-4). 
4. The Beginning of King Rama X
 
In theory, in Thailand and elsewhere, a constitutional monarchy is above politics. In 
reality, many scholars and observers have made it clear the Thai monarchy has played 
a crucial and sometimes active role in politics (Handley 2006; Thongchai 2019).  As 
described earlier in this article, the political crisis since 2006 has been related to the 
monarchy indirectly and directly and implicitly as well as explicitly. Royal democracy 
implies the presence of the monarchy in name as well as in action. In the last twenty 
years of Bhumibol’s reign, the stature of the king grew tremendously in tandem with 
his ever increasing significance as a pillar to Thailand’s royal democracy.
The passing of Bhumibol created political anxieties that should not have been the 
case had the monarchy been truly uninvolved in politics. The anxieties related to the 
future of royal democracy and the political domination of the monarchists since the 
cult of a charismatic and beloved king was a pillar of the successful royal democracy 
(Thongchai 2019, 287-290, 301-303).  Without this kind of cult, the dominance of the 
monarchy could be in trouble. Such a cult, however, relies on the accomplishment and 
charisma of the reigning monarch. 
Since the monarchy is an institution of one person (plus his followers and networks 
who often act in his name), his personal character and attributes, words, actions and 
inactions, and even rumors about him, could affect and shape the king’s aura. 
Currently, the shadow of Bhumibol’s cult remains beneficial to the new king. Sooner 
or later, the shadow will fade away, and King Rama X will be responsible for his own 
reputation.
The first few years of Rama X have been another cause for concern. The new king 
has been active in recreating the monarchy in his vision. He reorganized and 
expanded the Office of the Royal Household in 20174).  A few old buildings in the 
palace compound were demolished, and several new ones were constructed. Huge 
areas of former crown estate that had been turned into public space for decades, 
including military bases, government offices, roads, and Bangkok’s only public zoo, 
were reclaimed by the palace5).  All crown properties, including all the assets of the 
Thai monarchy over generations, have been declared the personal property of the new 
king6).  All properties are exempt from tax. These changes were executed legally. 
Several royal customs that had ended with the absolute monarchy have been revived, 
including the official, legal appointment of the royal consort7).  What these actions tell 
us and the political community in Thailand about the king and his probable role in 
politics remains a matter of speculation. 
Nevertheless, this was one of the conditions in which the general election was held 
on March 24, 2019.
5. The March 24, 2019 Election
As mentioned above, the election may not mean the return to democracy as the 
junta, apparently, attempt to hold on to power in a different form than military rule. 
They have done so using several legal instruments. 
First, due to several restrictions and mandates in the election law, the result of the 
general election would likely produce no majority party. Thus, a weak and possibly 
fragmented coalition government is the likely outcome. 
Second, the constitution also allows a nonelected person be chosen as the prime 
minister. Given the fragmented coalition, it was expected long before the election that 
General Prayuth Chan-ocha, the head of the NPCO, would likely be chosen. 
Third, the upper house (the Senate) of the new parliament comprises of 250 
members, all of whom are all selected by the NCPO, with the majority being military 
officers. They are chosen without any election or broad-based selection criteria. 
Fourth, together with the 500 elected members of the lower house, these senators 
will take part in the selection of the prime minister. In addition, the senators serve a 
five-year term. Assuming a government lasts a full four-year term, these senators can 
choose two prime ministers.
Last but not least, the 2017 constitution mandates that every government must 
observe the “national strategic plan.” Drafted by the NPCO-appointed committee and 
approved before the election by the NPCO-appointed national assembly, the plan is 
the framework that all policies and projects by any elected government in the next 
twenty years must follow. Violations to the strategic framework could result in the 
disqualification of the government.
The March 24 election took place under these restrictions. Despite that, political 
parties and the public enthusiastically welcomed the election, as it could represent a 
fresh change of condition without severe limits to political freedom and freedom of 
expression. Many may have hoped that it would be the end of the downward spiral of 
popular democracy or the beginning of the end of the actual power of the NPCO. 
It remains to be seen if it would be the beginning of another attempt at popular 
democracy or if it is indeed the renewal of the authoritarian rule under a different 
cloak.
The election may help understand not only the future of popular democracy but also 
serve as a lens to examine the relationship between the military and the new king. 
The monarchists knew that they should not rely too heavily on the military. During 
the latter half of the reign of King Bhumbol, the military became monarchized, the 
“soldiers of the king.” The election may provide some hints about their power 
relations under the new king. The February 8, 2019 incident was significant in this 
regard as well. 
A few days earlier, the king’s elder sister, who had resigned from royalty decades 
ago to marry a foreigner, was nominated by a political party to be the candidate for 
the next prime minister. This was certainly a challenge to the NPCO’s plan for 
General Prayuth to remain the prime minister. After a few days of political 
maneuvers, on February 8, 2019, the king intervened, issuing a public statement, 
forbidding his sister from submitting herself as a candidate. The statement did not 
refer to any legal prohibition, since his sister is an ordinary citizen, legally speaking, 
and nobody counter-signed the statement8).  Regardless of these legal quandaries, as 
this happened in Thailand, the king’s statement was accepted as the final word by 
everyone. What did this incident tell us about the relationship between the palace and 
the NPCO? Unfortunately, information about the event remains inadequate for 
speculation. 
Conclusion
Even as the monarchists distrust popular sovereignty and the representative system, 
they also need “people” or popular support to bargain with the military. Meanwhile, 
the rapid ascendency of their power, especially their embeddedness in the state and 
society, suggests that the military have a vision for their eventual supremacy. They 
are here to stay for the long term, not merely as a caretaker for royal democracy and 
definitely not to return to barracks after the election. After all, they are the only 
political force with weapons, and a coup in Thailand is a relatively low-risk action 
(Mérieau 2019). 
Despite the initial popular support for the coup for the sake of peaceful and orderly 
society, people’s dissention to military authoritarianism is growing, especially in the 
past year as the economy has grown sluggish and the ruling junta has become 
shamelessly out of touch in many respects. Ordinary people, however, have no agency 
currently, other than political parties and politicians, who do not always represent 
their voice and interests. 
The political status quo under King Bhumibol meant the settlement of power 
Introduction
Even before the recent election in Thailand on March 24, 2019, Thai people and 
foreign observers alike wondered if this was simply another election in the repeated 
cycle of coups, military rule, new constitutions, and elections that end with the failure 
of democracy and the beginning of another coup. Was it another farce in Thailand’s 
political history? 
This seemingly repeating cycle of political history is a superficial observation of an 
apparent phenomenon. In fact, many elections, democratic breakthroughs, 
constitutions, and even coups and military rules, and constitutions in the past were 
meaningful in various ways in par ticular moments relating to the history of 
democratization in Thailand.
Thailand’s election on March 24, 2019 was a historic one in many respects. It was 
the first general election after almost five years of an authoritarian regime under 
military rule. It was either the beginning of another attempt at democracy or the 
renewal of the authoritarian rule under a different cloak. Perhaps it was both at the 
same time, as different political agents have attempted to push different agendas for 
the county’s future. It was also the first election and first major political event in the 
new reign of King Vajiralongkorn or Rama X.
This essay will provide the historical background and context to help understand 
the March 24, 2019 election. It looks at the election through the perspective of the 
long history of democratization in the country and within the context of Thailand’s 
ongoing political crisis since 2006 that eventually led to the 2014 coup. Then, the 
essay examines the two most important contextual factors surrounding the election; 
namely, the military regime under which the election was held and the royal 
succession and early years of King Rama X’s reign.
1. A Brief History of Democratization in Thailand
We may say summarily that the democratization process in Thailand has been a 
contest of power among three main political forces; namely, the military, the 
monarchists, and ordinary people for military rule, royalist rule, and popular 
sovereignty, respectively. Never theless, af ter nearly one hundred years of 
democratization, no single faction has achieved outright domination or sustained its 
desired regime; instead, they have had to settle for compromise or alliance with other 
forces. 
The concept of “democracy” was introduced to Siam, the former name of Thailand 
before 1939, around the turn of the twentieth century. At the time, it was simply 
dismissed by the elite of the absolute monarchy as an unsuitable idea for a country 
where people were mostly uneducated and unable to represent themselves and were 
thus content with rule by monarchy1).  Whereas the modern state and government 
were introduced by the absolute monarchy since the late nineteenth century as a 
consolidated and more efficient form of rule, the royals kept power to themselves, 
believing that only they could rule the country properly, including granting a 
democratic government from the top down at the appropriate time (Batson 1974).  
They did not realize the growing dissatisfaction with royal rule that eventually 
toppled the absolute monarchy in 1932. 
The revolutionaries—called the People’s Party—represented the rising power 
among the commoners, especially in the military, which was one of the most 
organized and developed institutions in Thai society at the time. However, the 
revolution was an “unfinished” transition (Ferrara 2015).  The monarchists kept 
t rying to return to power, not to revive the absolute monarchy, but to a new 
supremacy i n  t he  new pa rl iament a r y reg i me.  A n a l l iance be t ween t he  
nonrevolutionary army officers and the monarchists toppled the last government of 
the People’s Party in 1947 (Handley 2006, 80-89).  Then, the long period of military 
rule began.
The rocky alliance and the infighting among military factions eventually resulted 
in military rule in 1957 that groomed the young King Bhumibol (Rama IX, born 
1930; reigned 1946 and lived mostly abroad until 1951) for politics (Thak 2006, 
chapter 3).  Thanks to the Cold War, the United States joined the junta in promoting 
the monarchy as an instrument against communism (Nattapoll 2013, chapter 8).  The 
monarchy, the young Bhumibol in particular, grew in stature and popularity, as he 
worked hard to cultivate the people’s utmost loyalty. Ostensibly, the monarchy was 
“above” politics. The harder he worked beyond politics, the more his enormous moral 
authority increased politically. 
Military rule began to retreat thanks to the popular uprising for democracy in 1973. 
The monarchy took the opportunity to broker the end of violence by forcing the junta 
into exile. In doing so, the nonpolitical institution ascended to the highest authority in 
the land (albeit not a legal-political power but a moral one) and the supreme source of 
political legitimacy. Between 1973 and 1992, the tug-of-political-war and shifting 
alliances among the three political forces, including several coups, attempted coups, 
one massacre that was the most horrific in Thai history in 1976, and another uprising 
for democracy in 1992, resulted in the retreat of the military from politics, “back to 
the barracks” so to speak, and the triumph of royalist democracy (Thongchai 2008, 
15-21).  
Ostensibly, the royalist democracy in Thailand f rom 1992 to 2006 was a 
parliamentary democracy. Actually, however, it was a form of “guided democracy.” 
The elected authority was under the influence, supervision, and interference of the 
monarchists, who operated from the palace and beyond through formal mechanisms, 
such as the Privy Council, and informal networks (McCargo 2005; Thongchai 2019, 
290-300).  Every government during the time presented themselves as the government 
of the king (Chambers and Napisa 2017, chapter 1).  Furthermore, the military’s 
political and material interests were also increasingly attached to the monarchy. They 
became the “monarchized military” or “soldiers of the king.” 
The unprecedented popularity of Thaksin Shinawatra, who won landslide elections 
twice in 2001 and 2004, however, signaled the growing independence of popular 
sovereignty from the traditional ruling institutions, such as the monarchy and the 
military. Particularly in rural areas and in provinces distant from Bangkok, people 
found that the elected authority responded to their demands and interests better than 
the highly centralized and cumbersome bureaucracy. This made the elected 
authority—politicians—a threat to royalist democracy. 
2. Thailand’s Unstable Politics and the Crisis since 2006
The coup in 2006 was an attempt by the monarchists to secure their political 
dominance by curbing the growing demand for popular democracy. The monarchists 
did so by damaging all the necessary democratic institutions and components; 
namely, political parties, freedom of expression, especially the credibility and 
independence of the judiciary rule of law, and the election2).  They also brought the 
military back into politics. The discourse regarding corrupt politics was overblown, 
represented by the demonization of Thaksin. The demagoguery of Thaksin became 
the specter of royal democracy. Ultimately, only in Thailand was democracy 
considered worse than dictatorship.
The brief military rule after the 2006 coup, however, failed to stabilize the royalist 
dominance because the root of conf lict was not merely Thaksin versus the 
monarchists. Underneath the apparent political conflict was a structural change in 
relations among the three main political force with the dominance of the monarchists. 
In this macropolitical perspective, the March 24, 2019 election was the first important 
political action in the absence of the lynchpin of monarchist dominance but with the 
most powerful military since 1992. It was the first major attempt to construct the new 
power relations or the new status quo among the three forces. The election may reveal 
the shifting balance of power and may foretell possible future scenarios. 
The NCPO came to power claiming that the political and social divides had reached 
a dangerous point because of the failure of democracy and politicians. They claimed 
that Thailand urgently needed reforms of politics and many other aspects of the state 
and society. After five years of its rule, it is doubtful that the election was better 
prepared and the outcome was better or reformed Thailand politics. It is highly 
doubtful if the divides have been less acute. Some have argued that the NCPO rule 
probably made the divides more severe. The March 2019 election may ref lect the 
failure of the NCPO in this regard as well. 
However one wonders was it the failure of reform its actual success that the junta 
bore in mind when retaining power.
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